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This dissertation studies the incidence of aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation and 
theory-choice on the development of science. It suggests that scientific communities 
customarily appeal to two sets of criteria of theory-evaluation in choosing between 
competing theories. Criteria of the first set are logico-empirical in nature and are 
indicative of the observational success of the theories to which they are applied: such 
criteria refer to such features of theories as their logical consistency and predictive 
accuracy. Criteria of the second set, which have hitherto received far less attention in 
philosophy of science, are aesthetic in nature and not indicative of theories' empirical 
success; they refer to such features of theories as the form of their simplicity or of their 
symmetry: 
The dissertation suggests that the mode of perception under which criteria of the 
latter set are applied to scientific theories is a mode of disinterested perception, which 
has no regard for the utilitarian virtues of theories. The conception of the mode of 
aesthetic perception as disinterested is retraced to its eighteenth-century formulations in 
the works of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as well as to some of its twentieth-century 
proponents. 
A model of the evoiution of aesthetic canons of theory-evaluation is proposed, 
which suggests that the aesthetic evaluative criteria applied by scientists to their theories 
are updated to reflect the aesthetic features of past theories which have demonstrated 
striking empirical success. 
These elements of scientific methodology are lastly used to construct a new 
interpretation of the notion of scientific revolution, as a discontinuous exchange of one 
aesthetic canon for another. This construal allows the belief in the occurrence of 
revolutionary discontinuities in scientific methodology to be meshed with a realist and 
rationalist view of the history of science. 
The dissertation contains studies of four episodes in history of science in which 
the operation of aesthetic criteria of theory-assessment may be discerned. These episodes 
consist of the formulation and early reception of the astronomical theories of Copernicus 
and Kepler, of the theory of special relativity, and of theoretical elements of quantum 
mechanics .. 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
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entirety my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done 
in collaboration with others. It does not exceed 80,000 words in length. 
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thank Dr Nicholas Jardine and Prof. Mary B. Hesse of the Department of History 
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of the period of my registration supervised my research. 
For financial support in aid of this work I thank the British Academy, Jesus 
College and Darwin College, Cambridge, and the electors to the Gerstenberg 
Studentship, University of Cambridge. 
Earlier versions of some of the arguments pursued here were presented in 
March 1987 at a seminar at the Department of History of the Universite de 
Montreal and in October 1988 at a seminar at the Department of History and 
Philosophy of Science at King's College, London. I am grateful to the participants 
at both seminars for their attention and comments. A brief published version of 
some of the conclusions reached here will appear under the title 'Truth and 
Beauty in Scientific Reason' in Synthese, 1989. 
iii 
James W. McAllister 
Darwin College, Cambridge 
Chapter One 
THEMES AND PROCEDURES 
Beauty. Publish this surely, beautiful!1 
Robert Millikan 
1. Two problems for the rationalist image 
An exhaustive description of scientific methodology which renders full justice to 
its historical, disciplinary and sheer idiosyncratic variability is a fond 
philosophical desideratum which it has so far proved impossible to construct. 
While awaiting its completion, a partial understanding of scientific method is 
attained by appeal to a set of partial models each of which accounts reasonably 
well for some facet or other of the explanandum. 
The models which compose this set fall into a hierarchy of generality. The 
models at the top of the structure attempt to account for the most general 
components of scientific method or for the broadest sweep of the history of 
science, but are insufficiently detailed to provide explanations of individual 
elements of each. Models of lower generality account for single methodological 
precepts or isolated episodes in the historical development of science, but are of 
little aid to an understanding of the large-scale properties of the enterprise. 
The greatest explanatory satisfaction is obtained if the models which 
compose this set are mutually consistent, so that a glance down the hierarchical 
structure permits the observer to retain conceptual continuity while homing in 
from the widest view to the smallest detail of the object of study. 
One of the most influential of the models at the top level of this hierarchy 
has been the rationalist image of science. This model supposes that there exists a 
set of methodological precepts - the norms of rationality - which admits of some 
Cited in Holton (1978), p. 67; emphasis in the original. This remark, inscribed in Millikan's laboratory notebook, is his reaction at some of the data collected in March 1912 in the oil-drop experiments to determine the electronic charge. The page of Millikan's notebook on which the remark appears is reproduced ibid., p. 64; for further information on the experiments and comments on the methodological implications of Millikan's remark see ibid., pp. 25-83. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THEMES AND PROCEDURES 
impartial and extra-historical justification, against which the actual methodology 
followed by scientists in history can be compared, and from which this actual 
methodology did not too persistently or too greatly depart. Many philosophers of 
science believe that this is a valuable top-level model of scientific method because, 
among other reasons, there exists a large number of lower-level models which are 
consistent with it and which provide explanations of reasonably good quality for 
individual facets of scientific method or particular episodes of the history of 
science. 
In recent years however considerable support has been gained by two 
explanatory models at a lower level of the hierarchy which seem to be 
incompatible with the rationalist image of science. This development constitutes a 
challenge to the rationalist image, since it may presage the day in which another 
top-level model of scientific method is preferred to the rationalist image on 
account of its greater consonance with popular lower-level models. 
Of the two models now in apparent conflict with the rationalist image, the 
first - which has been elaborated in considerable detail and which poses the 
greater challenge - claims that the past development of science has been fractured 
by revolutions into distinct epochs adhering to norms of theory-formulation and 
theory-evaluation peculiar to each and not altogether shared by adjacent periods. 
The second model, of which only elements have hitherto been delineated and 
which thus mounts the less well-studied threat to the rationaljst image, claims 
that in the history of science many important acts of theory-evaluation and 
theory-choice have been decided partly on grounds which related not to the 
observational success of theories but rather to their aesthetic features.2 On this 
claim, the development of science over centuries - which is itself no more than 
the effect of a sequence of acts of theory-choice - is shaped partly by aesthetic 
considerations and not entirely by calculations of empirical success. 
Each o~ these lower-level models appears to undermine the viability of the 
rationalist image as the top-level model for scientific methodology, by suggesting 
that important components of either a systematic or a historicist description of 
that methodology would conflict with presuppositions held by the rationalist 
image. The first of the lower-level models described above suggests that over the 
course of past science theory-formulation and evaluation have been justified by 
2 The expression of a low-level model of scientific method which advances this claim is contained, for example, in Dirac (1963), pp. 46-7, an article which is widely known among both scientists and those in science studies. Many other partial 
models of scientific method which appeal to aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation 
will be cited in the chapters to follow. 
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appeal to an indefinitely large number of different canons of rationality, and 
furthermore that there exist no grounds upon which to confer privilege to any 
one of these canons as a basis for a reconstruction of the developments in science 
in periods other than the one in which appeal to that canon was customarily 
made. The second model suggests that choices among theories have furthermore 
commonly been influenced by scientists' preferences in the matter of the aesthetic 
features of the theories with which they were presented. If these predispositions 
of scientists are as idiosyncratic and irreducible to rational deliberation as they are 
generally and tacitly supposed to be by those who discuss the incidence of 
aesthetic considerations in theory-evaluation, the historical development of science 
surely escapes the explanations proposed for it by the rationalist image. 
The present work aims to establish that, while both these lower-level 
models of scientific methodology are to a large measure valid, their validity does 
not compel the abandonment of the rationalist image as the top-level model in 
the hierarchy. Indeed, this work will attempt to show how under the rationalist 
image of science can be accommodated both the belief that the methodological 
canons of science have undergone radical and sudden transformations, and the 
belief that aesthetic considerations lie among the grounds on which scientific 
communities have chosen between competing theories. To this end it will be 
necessary to contribute to the development of the two lower-level models which 
initially appear incompatible with the rationalist image of science. Among the 
tasks of the present work are thus the elucidation of the concept of the 
methodological revolution in science and the study of scientists' practice of 
aesthetic theory-evaluation. Furthermore, since there is a conceptual 
interdependence between models at lower levels of the hierarchy and the top-
level model which claims consistency with them, the very act of contributing to 
the development of the lower-level models will tend to alter the model at the top. 
The present . work will thus lend a certain new gloss to the rationalist image: its 
outcome will consist of elements of a rationalist model of science which 
nonetheless allows the occurrence of revolutionary changes in methodological 
canons and reserves a distinctive role to aesthetic <;onsiderations in theory-choice. 
It was remarked above that the models of scientific revolution currently 
circulating in the philosophical community have attained a degree of 
sophistication considerably greater than that of any available model of the 
practice of aesthetic theory-evaluation in science. The latter practice thus calls for 
3 
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more study than does the former.3 Furthermore, the alterations which the present 
treatment intends to impose to the commonly-accepted model of scientific 
revolution derive from the model which it will construct of the practice of 
aesthetic theory-evaluation. In consequence, the bulk of the following treatment 
will be devoted to a construction of a model of the practice of theory-evaluation 
on aesthetic grounds in science; the incidence of this model upon notions of 
revolutionary discontinuities in science will be studied in chapter 8, and the final 
chapter will show the relevance of these conclusions to the rationalist image. 
Before this enterprise is joined, it is necessary to set out some of the 
methodological presuppositions by which it will be guided. This will be achieved 
in the remainder of the present chapter. 
2. Mutual evaluations of science and philosophy 
History and philosophy constituted according to logical positivism 
complementary but quite separate approaches to the study of science: on this 
view the historian sought to construct an accurate and well-supported description 
of actual scientific practice whilst the philosopher issued a normative, evaluational 
and largely a priori account of how science ought to proceed. A pecking-order of 
the disciplines was thus erected. Philosophers occupied the prescriptive high 
ground from which to test and evaluate scientists' beliefs and methodologies, as 
these · had been described by historians; but philosophical theories concerning 
science were believed subject to no countervailing evaluation, since philosophy -
it was argued - was not an empirical discipline and did not therefore depend 
upon the accuracy of factual beliefs about science. The extent to which actual 
science departed from the philosophers' rational reconstructions was interpreted 
as a measure not of the misunderstanding of science by philosophers but on the 
3 The current need for further study of the practice of aesthetic theory-evaluation is 
sensed for instance by Barrow in a review of a book of Dyson's which describes the 
appeals by Dirac and other scientists who are - in the author's expression -
'unifiers' to considerations of beauty in theory-assessment. Barrow finds Dyson's 
remarks unsatisfying (1988, p. 1,392): 'Missing from the argument [ ... ] is [ ... ] why 
there is a peculiar tendency for scientists who are unifiers to hypostatize the notion 
of "beauty'' in their mathematical equations. Is Dirac saying anything sensible about 
aesthetics when he argues that it is of paramount importance to have ''beauty" in 
one's equations, or is he merely revealing a rather limited personal experience and 
appreciation of things other than equations?' In chafter 5 and elsewhere below, a 
rationale for Dirac's appeals to beauty in the appraisa of theories will be offered. 
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contrary of the shortcomings of real, imperfect and messy science by comparison 
with its ideal form of which the features were philosophically stipulated. 
Of course this view has in recent years been heavily criticized by among 
others T.S. Kuhn, I. Lakatos and L. Laudan. Whilst granting that the aim of the 
philosophy of science is in part the generation of a set of norms by which to 
evaluate scientific theories, such critics envisage also a countervailing evaluation 
of philosophical theories in the light of scientific practice. After all, argues 
Laudan, we possess an intuitive grasp - bequeathed by a low-level acquaintance 
with the history of science - of what constitutes paradigmatically successful 
science, and a philosophical reconstruction of the discipline should render justice 
to this apprehension.' Philosophical systems are consequently subject to 
judgements based on historical data. We should reject an account of for instance 
the methodology of theory-assessment which construed as unscientific many acts 
of theory-choice in periods of the history of physics or biology in which, we 
intuitively believe, those disciplines were scientifically successful. 
Philosophy and science thus lie in an evaluative dosed circle. On the one 
hand philosophy of science holds a normative import for scientific practice and 
can therefore evaluate competing scientific theories by reference to their 
philosophical features (e.g. their logical structure or their use of conceptual 
elements such as hypotheses or empirical data); on the other hand data from the 
historical narrative of scientific practice exercises an evidential role in philosophy 
of science and may militate for or against competing philosophical theories about 
science by supporting or undermining their claim to depict actual science.5 
The philosophy of science is by no means the sole branch of philosophical 
· enquiry in which theories of a prima facie normative nature are evaluated by 
reference to data from an empirical source: such an evidential relation is 
encountered whenever philosophical speculation attempts to reconstruct an extant 
practice. An empirically-based evaluation of a philosophical theory similar to 
those performed in the philosophy of science is met by moral or political 
philosophers in, say, initial attempts to elucidate the notion of 'justice'. In the 
Republic of Plato, the first definition of 'justice' proposed by Cephalus is 'telling 
" 
5 
Laudan (1977), p. 160. 
For a further discussion of these issues see McAllister (1986), pp. 315-8. That 
philosophical reconstructions ought to bear some resemblance to historical accounts 
of science is conceded even by Giere (1973), who distinguishes himself in the 
discussion of this problem by his wish to deny any relevance of historical data to 
the philosophy of science. 
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the truth and paying back anything we may have received'.6 Socrates criticizes 
this suggestion as inadequate, putting forth an example of an act which falls 
within the proposed definition but which, he alleges, is ruled to be 'unjust' by the 
intuitive notion of 'justice' shared by all the interlocutors: if a friend who left with 
me a weapon has since gone mad, the act of returning the weapon to its owner, 
whilst in accordance with the proposed definition of Cephalus, would be unjust.7 
Since candidate-definitions of 'justice' are ostensibly prescriptive, aiming at 
governing human conduct, it is a matter of some initial mystery why a proposed 
version of that definition should be vulnerable to the observation that a certain 
human action would fall within or without it. _ The answer is that attempts to 
define 'justice' aim in part to account for existing practice, to which Socrates here 
refers. 
Criticism of this kind establishes alongside the logicist analysis of science 
performed by philosophy tout simple (most brilliantly by the logical positivist 
school) a historicist reconstruction erected by a compound discipline of history 
and philosophy of science, or HPS. The difference between these two approaches 
to the study of science lies in the role reserved therein to historiographic 
evidence. The only role open to historical data in purely philosophical analyses of 
science is that of exemplification: philosophical disputes cannot, presumably, be 
decided by data on what as a matter of fact transpired in historical episodes. 
Issues raised in HPS are on the contrary in principle susceptible of decision by 
historical evidence. 
The pursuit of the conjoined discipline of HPS appears at first blush to 
initiate an infinite judgemental regress. Under the tenets of logical positivism, the 
task of selecting a philosophical standpoint from which to assess the relative 
merits of scientific theories was conceptually independent of any features of those 
or of any other actual theories and could therefore in principle be completed 
before any investigation was undertaken of the vicissitudes of actual science; in 
other terms, it was logically possible to perfect one's philosophy of science before 
embarking on the study of its practice or history. In the light of the more recent 
criticism such a project appears nonsensical: the construction of a philosophy of 
science has now come to depend to a certain extent upon an empirical input from 
the history of science concerning the features of successful or representative 
6 
7 
Republic, 331c (Cornford ed. 1968, p. 7). My attention was drawn to this passage by H.I. Brown (1977, p. 133), who however uses the illustration to different effect. 
Ibid. In the face of this criticism Cephalus withdraws the definition which he proposed. 
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scientific theories. Here is initiated the regress: for in turn how is one to assess 
which such theories are indeed representative or successful - and thus warrant 
consideration in the process of constructing one's philosophy of science - without 
a prior philosophy from the standpoint of which to perform the judgement? 
The circle is not as vicious as may at first glance appear. The solution is 
plainly that history and philosophy of science are now to be considered no longer 
separate disciplines but rather a single unified field which accomplishes its 
evaluations by a recursive effort in which subsequent assessments of 
philosophical and scientific theories are mutually corrected and perfected. The 
question does not arise of which of the two disciplines is logically prior and is 
therefore subject to being completed without recourse to the other, since we have 
here not two but a single disciplinary approach to science. 8 
The work which follows locates itself within the conjoined discipline of 
HPS described in this section rather than in the tradition of logicist investigations 
of scientific method. As a consequence, historical evidence is deemed in this work 
to possess an evidential and evaluative role rather than to be a mere source of 
exemplification. This stipulation helps to explain why the treatment should devote 
so much space to material culled from historiographic sources whilst being in 
principle a work in philosophy of science: the historical evidence marshalled in 
chapter 10 and elsewhere has in this treatment the power of contributing to 
decide the degree of validity to be attributed to the philosophical theses contained 
herein. 
3. The value of scientists' testimony 
In tracing the progressive evaluative circle of which the previous section speaks, 
historically-informed philosophers of science have customarily looked to so-called 
rational reconstructions as the source of historiographic tests of their conclusions. 
A rational reconstruction is an account of some - preferably - commonly-known 
and non-controversial historical episode which makes crucial use of the 
conceptual apparatus of the philosophical thesis under test. The intention is that 
the degree to which the rational reconstruction accords with what is known about 
8 A survey of the debate on the relationship between philosophy of science and 
historical evidence is contained in Losee (1987), passim. 
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the episode independently of the claims of the thesis - and this includes what is 
known 'pre-analytically' about the episode - should be translated into empirical 
support for the philosophical thesis.9 
On the other hand, philosophers of science have tended to recoil from 
enlisting in support of their views about the manner in which science has 
progressed the statements on this topic of scientists themselves. Even if a certain 
scientist's description of the manner in which · a piece of research had been 
undertaken or an inference drawn happened to accord with the philosophically-
informed description of this episode proposed by a given thesis in philosophy of 
science, in the view of many philosophers that testimony cannot be allowed to 
count as evidence in support of the thesis. The reason for ruling such prima facie 
evidence as inadmissible is the fear that scientists may constitute unreliable 
witnesses about their own and their colleagues' actions: to study scientific 
method, the motto runs, one ought to examine what scientists do rather than 
what they say that they do.10 
The present treatment recognizes the sagacity of scrutinizing the degree of 
reliability of items of historiographic evidence which are adduced in support of a 
thesis in philosophy of science from whatever source these items may derive; but 
it does not entirely share the special and further fears about the use in evidence 
of scientists' testimony which are outlined in the previous paragraph. In fact, this 
treatment will at several junctures appeal to scientists' testimony - as well as to 
the rational reconstructions contained in chapter 10 - in support of its claims 
about scientific method. Since this practice perhaps departs from the usual mode 
of argument in the discipline, some remarks in its defence are required. Two 
justifications for a limited appeal to scientists' testimony in support of 
philosophical theses are here envisaged. 
First, the evaluative circle which was described in the previous section and 
which constitutes a common mode of progress in the discipline of HPS is to a 
certain extent susceptible to the danger of excessive conservatism. Consider the 
operation of the evaluative circle in a particular hypothetical scenario. If the 
discipline of HPS were to witness a run of philosophical theories about scientific 
method which did not admit the occurrence of a certain class of phenomena in 
9 
10 
Some further discussion of rational reconstructions will be pursued in the following 
chapter. 
Some of the doubts on the reliability of scientists' pronouncements are motivated by 
the growing understanding of their rhetorical purposes: representative studies of 
this aspect of the methodological statements of scientists are contained in Schuster 
and Yeo eds (1986). 
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scientific practice, it is likely that an increasing proportion of histories of science 
would then come to be written which, influenced by the philosophical consensus, 
would suppress or fail to perceive the historiographic evidence which suggested 
the occurrence of phenomena of that class. A growing degree of eminence would 
most likely come to be attached within the discipline to the historiographic model 
encapsulated in those treatises which omits mention of that particular class of 
phenomena of scientific practice. Then the rational reconstructions of episodes of 
history to which philosophers appealed in support of their claims would in tum 
tend to fall under the influence of what would be seen as the historiographic 
consensus about past science: the continuing development of the philosophy of 
science would further be insulated from evidence of the occurrence of the 
phenomena which had previously been ignored. 
While this tendency in the pursuit of the discipline of HPS does not 
amount to a strict vicious circle - in that a new historiographic finding or an 
innovation in philosophical thinking can at any moment recall the attention of the 
community upon the previously-neglected class of phenomena - it can needlessly 
and damagingly limit the scope of studies in the discipline. This limitation is 
evaded most easily by appealing to a body of historiographic evidence which lies 
outside the evaluative circle established in the discipline, which has not already 
been stripped of unfamiliar suggestions by the operation of the circle, and which 
may therefore force upon the awareness of the community a new range of 
phenomena to be investigated. Appeal to historiographic evidence in forms other 
than the currently popular rational reconstructions can therefore alert the 
· community to the occurrence of previously unsuspected or neglected phenomena 
in scientific practice. Among the items of historiographic evidence which can 
exercise this role is, notably, the reported testimony of scientists. 
When used to this end, scientists' testimony is a body of evidence apt to 
suggest that _the scope of philosophical or historical enquiry about science be 
widened to embrace the study of some aspect of or phenomenon in scientific 
practice which has been neglected by the evaluative circle composed of successive 
rational reconstructions. The suitability of scientists' testimony to attain this end 
constitutes a powerful justification for its use by studies in HPS. Once the scope 
of the inquiry has been broadened on the suggestion of scientists' testimony, the 
philosopher may return to customary methods for constructing theories about 
science, and appeal to rational reconstructions of episodes of history to gauge the 
validity of the theories which result. Since in this usage scientists' testimony plays 
primarily a suggestive rather than validational role, any misrepresentation of 
9 
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scientific practice which it may contain is not necessarily reflected. in the theories 
embraced. about science by philosophers, if these are properly tested by appeal to 
rational reconstructions. 
The present work will deploy historiographic data in the form of scientists' 
testimony as evidence for the claim that the appeal in certain contexts to aesthetic 
considerations form a customary part of scientific practice, and are hence a proper 
object of study by the philosopher. The reason for appealing to scientists' 
methodological pronouncements to this end is the wish to break the tacit 
consensus in current writing in the philosophy of science that aesthetic 
considerations are of precious little interest in the construction of a rational image 
of science. Where aesthetic criteria have been mentioned. in recent work in 
philosophy of science, their incidence has generally been confined. to the domain 
of theory-formulation, as will be shown in chapter 5; in any case, the criteria to 
which a scientist has appealed. have generally been supposed. to have been 
peculiar to him or her and not the expression of a methodological norm 
entrenched in· a social practice. In consequence, aesthetic considerations have 
generally been considered. unimportant to the elucidation of the nature of 
scientific rationality. 
Under the operation of an evaluative circle of the kind mentioned. above, 
current influential works in the historiography of science have conformed. to this 
tacit philosophical consensus: today historians' mention of aesthetic 
predispositions is confined. to biographical history, playing little or no part in the 
project of reconstructing the large-scale behaviour of scientific communities in, 
say, instances of theory-choice. In the face of the seeming consensus on the part 
of historians and philosophers to ignore as irrelevant the aesthetic predispositions 
of scientists in theory-choice, appeal to scientists' testimony directly rather than 
through the mediation of professional historians may serve to alert historians and 
philosophers. to the need to broaden the scope of their models of science and 
reserve a place of greater importance than has hitherto been common to the study 
of the aesthetic considerations which figure in scientific practice. 
The second justification for the appeal to scientists' testimony which is 
envisaged. here has less force, and seeks to suggest that this form of 
historiographic evidence is prima fade no less worthy of consideration than are 
historiographic data accessed. in the form of a rational reconstruction. 
Section 1 of · this chapter suggested. that the attempt to reduce scientific 
methodology to · comprehension is pursued by erecting a hierarchy of partial 
models of science, each of which accounts for some aspect of scientific practice 
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and the conjunction of which possesses some high degree of internal consistency. 
Rational reconstructions of episodes of the history of science can most aptly take 
their place in this hierarchy, since such reconstructions are just models of the 
episodes to which they are associated .. But the methodological pronouncement of 
a scientist, which contains the scientist's own description of his or her actions at a 
historical juncture, is similarly a partial model of the history of science. For sure, 
the scope of the model constituted by the rational reconstruction may be much 
broader than that of the model constituted by the scientist's memoir, in that the 
former may purport to account for each member of a large set of historical 
episodes while the scientist may have uttered a statement intended to pertain to 
no more than a singular event; but the scenario envisaged in section 1 is that of a 
hierarchy of models of varying scope, so a hierarchy in which some of the models 
have a scope broader or even much broader than that of others is just what one 
would hope to assemble. The conclusion which this comparison supports is that 
rational reconstructions of historical episodes on the one hand and the 
descriptions of scientific methodology uttered by scientists on the other are 
eiusdem generis in being bodies of historiographic data to which an initial 
theoretical interpretation has been lent. Provided that the cautions which are used 
in approaching rational reconstructions are used also in the reading of scientists' 
testimony, the latter is in principle a no less useful source of historiographic data 
than are the former. 11 
11 For further discussion of the value of scientists' methodological testimony see Kragh (1987), pp. 150-8. 
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THE STIPULATION OF METHODOLOGICAL NORMS 
1. War games and the philosophy of science 
Many who are not otherwise militaristic tum for recreation to war games, in 
which model armies are commanded into battle on gameboards by contestants 
subject to regulations. The rules lend structure to the game by setting constraints 
upon the range of actions permitted of the players, by imposing upon them a 
tactical canon. This canon may be explicitly demanded, through the prescription 
to the players of specific deliberative formulae, or implicitly promoted, perhaps 
by suitably defining the imagined performance of each class of model soldiers at 
their command. 
In principle the tactical canon and the consequent character of a war game 
are wholly arbitrary, and one may invent games of any complexion by adjusting 
the rules. With greater representationalism, however, some war games aim not to 
stage an imaginary conflict but to replay a battle of recorded history. Here the 
players enter the boots of historical military commanders in a reconstruction of 
the outbreak of a past battle which they thereafter manipulate in accordance with 
a tactical canon of some degree of verisimilitude. Both the initial conditions and 
the rules of such a Kriegsspiel are informed by historical data on the actual battle: 
these may relate to the topography of the battleground, the numbers and initial 
disposition of_ the opposing forces, and the specifications of their weapons.1 The 
In a typical war-gamers' manual, Featherstone (1977), pp. 19-92 describe the forces 
which participated in various tank-battles in th~ Mediterranean theatre of the Second World War, the terrain which they encountered and the tactics which they pursued, pp. 93-114 draw from the outcomes of those battles lessons for the tactics 
of those who would re-enact them in a war game, and pp. 115-46 list the 
specifications of the vehicles and weapons employed therein. These particulars are intended to help to mount a sufficiently realistic war game and draft its rules of play. There circulate innumerable primers of this kind for what is evidently a 
widespread pastime. Such manuals are interesting historiographical beasts: falling 
short of tre.atises of military history of the Thucydidean model, they limit themselves instead to providing the 'boundary conditions' of episodes of actual history from which re-enacbnents of those episodes will originate and within the 
confines of which they will develop. 
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players may yet exercise freedom of action, and their decisions in the course of 
the game may learn and diverge from the conduct of the historical commanders 
to the extent of reversing the outcome of their encounter. The scope of the 
analogical relation is therefore limited: although the gameboard may map the 
field of combat and the ranks of figurines may constitute a model of the historical 
armies, the re-enacted engagement does not necessarily model the historical 
episode. A game may open on a reconstruction of the field of Marengo but in its 
progress assume configurations quite different from those of the battle of 1800. 
One may however conceive of extending the scope of the model by altering 
the tactical canon imposed upon the players by the rules. By judicious redrafting 
of the rules it is in principle possible to replicate in the players of the game the 
string of decisions followed by the commanders in the actual battle which the 
game re-enacts. From the historical initial conditions of a battle will ensue under 
these rules its historical denouement: re-enactments of Marengo will see Napoleon 
for evermore defeat the Austrians. The scope of the model now encompasses not 
just the physical manifestations of the battle but also the conditions which 
prompted the inferences and decisions of the historical participants. The entity 
which models those conditions is the war game's rule-book. For the modelling of 
the historical combatants' sequence of decisions to achieve success, the combatants 
need not have explicitly endorsed the tactical canon compiled for the players of 
the subsequent game; a historian may however find evidence separate from the 
combatants' sequence of decisions - contained in for instance their descriptions of 
their own actions - that the combatants acknowledged the concerns or objectives 
set by the game's rule-book. 
Part of the discipline of philosophy of science stands in a relation to the 
historical record analogous to that of a war game. As the war game is a study of 
the judgements and decisions of a historical military commander, conducted 
through a re-enactment of the scenario and constraints encountered by that figure, 
so the philosophy of science studies the judgements and inferences of the 
historical scientist through a reconstruction of the situation and constraints faced 
by that figure. As the war-game player first drafts a proposed rule-book, then 
investigates how a personator of Napoleon acts at a reconstruction of Marengo 
under the constraints of that book, and finally draws from the similarities and 
divergences between the re-enactment of the battle and the. historical Marengo 
conclusions concerning the capacities and constraints of Napoleon, so acts the 
philosopher in regard to the historical scientist. Under this analogical relation the 
relatum of the war-game rule-book is the system in prescriptive philosophy of 
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science, battle-tested for its effects on the evolution of the re-enactment of the 
historical episode; the relatum of the tactical canon prescribed of the war-game 
player by the rules is the canon of rationality tentatively ascribed to the historical 
scientist; and the relatum of the commander whose behaviour is thus studied is 
the scientist of interest. 
Such re-enactments are performed whenever a body of modem 
methodological precepts is brought to bear upon a scenario encountered by past 
science, and it is investigated how the protagonists of the period would have 
acted if following those dictates. A historical figure whose research and inferences 
have been re-enacted under the aegis of several competing philosophical systems 
is of course Galileo: one meets the intellectual biographies of Galileo as a 
Platonist, an Aristotelian, an inductivist and an experirnentalist.2 The accounts 
therein contained of key junctures of Galileo's research are reconstructions which 
proceed along lines dictated or constrained by the philosophical rule-books to 
which they pay allegiance. 
In principle the fidelity of these scientific re-enactments is no less flexible 
than that of their military counterparts. Under rules which allow sufficient 
freedom of action, the players may depart from the inferences and decisions of 
the original participants of the historical episodes now under reconstruction: 
indeed a philosophical system may permit the personators of the historical 
scientists to learn and benefit from the errors of their archetypes and thus to 
hasten in the re-enactment the advancement of science. This degree of freedom is 
allowed for instance by the philosophical system of Lakatos. One of the 
introductory statements in his treatment of historiography signals the congruity 
between his vision of the philosophy of science, which assigns a central role to 
reconstructions of past scientific episodes, and the present treatment based on the 
analogy with war games: 'Whatever problem the historian of science wishes to 
solve, he has first to reconstruct the relevant section of the growth of objective 
knowledge, that is, the relevant section of "internal history".'3 Lakatos allows the 
historian bent upon the reconstruction of this section of history a wide freedom of 
operation: 
2 
3 
In constructing internal history the historian will be highly selective: 
he will omit everything that is irrational in the light of his rationality 
theory. But this normative selection still does not add up to a fully 
These interpretations have been propounded respectively by Koyre (1939), Wallace (1981), Whewell (1840) and Drake (1970). The character named Galileo who features in certain of the more partisan interpretations (less sagacious than those mentioned here) is, some readers would say, clearly an impersonator. 
Lakatos (1971), p. 106. 
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fledged rational reconstruction. [ ... ] Internal history is not just a 
selection of methodologically interpreted facts: it may be, on occasion, 
their radically improved version.' 
Those who in a Lakatosian reconstruction re-fight a past scientific battle are in 
truth fighting a battle quite different from the original, with a new tactical canon, 
dissimilar moves ari.d a discrepant outcome. Lakatos quite openly accepts this 
divergence: 
One may illustrate this using the Bohrian programme. Bohr, in 1913, 
may not have even thought of the possibility of electron spin. He 
had more than enough on his hands without the spin. Nevertheless, 
the historian, describing with hindsight the Bohrian programme, 
should include electron spin in it, since electron spin fits naturally in 
the original outline of the programme. Bohr might have referred to it 
in 1913.5 
Clearly whoever will personate Bohr in a Lakatosian reconstruction is not 
constrained to follow Bohr's original inferences, any more than the war-gamer 
who takes the part of Napoleon at Marengo is necessarily compelled to deploy 
his or her model troops in the same actions. Both are free to improve upon the 
performance of their historical archetypes.6 
In advocating the pursuit of reconstructions in which modem 
impersonators of past scientists are allowed to learn from and thus correct the 
blunders of their predecessors, Lakatos makes a virtue out of historiographical 
inexactitude. He severely reduces, however, the specificity of the historian's work. 
A figure in Lakatos's history will resemble an actor who, while remaining in 
character, departs from the prescribed lines to utter ad-lib comments to the 
audience: though this knack may please in its inventiveness, it reveals little of the 
texts on which the performance is based. The greater historiographic insight is 
naturally obtained when the re-enactment is capable of capturing the vicissitudes 
of the original episode. By careful tuning of the variables which affect the 
behaviour of the reconstruction, the battles relived by philosophers of science can 
4 
5 
6 
Ibid.; emphasis in the original. 
Ibid., pp. 106-7. Lakatos notoriously continues: 'Why Bohr did not do so, is an interesting problem which deserves to be indicated in a footnote' (ibid., p. 107). 
Musgrave (1976, p. 193) openly concedes that the Lakatosian 'rational reconstmction' in which he is engaged amounts to 'remedying history's mistakes'. Here and there in Howson ed. (1976), a collection of historical essays on Lakatosian principles 
which includes Musgrave's paper cited here, one finds evidence that the authors 
regard their studies as a re-staging of the episodes, as investigations of how the protagonists would have acted if endowed with the canons of rationality which Lakatos's philosophical system predicates of the characters in the reconstruction. Musgrave again for instance writes (1976, ibid.): 'In rationally reconstructed history, having predicted oxygen, Lavoisier went on to discover it - while in actual history it was discovered by Priestley.' 
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like those re-enacted by military enthusiasts come to reproduce the outcomes of 
their historical correspondents. The rules then possess both a normative and a 
descriptive valence: they shape the turns taken by reconstructions of historical 
episodes and, to the extent to which · those reconstructions are faithful to the 
historical evidence, they model the conditions under which the participants in 
those episodes drew their inferences and took their decisions.7 The scope of the 
model constituted by the philosophical system is then extended and embraces the 
most recondite and impalpable element of the past episode: the canon of 
rationality proposed by the philosophical system comes to model the actual canon 
which animated the characters of the past. 
Once again, as in war games, for the modelling of past sequences of 
scientific inferences to achieve success, the authors of those inferences need not 
have endorsed or even recognized the norms or priorities enshrined in the 'rules 
of play' prescribed by philosophical systems to their later impersonators; 
nonetheless scientists frequently describe the methodological values which they 
consider have animated their work, and those stated values may accord with 
those prescribed in the reconstruction, thus further enhancing the fidelity of the 
model. Indeed a reading of the methodological reflections of past scientists may 
well prompt the inclusion of the values which they mention in the rule-books of 
later philosophical systems. 
The analogy of war-gamers' rule-books is able to shed intuitive light on the 
relationship of philosophical systems to historical evidence. As the stakes of the 
philosophical battles are however of greater conceptual subtlety than those of 
military re-enactments, the debate on the compilation of the historiographic rule-
book has been correspondingly more intense. 
7 The conception of the function of rules in the philosophy of science which is 
prompted by the analogy with war-game rule-books may help to reconcile 
Feyerabend to prescriptivism in this arena. Feyerabend (1975, e.g. p. 23) mistrusts 
the prescription of rules · to scientists, fearing it will reduce their methodological 
freedom and inhibit progress. But in the present treatment, which might be termed 
one of vicarious prescriptivism, the objects of such prescriptions are not living 
scientists but imaginary agents delegated to re-enact an episode of scientific history. 
Since the creativity of living scientists is thereby unaffected, Feyerabend would 
surely have no grounds to resist this use of methodological precepts. 
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2. The constitution of scientific success 
If a purpose of the rule-book in a war game is to achieve in the re-enactment a 
close replica of the original episode, any proposed version of the rule-book may 
seek to draw justification from the closeness of the replication. This 
historiographic warrant is not of course the sole form of justification which a rule-
book may seek to gather: there exists a class of justificatory argumentation which 
is non-historiographic or systematic. In the case of war-game rule-books this form 
of justification is probably rather trivial, and derives from common-sense 
understanding of the goals and nature of warfare: nonetheless, because of the 
existence of this second source of justification, any proposed rule-book will be 
evaluated not solely on its capacity to reproduce on the gameboard the 
vicissitudes of past battles, but also on its acceptability on common-sense 
grounds. 
Systematic justification plays a role of much greater moment in the other 
pole of the extended metaphor here being explored, in the compilation of 
methodological rules in the philosophy of science. The norms which are 
prescribed to the personators of past scientists in a reconstruction are justified not 
solely by the accuracy of the resulting reconstruction but also by philosophical 
argumentation from the goals and nature of sdence.8 These arguments originate 
in a judgement of the identity of the theoretical quality to be held constitutive of 
success in science, and aim to determine a canon of methodological precepts apt 
to generate theories which exhibit that quality to the highest degree. 
The identification of what counts as scientific success seems at first blush 
afflicted by a relativism with respect to ontological doctrine: while antirealism, 
shunning ontological commitment, views success as the attainment of empirical 
adequacy, realists posit as the ultimate goal of science the construction of true 
explanatory theories about phenomena.9 The divergence in ontology is however 
recomposed in methodology. Antirealists readily recognize - indeed proclaim -
observational success as the sole possible content of the notion of empirical 
adequacy, while realists for their part see observational success as the sole - albeit 
a fallible - diagnostic criterion of truth or verisimilitude in the absence of any 
means of comparison with a putative 'truth of the matter' to establish how closely 
8 
9 
Losee (1987, pp. 77-110) similarly distinguishes between what he terms 'historicist' and 1ogicist' justifications of scientific methodologies. 
The stipulation of explanatory power eliminates from the quest tabulations of mere logical theorems or phenomenic accidents and introduces a requirement for theories to grasp the causal mechanisms which underlie reality. 
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a theory has fulfilled the goal of true explanation. Observational success is thus 
consensually and unproblematically held to be constitutive of what it is for a 
scientific theory to be successful.10 
Ultimately, a theory's observational success would be demonstrated by its 
according with evidence accumulated from disparate sources over unlimited time-
spans. But unlimited time-spans are not at the disposal of scientists hesitating 
between alternative theories: the working scientist requires criteria of prompt 
application able to indicate whether a theory is likely to demonstrate long-term 
observational success. A set of such criteria is constructed tacitly by a scientific 
community and explicitly by philosophers of science by considering what features 
it would be necessary or helpful for a theory to possess for it to be able to 
demonstrate long-term observational success. Since observational success would 
be a logico-empirical attainment of a theory, the criteria to which these 
considerations lead are themselves logico-empirical in nature: that is, they judge 
the theory to which they are applied on its possession of certain logico-empirical 
features, an example of some of which is offered in the next section.u 
In this way is constructed a chain of reasoning from the stated goal of 
science, observational success, to a set of logico-empirical features of theories. The 
chain of reasoning yields a conditional imperative: if contributions are to be made 
towards the attainment of the goal of science, theory-choice must prize those 
theories which exhibit a certain set of logico-empirical features. 
A chain of inference from the goal of science to a canon of methodological 
precepts lies at the heart of the model of scientific methodology of W.H. Newton-
Smith. He first states the aim which he attributes to science: 'One of our starting 
points · in this work was the assumption that the goal of science is truth.'12 His 
construal of the notion of truth quickly leads to the formulation of a eventual 
principle of comparative theory-test: 'In the long run the ultimate test as to 
whether one theory has more successfully latched on to a facet of the world than 
another theory is their relative observational success.'13 The inordinate length of 
the time-spans over which for this test to be reliable it is necessary to allow a 
10 
11 
12 
13 
The wide agreement on this point throughout the philosophical community is one of the reasons for which the debate between realists and antirealists is so apparently 
undecidable: if realists and antirealists differed in the substantive methodological prescriptions which they issued to scientists, it might be possible to conclude that 
one or the other ontological doctrine was superior on those grounds. 
That logico-empirical criteria have attracted the lion's share of the attention in philosophical discussions of the appraisal of scientific theories is attested by Koertge (1979), pp. 228-40, in a review of current research in the field. 
Newton-Smith (1981), p . 223. 
Ibid. 
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theory to accumulate observational success then prompts Newton-Smith to infer 
methodological precepts of quicker applicability: 'We need other factors to guide 
us which can serve as fallible indicators of likely long-term observational 
success.'14 These he identifies in a battery of principles of theory-assessment 
similar to the logico-empirical criteria to be outlined next. 
3. The logico-empirical rule-book 
The qualities of theories which are commonly reputed to be constituent of 
observational success are the following. To a brief account of the reasons for 
which theories exhibiting each of these qualities are held to be ceteris paribus 
preferable to others is appended mention of a historical episode in which the 
perception of that quality in a theory helped to shape its community's attitude to 
it. 
(a) Internal consistency A theory ought not to harbour internal contradictions for, at 
least in standard logic, any such incongruity would cause it to entail every 
proposition of its language, and hence be worthless as a predictive tool.15 Such a 
flaw was discerned in the Aristotelian theory of free fall which asserted that 
heavier bodies fell faster than lighter ones. Galileo envisaged a heavy body 
attached by a cord to a lighter one and asked how fast the resulting compound 
would be expected to fall.16 On one application of Aristotelian theory the light 
body would retard the heavy one so the velocity of the composite should be less 
than that of the heavier body alone; on another the compound object is heavier 
than its heavy component mass and should consequently fall faster. Galileo caps 
his discussion_ with a ritual formula of one who has caught his opponent in 
contradiction: 'from the supposition that the heavier body is moved more swiftly 
than the less heavy, I conclude that the heavier moves less swiftly.'17 
(b) Consistency with existing corroborated theory P. Duhem and W.V. Quine have 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Ibid., p. 224. 
For a derivation of the logical result see e.g. Newton-Smith (1981), p. 229. Smith (1988) argues to the contrary that a community need not withdraw support from a 
theory on account of its possession of internal inconsistencies, especially if the 
theory appears susceptible of further and interesting development. 
Galilei (1638), pp. 66-8. 
Ibid., p. 67. 
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argued for a form of epistemological holism in which scientific theories are tested 
not in isolation but in bodies of belief which include auxiliary theories and 
background knowledge. In domains of science where this view appears pertinent, 
theories lose their individuality and the. notion of a theory is replaced by that of 
composite bodies of theories: the requirement of internal consistency of a theory 
correspondingly broadens into a requirement for the mutual consistency of bodies 
of theories. Rutherford's atomic theory of 1911, couched within the paradigm of 
classical electromagnetism, viewed the atom as a miniature planetary system of 
which the positive charge was concentrated in the centre and surrounded by 
electrons. A theorem in electromagnetism stated that a system of charged bodies 
cannot be in equilibrium at rest under the action of their electrostatic interactions 
alone; simultaneously another result implied that if Rutherford's electrons were in 
motion along closed orbits, the centripetal acceleration necessary to maintain 
those trajectories would cause the charges to radiate, dissipate energy, and thus 
spiral into the nucleus. Rutherford's model thus appeared to contradict the 
background theory of electromagnetism. This difficulty was resolved by Bohr's 
model of the atom of 1913 which confined the motion of electrons within 
quantum-mechanical orbitals, thus declaring classical electromagnetism 
inapplicable to atomic theory. 
Whilst a theory is minimally required not to contradict other, background 
theories, it is more strongly valued if it can provide deeper explanations of the 
generalizations which they express. The statistical mechanics of R. Clausius and 
C. Boltzmann was valued partly for its consistency with the predictively 
successful empirical laws of classical thermodynamics, and furthermore for 
deriving the equations of state of ideal gases - which in the earlier theory had the 
status of mere phenomenological generalizations - from the principles of 
conservation of energy and momentum. 
(c) High degre~ of simplicity The requirement that theories be simple is in some 
ways the most ambiguous of the commonly stipulated theoretical desiderata.18 In 
many instances the choice by a scientist of one theory in preference to another on 
the grounds of simplicity appears to be motivated by subjective concerns not 
immediately connected with the theories' relative empirical performance.19 It is 
however reasonably widely accepted that a high degree of simplicity in a theory 
18 
19 
For a survey of various ways in which simplicity in theory-assessment is regarded, 
see Hesse (1967), pp. 445-6. 
This observation, which plays a role of some importance in portions of the 
argument to follow, will be elucidated in chapter 6, where the content of aesthetic 
canons of theory-assessment is analyzed. 
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is a logico-empirical virtue of that theory, in that simpler theories making the 
same claims as more complex ones are better supported by favourable evidence.20 
S.F. Barker explains the issue as follows: 
If one system is simpler than another [ ... ] then the simpler one 'says 
more,' it has 'more content,' because it excludes a greater number of 
possible models; therefore it runs more risk of being contradicted by 
the evidence. A system which takes a risk yet survives deserves 
more credit, it earns more credibility, than does a system which 
survives but says less and thus has taken less risk. 21 
Many applications of criteria of simplicity in theory-evaluation occur in the 
biological sciences. In evolutionary theory G.C. Williams uses a principle of 
__,,,r parsimony to argue that the principles of group selection and biotic adaptation 
are less well supported by the data than are the principles of genie selection and 
organic adaptation.22 A similar criterion has been extensively applied in the 
assessment of theories in phylogenetic systematics, as R. Johnson reports.23 
( d) Consistency with known data Deductions from the theory should lie in 
agreement with the results of past observation and experiment. Newton rejected 
the Cartesian theory of vortices as the foundation of celestial mechanics because it 
was incapable of accommodating among its implications the known elliptical 
orbits of the planets. 
(e) Generation of novel predictions If the sole empirical requirement of a theory were 
its accordance with data previously gathered, the danger would exist that a 
favourable assessment might be accorded to a theory constructed post facto to 
account for those data. To guard against that danger methodologists commonly 
stipulate an additional empirical requirement, that a theory should generate some 
novel predictions. C. Clavius argued that the Ptolemaic theory of the solar system 
was likely to be true because 'by the assumption of Eccentric and Epicyclic 
spheres not only are all the appearances already known accounted for, but also 
future pheno~ena are predicted.'24 W. Whewell insisted that good hypotheses 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Failure to acknowledge this finding is one of the faults of my previous treatment of 
aesthetic criteria of theory-assessment, McAllister (1989). 
S.F. Barker (1957), pp. 181-2. This explanation of the value of simplicity in theory-preference would win the agreement of Popper: see e.g. his (1959), pp. 140-2. 
Williams (1966), pp. 123-4. The use of simplicity criteria in assessing competing theories in evolutionary biology is discussed in Sober (1987), pp. 212-8. 
Johnson (1982), pp. 83-8. This article provides also a useful brief overview of the discussions of the formal aspects of simplicity-criteria in philosophy of science (ibid., pp. 79-83). for bibliographic advice on this topic I am grateful to Ors D.J. Komet of the Institute of Theoretical Biology, University of Leiden. 
Quoted in Blake (1960), p. 34. Oavius was writing in 1602. 
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'ought to foretel phenomena which have not yet been observed.'25 
A theory's predictions can be novel in two ways: they may forecast data 
which before the formulation of the theory one had not thought to gather, or they 
may 'retrodict' data already available but not previously thought relevant to the 
assessment of theories in this domain of phenomena. 
J. Kepler's theory of planetary dynamics issued a class of predictions which 
were novel in the former sense. After nine years' investigation of the orbit of 
Mars Kepler published his first two laws in the New Astronomy [ .. .] with 
Commentaries on the Motions of Mars: their empirical domain extends however -
within the bounds of non-relativistic accuracy - far beyond the fourth planet of 
the Solar System to all celestial bodies and indeed to all bodies in closed orbits 
under inverse-square law attractive forces, as Newton's work was to establish. 
Novel predictions in the second sense are the sign of an attempted 
unification of previously disparate branches of science. J.C. Maxwell's unification 
of optics and electromagnetism was responsible for widespread novel predictions 
in this sense. A measure of the scientific community's appreciation of this 
achievement is obtained from a eulogy of Maxwell by M. Planck: 
Maxwell [ ... ] created a theory which not only could compete with 
the well established theories of electricity and magnetism but 
surpassed them entirely in success. For the criterion of the value of a 
theory, that it explains quite other phenomena besides those on 
which it was based, has never been so well satisfied as with 
Maxwell's theory. Neither Faraday nor Maxwell may have originally 
considered optics in connection with their consideration of the fundamental laws of electromagnetism. And yet the whole field of 
optics, which had defied attack from the side of mechanics for more 
than a hundred years, was at one stroke conquered by Maxwell's 
Electrodynamic Theory; so much so that since then every optical phenomena can be directly treated as an electromagnetic problem. 
This must remain for all time one of the greatest triumphs of human intellectual endeavour.26 
The generation of novel predictions constitutes an important desideratum of 
scientific theories and completes the review of logico-empirical criteria of theory-
evaluation. 
Although these criteria may be formulated o.r classified in different ways, 
their inclusion in a canon by which to evaluate theories is not a matter of current 
controversy: both scientists and philosophers of science appear to agree that these 
criteria figure among scientific communities' standard means to judge the logico-
25 
26 
Whewell (1840), vol. 2, p. 228; emphasis and orthography as in the original. 
Planck (1931), pp. 57-8. 
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empirical worth of theories. For instance, F.J. Belinfante prefaces a discussion of 
hidden-variable theories in quantum mechanics by the statement that 'physicists 
call a theory satisfactory if (1) it agrees with the experimental facts, (2) it is 
logically consistent, and (3) it is simple as compared to other explanations.'27 
Newton-Smith, whose approach is representative of that of many philosophers of 
science, includes among 'the good-making features of theories' observational 
nesting, fertility, track record, intra-theory support, internal consistency and 
simplicity .28 
4. The recourse to extra-empirical criteria 
Nothing which has so far been said suggests that of the two views of 
methodological norms, the historiographic view with a presentation of which the 
chapter opened and the systematic view briefly discussed in section 2, one 
possesses philosophical value in any respect greater than that of the other. While 
a philosophical image of science may seek to justify its methodological precepts 
through historiographic evidence or systematic argumentation, in keeping with its 
temperament and predispositions, there has so far been presented no suggestion 
that one of these courses is preferable to the other. 
Where the historiographic conception proves superior to its systematic 
counterpart is in the task of stimulating philosophers to consider possible 
additions to their inventory of methodological precepts, and to avert the risk that 
the list of precepts may be brief to the point of inadequacy. As was argued in the 
previous chapter, a purely systematic approach to the tabulation of 
methodological norms, with no historiographic input, tends to spawn an 
excessively cir~mscribed methodological canon and a narrow characterization of 
scientific rationality. Historiographic research, with its access to a virtually 
inexhaustible pool of historical data, is apt to goad methodologists into 
consideration of precepts the incorporation of which into the philosophical image 
of science will allow both a more faithful reconstruction of past scientific episodes 
and a broader and more interesting characterization of scientific rationality. 
27 
28 
It is today a commonplace that ascription to past scientists of logico-
Belinfante (1973), p. 3. 
Newton-Smith (1981), pp. 226-32. 
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empirical criteria of theory-assessment alone cannot suffice to reconstruct salient 
instances of theory-choice. Alone, the logico-empirical rule-book is inadequate to 
ensure that the staged reconstruction of episodes of scientific history remain close 
to the events themselves. Accordingly philosophers of science who value the 
attainment of such proximity have posited additional categories of evaluative 
criteria, which cannot be reduced to the logico-empirical factors. 
The realization that such categories are · fruitful for the philosophy of 
science has however been a gradual achievement, attained in the teeth of 
rearguard resistance by positivists who privileged logico-empirical criteria to an 
inordinate degree and therefore denied efficacy or legitimacy to extra-empirical 
considerations. Throughout much of the debate, the evaluative criteria of the 
additional categories envisaged by philosophers of science have been deemed by 
them to be of metaphysical character.29 
The positivist attitude towards extra-empirical criteria is exemplified by the 
writings of H. Margenau and P. Frank. Margenau dedicates a chapter of his 
survey of the philosophy of modem physics to what he terms the 'metaphysical 
requirements on constructs' .30 He attributes to them a quasi-Kantian, regulatory 
role: 
The methodology of science involves deliverances of sense as well as 
rules of correspondence, constructs, and principles regulating 
constructs. Having learned that the latter are not conveyed by 
sensory data and yet function in guiding experience, we should call 
them metaphysical principles in the modem sense of the world. 
Metaphysical principles, thus understood, are an important part of 
all procedures which ultimately define reality.31 
Margenau names as metaphysical requirements the following: the requirements of 
logical fertility, of multiple connections, of permanence and stability, of 
extensibility of constructs, of causality, and of simplicity and elegance.32 
Frank too draws a distinction between empirical and non-empirical criteria 
of theory-assessment; in consequence of positivist concerns on the demarcation of 
29 
30 
31 
32 
The problem of determining the contribution to theory-assessment of metaphysical 
criteria is different from, though doubtless related to, that of charting the 
metaphysical content of scientific theories, even if the theories are subsequently praised or criticized for that component: theory-assessment on metaphysical criteria involves the appeal to metaphysical tenets exterior to the theories examined. Popper's early criticism of Darwin' s theory of evolution as metaphysical rather than 
scientific (Popper 1974, pp. 133-43) was thus not an instance of a metaphysical 
evaluation but a straightforward logico-empirical one - indeed it is for this reason that Popper's judgement was so unfavourable. 
Margenau (1950), pp. 75-101. 
Ibid., p. 81. 
Ibid. The criteria of Margenau are briefly discussed by Losee (1987), p. 56. 
24 
CHAPTER TWO: THE STIPULATION OF METHODOLOGICAL NORMS 
science from pseudo-science, he terms them 'scientific' and 'extrascientific' 
factors.33 According to Frank, the '"scientific'' criteria in the narrower sense' are 
'agreement with observations and logical consistency',34 a concise formulation of 
the logico-empirical evaluative canon explored at greater length in the previous 
section. The 'extrascientific' criteria appear to be ethical and metaphysical; in 
defence of the inclusion of the former category Frank says that 'It is easily seen 
from well-known examples that fitness to support desirable conduct on the part 
of citizens, or briefly, to support moral behavior, has served through the ages as a 
reason for the acceptance of a theory.'35 
The operation of extra-empirical criteria of theory-evaluation in science is 
brought to the attention of Margenau and Frank despite rather than by their 
analytical concerns, which centre upon the empirical virtues of theories. These 
concerns ensure that extra-empirical criteria are offered a marginal and secondary 
place in positivist treatments. A more forthcoming reception is afforded by those 
philosophical schools arising in the early 1960s which struck towards science a 
historicist rather than analytical stance. J. Agassi was one of the first to address 
metaphysical criteria of theory-evaluation under this new light. His treatment of 
the metaphysical roots of scientific problems showed that metaphysics had in 
history regularly been used to appraise scientific theories. For instance, the 
continuum theory (the study of the properties of matter, especially elasticity, on 
the metaphysical assumption that matter is continuous) receives an unfavourable 
evaluation on the part of anyone whose metaphysical canon embraces atomism.36 
The problem perceived by Agassi of accounting for the history of science 
was further and ably addressed by G. Buchdahl. He saw that the historical record 
of scientific practice offered a test of the completeness or exhaustiveness of the 
norms composing the methodological canons proposed by philosophers of 
science. He believed that a canon consisting solely of logico-empirical criteria of 
theory-evaluation could not pass such a historiographic test: 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Although falsifiability, confirmation, and predictive power - all 
Frank (1957): on the 'scientific' criteria see pp. 348-54; on the 'extrascientific' criteria 
PP· 354-60. , 
Ibid., p. 359. 
Ibid., p. 354. 
Agassi (1964), p. 210. That philosophical criteria may be brought to bear upon the 
evaluation of scientific theories was later argued also by Brush (1974, p. 1,169): Those scientists who did suggest that the kinetic theory be abandoned in the later 19th Century did so not because of empirical difficulties but because of a more deep 
seated purely philosophical objection. For those who believed in a positivist 
methodology, any theory based on invisible and undetectable atoms was 
unacceptable.' 
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involving appeals to observational data, however conceptualized -
are important criteria for the choice and acceptability of hypotheses, 
they are not sufficient, even if one does not go so far as to hold 
them not to be necessary either.37 
Much of Buchdahl's treatment of this topic is concerned with the development of 
theories of gravitation, in the conviction that 'the best defense for any 
methodological structure like the one here proposed is to observe it at work' ;38 he 
claims to have distilled from the record the criteria upon which theories in this 
domain were validated: 
All such justifications evidently involve an appeal to a 
supplementary set of ideas: maxims of simplicity and economy; 
considerations of an esthetic nature; principles of continuity or discontinuity; linkages with general metaphysical notions as for instance 'the real does not change,' 'nothing comes from nothing,' 
'the effect is equivalent to the cause'; or more generally, maxims like 
that of homogeneity, affinity (or the 'analogy of nature'), teleological 
or alternative preferred explanation schemas, and even certain 
theological conceptions. 39 
It is notable that all these treatments regard the category of metaphysical criteria 
of theory-assessment as fundamental, perhaps on a conceptual par with the 
category of logico-empirical evaluative criteria, and consign aesthetic criteria -
where indeed any is mentioned - to a subclass of the category of metaphysical 
criteria. The present treatment hopes to show inter alia that an inversion of that 
hierarchical relation is apt. 
37 
38 
39 
Buchdahl (1970), p. 204. 
Ibid ., p. 213. 
Ibid., p. 206. 
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BEAUTY DISCERNED IN SCIENCE 
One of the older research students said the sweetest thing to me 
after my lecture, that he had never realized there was anything 
aesthetic in Mathematics till one of my lectures. I was frightfully 
bucked.1 
Sir Nevill Mott 
1. Judgements of utility and of aesthetic value 
The attainment of predictive power and technological applicability has schooled 
the observer to regard science as the purveyor of advantage and the vehicle of 
utility. The capacity of scientific theories which dominates most perceptions is 
their power to apprehend the causal mechanisms which underlie reality: those 
who wield that power are enabled to manipulate their surroundings to profit. 
This Baconian concern has so overwhelmed all other perspectives on 
science that attention for any non-utilitarian virtues of theories has been dulled. 
This is both readily understandable and a matter for regret. The early depiction of 
science as single-mindedly useful doubtless intended to emphasize and glorify the 
distinctive capacity of science, distancing it from non-practical or parasitic human 
pursuits. However, social phenomena which probably include the continued 
dominance of classicist or literary culture and the increase of leisure which 
accompanies economic progress turned this utilitarian boast to the discredit of 
science. The emphasis devoted by partisans of science to its practical virtues were 
then read as the admission that such were the sole merits to which science could 
lay claim: views of science emerged in some quarters as the occupation of 
mechanics, yielding no value higher than the utilitarian. 
In these quarters frequent recourse was made to the contrast of science 
with the arts, seen as the pursuit of contemplation rather than manipulation, as 
the province of aesthetic rather than utilitarian values. A radical polarization was 
Mott (1986), p. 36. One gains the impression that this insight has diffused among 
physicists from generation to generation: Mott recounts that he learned 'how 
beautiful physics could be' from Bohr (ibid., p. 25). 
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entrenched where a gentle differentiation would have served. The products of 
science were attributed a monopoly over the utilitarian value denied to art, which 
for its part was interpreted as the locus of the aesthetic value denied to scientific 
theories. 
The ascription of separate spheres of value to the products of science and 
of art is the outcome of centuries of conceptualization to which have contributed 
schools as diverse as positivist philosophy and Romantic literary theory. Anxious 
to secure recognition for science's benefits to mankind and for the power of 
scientific reasoning in all domains of the intellect, positivism took to denigrating 
poetry by comparison. In 1820 the utilitarian T.L. Peacock scorned this genre as a 
pursuit devoid of practical value in a world constantly bettered by science: 1t 
cannot claim the slightest share in any one of the comforts and utilities of life in 
which we have witnessed so many and so rapid advances.' Indeed, the poet 'in 
the present state of society is [ ... ] a waster of his own time, and a robber of that 
of others.'2 
While the denial of utilitarian value to art does not necessarily inhibit the 
perception of aesthetic value in science, the scientistic dismissal of art as devoid 
of utility fostered the circumscription of aesthetic value to artistic practice alone. 
This further step was taken by literary theory. Romanticism commonly attempted 
to illuminate the nature of poetical works by contrasting them with the dry and 
unemotional utterances of science: to J. Keats it seemed obvious that matters of 
fact or science were aesthetically barren. B.R. Haydon recalls hosting a dinner in 
1817 for a circle of important Romantic literary figures during which C. Lamb 
abused the work of Newton as inimical to artistic vision. 'And then he and Keats 
agreed [Newton] had destroyed all the poetry of the rainbow by reducing it to 
the prismatic colours. It was impossible to resist him, and we all drank 
"Newton's health, and confusion to mathematics."'3 The Romantic view that the 
scientist's concerns stand in opposition to those of the poet amounted to a denial 
of aesthetic value to the sciences.' 
2 
3 
4 
Brett-Smith and Jones eds (1934), vol. 8, pp. 21-2. Further on the antagonism of positivists towards artistic endeavour see Abrams (1953), pp. 300-3. 
T. Taylor ed. (1926), vol. I, p. 269. The opinions aired at what Haydon called 'the immortal dinner' - surely one of the most celebrated repasts in the history of literary criticism, attended also by Wordsworth - are considered in Nicolson (1946), pp. 1-5, and Abrams (1953), pp. 303-4. 
Romanticism's denial of aesthetic value to science did not · entail the denial of practical value to the arts. Some Romantic thinkers believed that art had an extrinsic (as opposed to purely aesthetic) value, as a means to moral or social effects beyond itself. Shelley's Defence of Poetry of 1821 was the most elaborately reasoned of all Romantic statements of the moral value of poetry. On this current in Romantic thought see e.g. Abrams (1953), pp. 326-35. 
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The tendency to attribute utilitarian value exclusively to the sciences and 
aesthetic value to only the arts has affected not only the conceptual image of the 
two domains but also their practice; it has in other terms coloured not only the 
way in which communities regard the two spheres but also the precepts by which 
their practitioners pursue them. In particular it has been suggested by some that 
the products of the two endeavours should be judged by reference to quite 
separate evaluative categories.5 On this view the sole category by which the 
products of science may be assessed is utilitarian, invoking the notion of 
observational success and a class of criteria similar to the logico-empirical canon 
codified in the previous chapter. Conversely it is thought that aesthetic categories 
of appraisal are suitably applied only to artistic creations as contemplative works 
detached from considerations of practical advantage. 
The partition of evaluative categories between the arts and the sciences 
along these lines has dominated most treatments of science and many broader 
discussions of culture in the last two hundred years. The present treatment 
believes nonetheless that the partition is inappropriate, and depends to some 
measure upon an excessively simple view of scientific practice and to a further 
extent upon a narrow definition of the class of objects deemed susceptible of 
aesthetic perception. The immediate concern of the present treatment is to instil 
doubts in the partition of evaluative categories between the arts and the sciences, 
and in particular to suggest that the products of science as well as those of art are 
susceptible to aesthetic evaluation. 
This suggestion will be entrenched in several stages in the course of this 
chapter and the next. First the roots will be retraced of the notion of intellectual 
beauty in philosophical aesthetics; then some evidence will be adduced to support 
the contention that scientific and other intellectual communities discern beauty in 
the products of research. Finally, the next chapter will explore the philosophical 
considerations underpinning the application of aesthetic evaluative categories to 
scientific theories. 
One of the earliest sophisticated modem proponents of the notion that 
intellectual constructs may possess aesthetic value was F. Hutcheson, a member of 
the eighteenth-century British empiricist school. His writings on this topic are of 
especial interest to the present treatment, for the following reason. The next 
chapter will retrace partly to Hutcheson the view of aesthetics as the study of 
disinterested perception, an interpretation upon which the present study of the 
s This suggestion is advanced by e.g. Feigl (1970), pp. 9-10, whose views will be 
considered in chapter 5 below. 
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perception of beauty in scientific theories will largely be based. It will be 
suggested also in the next chapter that, as occurred in Hutcheson's work, the 
interpretation of aesthetics as the study of the disinterested mode of attention 
rather than as a differently constituted investigation leads naturally to a 
broadening of the class of entities designated as objects of aesthetic perception: in 
particular this class is widened to include not only bona fide works of art but also 
non-artistic objects and indeed intellectual constructs like scientific theories. 
Appeal to the interpretation of aesthetics as the study of disinterested perception 
will therefore facilitate the present treatment's study of aesthetic criteria of theory-
evaluation in science in two ways: first, as explored in the next chapter, by 
providing the philosophical stance from which to consider the perception of 
aesthetic virtues in scientific theories; second, as outlined in the remainder of this 
chapter, by tabling the presumption that aesthetic evaluative categories should be 
extended to the study of intellectual constructs like scientific theories. The ordo 
docendi chosen here for the exposition of the implications of the view of aesthetics 
as the study of disinterested perception departs from the ordo inveniendi in which 
these implications would be analytically encountered: hence this chapter will 
consider the remoter implications of this view - the extension of aesthetic 
categories to intellectual constructs - while the next chapter will consider the 
central doctrines of this view from which descends inter alia the broadening of the 
category of objects of aesthetic perception to embrace the class of intellectual 
constructs. 
2. Hutcheson's discussion of intellectual beauty 
Hutcheson's account of beauty in intellectual constructs derives unbrokenly from 
his more general aesthetic theory: the objective qualities to which he attributes the 
cause of the occurrence of · ideas of beauty in the observer are in his theory the 
same independently of whether the object of perception is an intellectual 
construct or a material object, such as a natural scene or a work of art.6 
6 
Hutcheson's theory of beauty stands in the context of representative 
Few critical discussions of Hutcheson's aesthetics have yet appeared, but the edition 
of Hutcheson (1725) utilized in this section includes an introduction, notes and bibliography by Kivy. 
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realism, of which the central presupposition was that the qualities of objects are 
distinct from, and in fact the causes of, 'ideas' , the only immediate materials of 
sensory awareness. Accordingly for Hutcheson beauty is an idea occasioned in 
the mind by a quality of external objects: he states that 'the word beauty is taken 
for the idea raised in us, and a sense of beauty for our power of receiving this idea.'7 In 
further characterizing the nature of the idea of beauty Hutcheson appeals to the 
distinction between ideas of 'primary' and ideas of 'secondary' qualities, drawn 
by J. Locke as follows: 
The ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, 
and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the 
ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no 
resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing 
in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies, we denominate 
from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us: and 
what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, 
and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which 
we call so.8 
Whereas the primary qualities are inseparable from matter and are found in every 
part of it, the secondary qualities are not intrinsic qualities but merely powers in 
the objects to produce sensory effects in us by means of the primary qualities. In 
a passage clearly inspired from the Lockean formulation, Hutcheson sets out a 
view of beauty as a secondary quality consisting of the reaction of the observer to 
certain of the object's primary qualities: 
Let it be observed that by absolute or original beauty is not 
understood any quality supposed to be in the object which should of 
itself be beautiful, without relation to any mind which perceives it. 
For beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the 
perception of some mind; so cold, hot, sweet, bitter, denote the 
sensations in our minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance 
in the objects which excite these ideas in us, however we generally 
imagine otherwise.9 
Hutcheson here construes beauty as the response of the aesthetic perception to 
objective characteristics of the perceived. 
Having specified what kind of entity are ideas of beauty, Hutcheson turns 
to investigate the quality of objects which causes their occurrence in the human 
mind. 'Since it is certain', he writes, 'that we have ideas of beauty and harmony, 
let us examine what quality in objects excites these ideas, or is the occasion of 
7 
8 
Hutcheson (1725), p. 34; emphasis in the original. 
Locke (1690), p. 137. I have simplified the typography of this passage. 
Hutcheson (1725), pp. 38-9; emphasis in the original. 
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them.110 Hutcheson's examination quickly yields the required property of objects 
of perception: 
The figures which excite in us the ideas of beauty seem to be those in which there is uniformity amidst variety. [ ... ] What we call beautiful in objects, to speak in the mathematical style, seems to be in 
compound ratio of uniformity · and variety: so that where the 
uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety; and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity.11 
In Hutcheson's view the property of 'uniformity amidst variety' causes those 
ideas of beauty which are formed in the mind through the perception of scenes in 
nature or works of art. 
A considerable part of the remainder of Hutcheson's treatise on aesthetics 
is concerned to provide examples of the application of this explanatory principle 
to the perception of various classes of objects. Hutcheson clearly hopes that those 
objects which in his view can be shown to possess 'uniformity amidst variety' to 
the greatest degree will also be those which the reader naturally finds most 
beautiful. He considers as a preliminary example the set of the regular polygons, 
perhaps because the number of their sides permits a clearly comprehensible and 
easily quantifiable measure of the degree to which they exhibit uniformity amidst 
variety, and thus a measure of the potency with which their perception will cause 
the idea of beauty to be conceived in the observer: 
First, the variety increases the beauty in equal uniformity. The beauty of an equilateral triangle is less than that of the square, 
which is less than that of a pentagon, and this again is surpassed by the hexagon. [ ... ] The greater uniformity increases the beauty amidst 
equal variety in these instances: an equilateral triangle, or even an isosceles, surpasses the scalenum; a square surpasses the rhombus or lozenge.12 
The modern reader finds the project of ranking geometrical figures according to a 
degree of beauty which varies proportionally with the number of their sides 
artificious and gratuitous: artificious because there is severe doubt whether the 
notion of beauty can be linked in such a pedestrian manner to a numerical 
variable, and gratuitous because it is no longer considered the task of an aesthetic 
theory to order geometrical figures by degree of beauty. 
Whilst Hutcheson fails to impart lasting value to his treatise in those 
passages which speculate on quantitative measures of beauty, his remarks on 
10 
11 
12 
Ibid., p. 39; emphasis in the original. 
Ibid., p. 40; emphasis in the original. 
Ibid ., pp. 40-1. 
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intellectual beauty attain greater significance. Hutcheson's anxiety to extend the 
scope of aesthetic theory to embrace the aesthetic dimensions of intellectual 
constructs is demonstrated when his treatment turns to consider the ways in 
which the property of 'uniformity amidst variety' may be said to be encountered 
in the cultivation of the empirical sciences. His attention is devoted mainly to 
astronomy, where he finds his views most clearly illustrated. 
Hutcheson draws a distinction which is · obviously fundamental to any 
analysis of the aesthetic appeal of science: he differentiates between the beauty of 
the systems which constitute the subject-matter of science and the beauty intrinsic 
to the theories which model or study those systems. Where however a less subtle 
investigator setting out to study the circumscribed topic of the beauty of theories 
would simply have dismissed the first form of beauty as irrelevant to the project, 
Hutcheson sees there too material useful to the consideration of the aesthetic 
aspects of scientific theories. The progressive unfolding of Hutcheson's treatment 
of the matter suggests that he believes the aesthetic perception of the natural 
systems studied by scientific theories to be more complex than the process of 
merely observing a landscape and drawing from it a sensation of beauty. 
According to Hutcheson the idea of beauty produced by contemplation of 
the natural systems studied by science is not reducible to the similar idea 
obtained from the unmediated observation of a natural scene: the former 
experience is crucially mediated by the scientific theory which alone allows us to 
grasp the structure of the system and to recognize beauty in it. The sensation of 
beauty which one feels under those circumstances could not be attained without 
recourse in the very act of perception to the theory which models the natural 
systems constituting the object of perception. The aesthetic perception of a natural 
system under those circumstances is a perception of the system through the 
mediation of theory. One might term it a theory-laden aesthetic perception of a 
natural phenomenon by similarity with the theory-laden observation of so-called 
empirical qualities of which the philosophy of science has long debated: in each 
case the quality attributed to the object is perceived not unmediatedly but 
through the crucial interpretative medium of relevant theory. Hutcheson thus 
appears to suggest that the theory-laden aesthetic p~rception of a natural system 
which constitutes the subject-matter of a complex of scientific theories is 
essentially different from the common-sense aesthetic perception of a natural 
scene to which our access is pre-scientific. 
Hutcheson thus envisages three forms of aesthetic perception, each of 
which is further removed from nature and more heavily dependant upon 
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conceptualization than is the previous one, but all of which are apt to be 
occasioned by the scrutiny of the same natural object: the unrnediated aesthetic 
perception of natural scenes, the aesthetic perception of natural systems as these 
are comprehended by the mediating scientific theory, and the aesthetic perception 
of scientific theories themselves. These three increasingly abstract forms of 
aesthetic perception find their correspondent in the three stages of Hutcheson's 
treatment of the astronomical example. 
Hutcheson first acknowledges that celestial bodies show in the regularity of 
their shapes and their orbits great aesthetic appeal: 
The forms of all the great bodies in the universe are nearly spherical, 
the orbits of their revolutions generally elliptic, and without great 
eccentricity, in those which continually occur to our observation. Now these are figures of great uniformity, and therefore pleasing to 
us.13 
The perception of the sphericity of the celestial bodies or the near-circularity of 
their orbits may well be attained by observation unmediated by theory, though 
perhaps not by the efforts of an earth-bound observer alone. Hutcheson moves to 
the second level of aesthetic perception in finding the origin of beauty not only in 
the shapes and motions of celestial bodies but also in the understanding of 
celestial configurations in terms characteristic of the astronomical theory which 
the observer employs to interpret the natural system before his or her eyes. This 
new sensation of beauty is yielded by theory-mediated perception and hence is 
not reducible to the sensation experienced by merely gazing at the night sky. In 
Hutcheson's example this sensation is gained from contemplation of the constancy 
or the interrelations of the quantitative parameters characteristic to the theory's 
structure, which are not offered to the perception save through the suggestion of 
theory. Hutcheson refers to terms such as masses, distances and periods of 
revolution, none of which is an object of unmediated perception but each of 
which is apprehended through understanding of the theory. The allusion in the 
following passage to the routine calculations of the astronomer suggests that 
Hutcheson envisaged perception of this form of beauty to be characteristic to the 
expert practitioner, who alone is able to apprehend the necessary mathematical 
variables and relations: 
Further, to pass by the less obvious uniformity in the proportion of 
their quantities of matter, distances, times of revolving, to each 
other, what can exhibit a greater instance of uniformity amidst 
variety than the constant tenour of revolutions in nearly equal times, 
Ibid., p. 42. 
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in which each planet around its axis, and the central fire, or sun, through all the ages of which we have any records, and in nearly the same orbit? [ ... ] These are the beauties which charm the 
astronomer, and make his tedious calculations pleasant.1'' 
The third stage of Hutcheson's treatment turns not to the sense of beauty 
afforded by the contemplation of nature, nor yet the sense gained from the 
contemplation of nature mediated by the scientific understanding, but the sense 
obtained from the perception of the products of science, or scientific theories. 
Hutcheson clearly believes that some theories possess the property of 'uniformity 
amidst variety' to exemplary degree. It is in theories of great generality which are 
known with certainty, or 'universal truths demonstrated',15 that Hutcheson 
discerns the greatest capacity for aesthetic appeal: there is no kind of beauty 'in 
which we shall see such an amazing variety with uniformity, and hence arises a 
very great pleasure distinct from prospects of any further advantage.'16 The reason 
for this is that in such theories 'we may find included, with the most exact 
agreement, an infinite multitude of particular truths, nay, often a multitude of 
infinities.'17 He contrasts the strength of the idea of beauty produced in those who 
contemplate such a theory with that afforded by the perception of a 
generalization which is merely inductive and thus not known with certainty: 
Let us compare our satisfaction in such discoveries with the uneasy 
state of mind when we can only measure lines, or surfaces, by a 
scale, or are making experiments which we can reduce to no general 
canon, but are only heaping up a multitude of particular incoherent 
observations. Now each of these trials discovers a new truth, but 
with no pleasure or beauty, notwithstanding the variety, till we can discover some unity or reduce them to some general canon.18 
Hutcheson states that the beauty which derives from the contemplation of 
generalizations proved with certainty is to be found notably in geometry; he does 
not however omit to mention an example from the empirical sciences of a theory 
capable of producing in the observer an equally strong idea of beauty: 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
There is another beatity in propositions when one theorem contains 
a great multitude of corollaries easily deducible from it. Thus there 
are some leading or fundamental properties upon which a long 
series of theorems can be naturally built. Such a theorem is the 35th 
Ibid., pp. 42-3. 
Ibid., p. 48. 
Ibid. The idea that the contemplation of such constructs may bring aesthetic gratification which is 'distinct from prospects of any further advantage' will play an important part in the definition of the attitude of disinterested attention which the next chapter will present as characteristic of one construal of aesthetics. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 49. 
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of the 1st Book of Euclid, from which the whole art of measuring 
right-lined areas is deduced by resolution into triangles which are 
the halves of so many parallelograms [ .. ~]. In the search of nature 
there is the like beauty in the knowledge of some great principles or 
universal forces from which innumerable effects do flow. Such is gravitation in Sir Isaac Newton's scheme.19 
Maintaining consistency with the principle which sees as the cause of ideas of 
beauty the property of 'uniformity amidst variety', the beauty which Hutcheson 
discerns in theories of empirical science springs from their generality and 
unifying power. As the following chapters will illustrate, this feature of theories 
has been cited by practising scientists from the time of Hutcheson to the present 
as a central component of their notions of theoretical beauty: Hutcheson' s theory 
of intellectual beauty to this extent captured elements of the aesthetic sensibility 
and predispositions of the working scientist. 
Hutcheson's treatment of the beauty of scientific theories serves as an 
example of an intellectual itinerary from the most general principles of an 
aesthetic theory - such as the principle that the cause of the idea of beauty in the 
mind of the observer is the object's possession of uniformity amidst variety - to 
the formulation of the problems attendant upon the notion that scientific theories 
may display and be evaluated on their possession of aesthetic value. While the 
details of Hutcheson's approach are not shared by the present treatment, and 
hence in this context a further examination of Hutcheson's views would be of 
largely historiographic interest, the present section has aimed at two results: 
illustrating the way in which the presumption that scientific theories possess 
aesthetic value was reached by a representative exponent of an influential 
aesthetic school, and setting the conceptual scene for what is to ensue. In 
particular, the next chapter will penetrate to a level of analysis deeper than that 
attained in the above exposition of Hutcheson's views, and investigate the nature 
of the aesthetic outlook which permitted and fostered Hutcheson's speculations 
on the beauty of intellectual constructs. The conviction that one may or ought to 
search for beauty in intellectual constructs and more especially in scientific 
theories will there be linked to the aesthetic outlook characterized by the notion 
of disinterested attention. Before that issue is broached, the remainder of this 
chapter will consider some other expressions of the view that intellectual 
constructs display aesthetic value. 
19 Ibid., pp. 50-1; emphasis in the original. 
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3. Some twentieth-century invocations of beauty in science 
Today the application of aesthetic categories to intellectual constructs is 
considerably less familiar to aesthetic theory than it was at the time of Hutcheson. 
H. Osborne laments this decline, which he attributes to changes in the concerns of 
the philosophical community rather than to any lack of value of the notion: 
Nowadays the concept of intellectual beauty is not, I believe, 
commonly repudiated as much as neglected; few of the standard 
works on aesthetics pay more than lip-service to it and I know of 
none which has either attempted a deep analysis or given to it equal 
weight with sensory beauties in the framing of general aesthetic 
concepts.20 
If twentieth-century writers in systematic aesthetics have tended to neglect the 
notion of intellectual beauty, greater interest in this topic has been demonstrated 
by scientists. Later chapters will illustrate and study scientists' use of aesthetic 
features in their practice of theory-assessment; but even where scientists have 
stopped short of suggesting explicitly that such features be used to evaluative 
ends, they have frequently voiced the conviction that scientific theories exhibit 
aesthetic features which are an occasion of delight. 
For instance, H. Poincare attributed great importance to the presence of 
certain aesthetic features in theories of his domain of physics, to the extent of 
appearing to believe that the distinguishing attribute of the mathematical mind is 
not logical but aesthetic.21 Poincare's explanation of the distinction between the 
intellectual beauty encountered in the mathematical investigation of nature and 
the 'sensory' beauty experienced in merely regarding natural scenes recalls the 
corresponding distinction traced by Hutcheson: 
If nature were not beautiful, it would not be worth knowing [ ... ]. Of 
course I do not here speak of that beauty which strikes the senses [ ... ]; I mean that profounder beauty which comes from the harmonious order of the parts and which a pure intelligence can grasp. [ ... ] Intellectual beauty is sufficient unto itself, and it is for its 
sake, more perhaps than for the future good of humanity, that the 
scientist devotes himself to long and difficult labours.22 
Elaborating in another work upon the mechanism by which the 'profounder 
20 
21 
22 
Osborne (1964), p. 160. This essay somewhat ruefully observes that one of the few practices which today invokes the notion of intellectual beauty is the study of chess. Osborne's more specific remarks on beauty in physical theories are contained in his (1984). 
Further on this belief of Poincare see Papert (1978), pp. 105-13. 
Poincare (1905), p. 8. 
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beauty' can be grasped by a 'pure intelligence', Poincare suggests that an aesthetic 
sensibility is exercised in scientific practice: 
It may appear surprising that sensibility should be introduced in 
connexion with mathematical demonstrations, which, it would seem, 
can only interest the intellect. But not if we bear in mind the feeling 
of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms and 
of geometric . elegance. It is a real aesthetic feelint that all true 
mathematicians recognize, and this is truly sensibility. 
Like Hutcheson in quite another historical context, Poincare moves from the 
acknowledgement that a sense of beauty is attained in the contemplation of 
certain intellectual constructs to the investigation of the properties of those 
constructs which are apt to produce the sense in the mind of the observer. He 
reaches a conclusion strikingly similar to that of Hutcheson: 
What are the mathematical entities to which we attribute this 
character of beauty and elegance, which are capable of developing in 
us a kind of aesthetic emotion? Those whose elements are harmoniously arranged so that the mind can, without effort, take in 
the whole without neglecting the details. This harmony is at once a 
satisfaction to our aesthetic requirements, and an assistance to the 
mind which it supports and guides.24 
Poincare's attribution of the idea of beauty to the perception in an intellectual 
construct of a harmonious arrangement which enables the mind to apprehend the 
whole and equally the details within the whole recalls Hutcheson's identification 
of the cause of ideas of beauty with the object's possession of 'uniformity amidst 
variety'. 
Poincare's close contemporary P. Duhem placed no less stress on the 
beauty of physical theory, in a passage tinged by somewhat Whiggish 
historiography: 
It is impossible to follow the march of one of the great theories of physics, to see it unroll majestically its regular deductions starting from initial hypotheses, to see its consequences represent a multitude 
of experimental laws, down to the smallest detail, without being 
charmaj by the beauty of such a construction, without feeling keenly that such a creation of the human mind is truly a work of 
art.25 
A few years later the same portrayal of scientific investigation as an endeavour 
rich in aesthetic or artistic tones, which contribute to the practitioner's conviction 
that science is a valuable and noble product of the human mind, was pursued by 
23 
24 
25 
Poincare (1908), p. 59. 
Ibid. 
Duhem (1906), p. 24. 
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B. Russell: 
Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty - a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without 
appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous 
trappings of painting or sculpture, yet sublimely pure, and capable 
of a stem perfection such as only the greatest art can show.u 
While the present treatment advances no suggestion that such brief statements 
bear the authority necessary to underpin the model of scientific rationality to be 
outlined in the chapters to follow, by such testimonials the suspicion gains 
purchase in the mind of the philosopher that the aesthetic appreciation and 
evaluation of scientific theories is a genuine component of actual scientific 
practice. The degree to which this component may be said to observe the 
methodological injunctions expressed by canons of scientific rationality remains to 
be determined; but the existence of a subject-matter for the succeeding 
investigation is thereby assured. 
4. The literary reception of scientific theories 
Aesthetic value is discerned in scientific theories not only by scientists but also by 
literary and artistic practitioners. The arts have throughout their ~istory devoted 
attention to the findings and theories of the sciences, and have frequently 
identified in scientific theories elements endowed of aesthetic value which they 
have sought to incorporate into their own creations. The aesthetic estimation of 
elements of scientific doctrines within literary or artistic works suggests that 
scientific theories may possess aesthetic value: to this extent the findings of 
literary criticism conform with the pronouncements of scientists themselves in 
supporting the contention that scientific theories are susceptible of aesthetic 
evaluation. 
One of the earliest literary critics to address in systematic fashion the task 
of analyzing the references to scientific beliefs in works of literature was I.A. 
26 
27 
B. Russell (1917), p. 49. 
See Richards (1926). 
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Richards. 27 Since his time studies of this topic have greatly proliferated.28 The 
amount of data and analysis therein accumulated renders it unnecessary for this 
section to provide more than brief examples of the aesthetic estimation of 
scientific beliefs in literary works. 
That literature has frequently drawn its aesthetic devices from current or 
recent natural philosophical or scientific beliefs is indubitable. For instance, the 
imagery of the centre and the circumference of the circle are persistent aesthetic 
devices in seventeenth-century English poetry and especially in the works of J. 
Donne, J. Milton and A. Marvell. These devices are often explicitly drawn from 
the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic cosmology which had prevailed earlier in the 
century and which attributed to the orbits of celestial bodies the circular form 
considered the sole figure appropriate to the perfection of the superlunary 
region.29 Milton transposes the circle from planetary astronomy to Christian 
poetry in describing the angels' celebration of God's pronouncement 'This day I 
have begot whom I declare My only Son': 
That day, as other solemn days, they spent 
In song and dance about the sacred hill, 
Mystical dance, which yonder starry sphere 
Of planets and of fixed in all her wheels 
Resembles nearest, mazes intricate, 
Eccentric, intervolved, yet regular 
Then most, when most irregular they seem, 
And in their motions harmony divine 
So smooths her charming tones, that God's own ear 
Listens delighted.30 
It is clear that in this passage Milton attributes to the angels in the celebratory 
dance motions drawn from the domain of cosmology: the circular motions 
attributed by Ptolemaic astronomy to celestial bodies are transposed from figures 
of astronomical theory to poetical trope, and as such are beheld as vehicles of 
aesthetic value. Milton's aesthetic delight is stimulated by the perception not of 
the motions of the angels in the imagined dance, nor yet by the motions of the 
28 
29 
30 
The critical discussion of literary references to scientific theories has been surveyed by Schatzberg, Johnson and Waite eds (1987), which has largely superceded Dudley 
ed. (1968). Although such discussions seem to have been pursued most keenly in English-language literary criticism, the same topic has attracted attention in other 
cultures; the Italian debate on literary references to science, for instance, is charted by Battistini ed. (1977), esp. pp. 222-34. 
Further on the incorporation of cosmological imagery in seventeenth-century English poetry see Nicolson (1950), pp. 47-80, and (1956), pp. 1-79. 
Paradise Lost, Book V, ll. 618-27 (Fowler ed. 1968, pp. 297-8). Paradise Lost is of 1667. Further on the cosmological imagery in Milton see Nicolson (1950), pp. 51-2, and (1956), pp. 80-109. 
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bodies in the heavens, but by the perception of the astronomical theory which 
attributes such motions to the celestial bodies. That the object of Milton's aesthetic 
delight is the theory rather than any physical manifestations of movement is 
suggested by his reference not to the motions of the celestial bodies as they 
appear in the sky to the observer, which are 'intricate, eccentric, intervolved' and 
thus scarcely regular or . harmonious, but to their actual motions which are 
'regular then most when most irregular they seem.' Any regularity of the celestial 
motions to which Milton refers is invisible to the observer of the physical 
phenomena and can be apprehended only by turning one's gaze from the 
heavens to the domain of physical theory: it is in the physical theory rather than 
in the night sky that any regularity resides. The harmony in which Milton 
delights is proper not to the observed motions of the celestial bodies but to the 
structure of Ptolemaic theory. It is hence the astronomical theory itself, or the 
world view which is underpinned by that theory, which is in Milton's eyes the 
source of aesthetic value. 
If Milton's poetry expresses the serenity and confidence imbued by the 
aesthetic delight at the perception of a secure world-view, the poetry of Donne 
can express aesthetic horror at the overthrow of that cosmology. Donne voices the 
apprehension of his contemporaries at the realization that natural philosophy no 
longer constitutes the model of harmony and propriety: 
And new Philosophy cals all in doubt, 
The Element of fire is quite put out; 
The Sunne is lost, and th' earth, and no mans wit 
Can well direct him, where to looke for it. 
And freely men confesse, that this world's spent, 
When in the Planets, and the Firmament 
They seeke so many new; they see that this 
Is crumbled out againe to his Atomis. 
'Tis all in pieces, all cohaerence ~one; 
All iust supply, and all Relation. 1 
Again, the object of the poet's perception, and the source of Donne' s horror as 
much as of Milton' s satisfaction, is not the physical appearance of the universe 
but rather the philosophical theories which model that appearance. The stimulus 
responsible for a community's transition from the state of satisfaction expressed 
by Milton to the state of anxiety voiced by Donne could not have been a new 
observation of the behaviour of the universe: clearly when Donne laments that 
this world 'is crumbled out againe to his Atomis' he refers :not to any newly-
31 The First Anniuersary: An Anatomy of The World, 11. 205-14 (Manley ed. 1963, p. 73). This poem was written in 1611. Further on Donne's cosmological imagery see Nicolson (1956), pp. 58-79. 
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performed observations of the universe but rather to the perception of new 
theories of the universe. The aesthetic object of Donne's poem is thus a 
conceptual construct, a natural philosophical theory of which he was appraised 
and which he saw as an object of aesthetic revulsion. 
While English poets of the seventeenth century displayed aesthetic 
responses to the structure of Aristotelian and Ptolemaic cosmology and to its 
overthrow, the aesthetic attention of those of the succeeding century was 
occupied partly by the world-view erected by Newtonian physics. Both the 
deterministic mechanics of the Principia and the theory of light of the Opticks 
attracted literary responses: the conception of the universe as a clockwork 
mechanism and of white light as a mixture of the spectral colours provided basic 
imagery and symbolism for much eighteenth-century poetry.32 To the extent to 
which they were utilized as poetic figures, these conceptions were perceived as 
bearing aesthetic value. 
Scientific theories have continued to attract aesthetic responses to this day. 
Darwin's theory of evolution was perceived as a construct of rich aesthetic 
value.33 In the twentieth century the theory of relativity has provoked a wealth of 
literary and artistic discussion, which has focused yet again not on the 
phenomena postulated by the theory ·but on the theory's assertions and the 
rupture which it wrought on general culture.34 
Literary criticism finds that scientific theories constitute an object of 
aesthetic perception in the literature of all ages. If theories are deemed 
appropriate objects of aesthetic perception by literary practitioners, the suggestion 
appears more plausible that scientific communities too should record and react to 
the aesthetic features of theories which they encounter. The principles of 
philosophical aesthetics under which such a perception of scientific theories is 
possible form the object of the next chapter. 
32 
33 
34 
See Nicolson (1946), esp. pp. 107-31, and Bush (1950), esp. pp. 51-78. 
The literary responses to Darwinism have been surveyed by Beer (1983), pp. 104-258, and Levine (1988). 
The reaction of the literary-artistic community to the theories of relativity is extensively described by Friedman and Donley (1985), esp. pp. 67-109; further on the relation between Einstein's work and the humanities see e.g. Ryan ed. (1987). 
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5. The perception of beauty in abstract objects 
While the interest of the present treatment lies in scientific methodology rather 
than cognitive psychology, it is necessary to adduce some explanation of how it 
may be possible for the observer to discern aesthetic value in an abstract object 
such as a scientific theory. Oearly it is not adequate to suggest that such 
intellectual beauty is perceived directly through the exercise of the normal or 
external senses, as the beauty of a painting would presumably be perceived. 
Hutcheson suggested a solution by positing the existence alongside the 
'external senses' - which are held responsible for the perception of ideas of 
beauty in external bodies - of an 'internal sense' apt to conceive ideas of beauty 
from the contemplation of abstract objects.35 He cites evidence from musical 
aesthetics: 'In music we seem universally to acknowledge something like a 
distinct sense from the external one of hearing, and call it a good ear.'36 
It is however not necessary to postulate an extra human sense for the 
perception of beauty in abstract objects. It is sufficient to suppose that the 
observer perceives elements of beauty not in the abstract object itself but in a 
token or representation of the object to which the aesthetic features of the object 
are transposed. For instance, a musical composition is universally deemed to 
possess aesthetic features, but it is at least plausible to suggest that those who 
contemplate such features perceive them not in the composition in itself, which is 
an abstract entity, but in some performance or other representation of the 
composition. Musicology implicitly acknowledges an operation similar to this 
transposition when it refers to the aesthetic features of a piece upon perception of 
t.he aesthetic features of one of its performances. 
Similarly it is plausible to suggest that the aesthetic features of scientific 
theories are perceived not directly in the abstract entity constituted by the theory 
but in some formulation of the theory on paper. By this device is averted the 
necessity of postulating the existence of human sensory modes outside those 
externally activated. 
35 
36 
Hutcheson (1725), p. 34. 
Ibid., p. 35; emphasis in the original. 
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THE AESTHETIC STANCE 
1. Two views of aesthetics 
The previous chapter outlined. some expressions of the view that aesthetic value is 
to be found in intellectual constructs and especially in scientific theories. These 
expressions were used to suggest that there exists in intellectual communities -
both within scientific circles and more widely - a practice of discerning beauty in 
science as well as in other objects of the intellect. Since the purpose of the 
previous chapter was merely to advance this suggestion in the mind of the 
onlooker, and thereby to gain legitimacy for the study of aesthetic features of 
science, little reference to philosophical aesthetics was required. The present 
chapter on the contrary will tum to considerations taken from aesthetic theory. 
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate a view of aesthetics which 
exhibits two characteristics: it possesses a distinguished. history in aesthetic 
speculation, and it offers an outlook particularly well suited to the investigation 
of aesthetic features of scientific theories. This chapter will therefore establish the 
foundations in philosophical aesthetics for the study of aesthetic criteria of theory-
assessment which constitutes the principal object of this work. 
The discipline of aesthetics may broadly speaking be defined in two ways. 
It may be defined as the study of some of the features of a specified. class of 
objects of pe~ception, or as the study of a specified. mode of attention or 
perception in the beholder. Definitions of the former type may be termed 
objective in as far as they stipulate the class of objects deemed susceptible of 
aesthetic perception, whilst definitions of the second type are subjective in the 
sense that they codify the mode of perception which is constitutive of aesthetic 
perception. Use here of the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' is not intended. to 
suggest any difference between the degrees to which the two definitions admit of 
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impersonal or absolutist specification.1 
Definitions of the subjective type possess advantages over objective 
definitions for both the philosophical fertility of aesthetics in general and the 
study of the aesthetic features of scientific theories in particular. Consider first the 
approach of aesthetic theorists who propose to define their discipline by reference 
to a class of objects. They will tend to identify in their mind a nucleus of that 
class composed of what they take pre-paradigmatically to be 'aesthetic objects', 
and define the class as the set of objects which agglomerate around that nucleus. 
This procedure exhibits two possible shortcomings for present purposes. 
First, definitions of aesthetics of the objective type tend to betray undue 
contamination by art criticism in basing their stipulation of the class of aesthetic 
objects upon the notion of the work of art, which is seen as the quintessential 
'aesthetic object'. Discussions in aesthetics where the discipline is held to be 
objectively defined consequently tend to decay into disquisitions on what should 
count as a work of art and hence as an aesthetic object, during which one 
commonly witnesses the trading among the interlocutors of features deemed 
indicative of 'good art'.2 While the comparative evaluation of the aesthetic 
effectiveness of works of art is an enterprise of interest for the discipline of art 
criticism, it ought presumably to be pursued downstream of the foundation of 
philosophical aesthetics rather than at the outset of aesthetic discussion. 
The attribution of excessive weight to the work of art in the definition of 
the class of aesthetic objects is perhaps a particular instance of the second possible 
shortcoming of the procedure by which the discipline of aesthetics is objectively 
defined. This concerns the speed of response of aesthetic discussion to conceptual 
innovation. Definitions of a practice or phenomenon which are based on a pre-
paradigmatic intuition of the nature of the object are almost invariably affected by 
the problem of conservatism. Frequently the term 'intuition' to which appeal is 
2 
The history of subjective and objective theories of aesthetics is presented in e.g. Listowel (1967), pp. 3-156. 
This approach to the definition of aesthetics is pursued by Beardsley (1961). That work first signals its endorsement of objectivist definitions of the discipline: 'It seems to me useful for aesthetics to have a generic term to mark out, though vague1;y, the objects within its field of interest [ ... ], say the neologism "aesthetic object'' (ibid., p. 177). Beardsley then associates the notion of aesthetic object indissolubly to the work of art: 1 stipulate that all musical compositions are aesthetic objects, all literary works are aesthetic objects, all works of plastic art are aesthetic objects,. .. etc.' (ibid.). He lastly attempts to characterize . what makes a work of art good (ibid., pp. 184-5), a notion around which the class of aesthetic objects will coalesce. It is unlikely that Beardsley's approach would have been able gracefully to resolve the polemic raised over the Tate Gallery's purchase of the controversial abstract work to which allusion will be made later in this section: would that object have counted as 'a work of plastic art' or not? 
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made in such a procedure is a euphemism for common belief engendered by 
prolonged exposure or persuasion: the supposedly unproblematic intuition thus 
represents no more than a prejudice entrenched by past speculation, and offers an 
insecure basis for a philosophically fertile approach to the definiendum.3 This 
danger potentially besets the identification of a nucleus of the class of 'aesthetic 
objects': a theorist's view of what counts as a quintessential aesthetic object may 
result from an upbringing which attributed instinctive preference to a particular 
past aesthetic theory. If so, this procedure imposes a time-lag between advances 
in aesthetic speculation and definitions of the subject-matter of aesthetics: the 
definition of aesthetics accepted at some time would be determined by the beliefs 
of a former time and hence lag behind current aesthetic thought. In particular, 
were daring speculation to suggest that a new set of objects not hitherto included 
in the definitorial class be treated by aesthetic theory, the discipline defined by 
reference to that class would experience difficulty in adjusting to the innovation. 
The approach to aesthetic theory predicated upon objective definitions is in 
these two ways potentially deleterious to the philosophical fertility of aesthetic 
theory in general because it imposes a pre-emptive delimitation of its subject-
matter, circumscribing the breadth of its analysis even before the analysis has 
been undertaken. Definitions of aesthetics of the subjective type do not present 
this danger, since they characterize the discipline as the study not of features of a 
certain class of objects, but rather of features of a certain and distinctive mode of 
attention which may be directed upon objects of perception of any specification. 
Subjective definitions are thus less prone than are their objective counterparts to 
prejudge the question of the range of objects to which aesthetic categories may be 
applied: subjective definitions of aesthetics specify the cast of mind with which 
the aesthetic observer turns to his or her object, but approach with an open mind 
the issue of what the nature of this object may be. 
In view of the fact that aesthetic concerns are closer to the public's heart 
than are tho.se of other branches of philosophy such as metaphysics or 
epistemology, it is perhaps not surprising that the contention between objective 
and subjective definitions of aesthetics has at times erupted into popular debate. 
Some of the discussions have manifested the shortcomings of objective definitions 
3 The danger that the definition of a notion by reference to a pre-paradigmatic intuition may lead to an excessively conservative approach to the study of that notion is apparent in disciplines outside aesthetics, and specifically in the philosophy of science. J.R. Brown (1980, pp. 238-40) criticizes as an approach subject to this danger the reliance of Laudan (1977, pp. 160-1) on pre-analytic intuitions in the characterization of scientific rationality. 
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of aesthetics to which reference was made above. In 1972 the Tate Gallery of 
London acquired Equivalent VIII, a composition by the contemporary U.S. minimal 
sculptor C. Andre consisting of 120 identical ready-made commercial firebricks 
arranged in a low parallelopiped. Four years after its purchase, this work became 
the object of a controversy raised by the British press and reported world-wide.4 
Critics alleged that an · arrangement of bricks did not constitute a suitable object of 
expenditure for an art gallery; defenders of the acquisition maintained that such 
criticism presupposed an excessively circumscribed definition of what counts as a 
work of art, and suggested that a structure of every-day objects like bricks could 
carry aesthetic value. The substance of the controversy was tersely captured in 
The New York Times's headline 'Tate Gallery Buys Pile of Bricks - Or Is It Art?'.5 
At the centre of this controversy lay the two approaches to the definition of 
aesthetics outlined above. Prescribing an objectivist definition of aesthetics, critics 
of the Tate's purchase would doubtless have insisted that the gallery's resources 
be devoted to paradigmatic art-works like paintings or sculptures, presumably 
because these pieces fall within the class of objects which the critics deemed 
susceptible to aesthetic perception. Defenders of the gallery's acquisition policy 
argued on the contrary that any artefact could be an object of aesthetic 
perception, and that the arrangement of bricks was in principle as worthwhile an 
object of aesthetic contemplation as a Constable: Underlying this broad-
mindedness is a notion of aesthetics as the study of the properties of perception 
rather than of the properties of a certain class of objects of perceptio.n. 
It seems a particularly barren philosophical project to attempt to determine 
whether a given object is to count as a pile of bricks or a work of art. One may 
see.k to evade this morass by refusing to constitute the discipline of aesthetics in 
terms of the class of objects of perception to which aesthetic categories will be 
applied, and to choose instead to define the discipline on the basis of the attitude 
of the subject of perception. 
If definitions of aesthetics of the objective type possess certain shortcomings 
for the pursuit of aesthetic speculation in general, they exercise an especially 
severe restrictive effect upon the study of the aesthetic features of scientific 
theories. Objective definitions strive to demarcate the -boundaries of the class of 
aesthetic objects in the light of extant ideas of what constitutes paradigmatic 
objects of aesthetic perception and of preceding speculation in aesthetic theory. As 
5 
For details of Andre's work and the beginnings of the controversy see Alley (1981), pp. 11-2. 
The article of which this was the headline is Semple (1976). 
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section 1 of the previous chapter showed, the study of aesthetic features of 
scientific theories hinges - in opposition to these concerns - upon a negation of 
the classical boundaries of the aesthetic. The study of the aesthetic features of 
scientific theories depends upon an unprecedented transcending of the class of 
objects to which it has customarily been deemed that aesthetic categories may 
appropriately be applied: this enterprise must guard itself against strangulation at 
birth by the imposition of an objective definition of aesthetics which 
unwarrantedly circumscribes the class of the objects of aesthetic perception. 
For considerations of this kind, the present treatment will seek to 
characterize the study of aesthetics by the subjective route. The next section will 
outline a conception of aesthetics as the study of a certain perceptual mode: the 
mode characterized by a lack of utilitarian interest in the object of perception. 
Section 3 of this chapter will retrace the historical origins of this view in the 
works of eighteenth-century English empiricist theorists. 
2. The study of disinterested attention 
Here is a theory about the mode of attention which is activated in aesthetic 
perception. There are perhaps many modes of attention which one may assume in 
the act of perception. These modes will typically be characterized by the aims or 
interests by which the perception is animated or in view of which it is conducted. 
One may for instance gaze upon a gem with the aim to valuate it or regard a 
chess-board with the interests of Black at heart. According to the theory 
developed here, neither of these modes of attention is the kind which is activated 
in aesthetic perception: the mode of attention characteristic of aesthetic perception 
is disinterested. 
'Disinterestedness' denotes an attitude of utilitarian neutrality or 
purposelessness towards an object of perception. As an object of disinterested 
perception, an object is regarded not as means to some end external to itself but 
as the self-contained end of a particular enterprise, the enterprise of perception. 
The disinterested stance towards an object dwells upon not its susceptibility to 
exploitation in the furtherance of some aim, but its intrinsic structure and 
significance. Under disinterested perception an object is autonomous, attended to 
for its own sake: the disinterested stance is characterized by the absence from the 
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scene of purposes exterior or ulterior to the object. 
The mode of attention which is characterized by this purposelessness may 
be termed 'intransitive' in that the act terminates upon the object of attention 
without referring to some entity exterior to that object.6 
It is in failing to meet the condit.ion of purposelessness that many general 
forms of perception differ from aesthetic perception. The observer whose eyes 
strain to value a jewel or to plot Black' s next move is not engaged in aesthetic 
perception. That mode of perception is attained only by banishing from the 
attention concern for ends outside the object of contemplation itself. Thus, not all 
perception of a work of art is aesthetic perception: concern for the patriotic 
emotion evinced by some of the compositions of Edward Elgar or for the 
accuracy with which some paintings of Joseph Wright depict eighteenth-century 
scientific experimentation is strictly outside the bounds of aesthetic perception, 
though it may of course form an important part of a wider description or 
judgement of the work.7 
Elucidation of the nature of aesthetic disinterestedness and examples of the 
application of the mode of attention characterized by it may be gleamed from the 
proponents of this theory in philosophical aesthetics. E. Bullough introduces the 
notion of aesthetic disinterestedness by considering the perception by an observer 
of a sea-fog. He notes that for most observers under ordinary conditions, and 
certainly for mariners, a fog at sea is the cause of a sensation of acute unease or 
discomfort. The reason for which these sensations may arise in . the observers is 
that sailors or passengers of a ship caught in fog do not generally turn upon their 
surroundings an attention shorn of utilitarian interest: they are likely to be in fear 
for the craft's safety or for their lives.8 The mode of attention which they most 
naturally exercise is thus coloured by consideration of their interests in the matter 
of the navigation of their vessel. 
6 
7 
8 
'Intransitivity' is the term introduced by Vivas (1955), pp. 93-9, in defending the tenet that disinterested attention is characteristic of aesthetic perception. 
Outlined in this paragraph is a thesis about aesthetic perception, which rules that all 
attention for utilitarian concerns falls outside that category. Related to this thesis is the more extreme aestheticist doctrine about works of art which holds that such 
objects do not admit of utilitarian or non-aesthetic ends. (The aestheticist doctrine, 
which has found expression in Cousin's phrase 'art for art's sake', is more extreme than the theory of aesthetic disinterestedness developed in this section in that the latter admits that one may perceive utilitarian ends in a work of art, albeit not through an act of aesthetic perception, whereas the former denies this possibility.) As a thesis about works of art rather than the mode of aesthetic perception, 
aestheticism f<ctlls outside the bounds of the present treatment. 
The force of this point is intensified by the recollection that the Titanic was lost in fog in the year in which Bullough's article was published. 
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'Nevertheless', Bullough writes, 'a fog at sea can be a source of intense 
relish and enjoyment. Abstract from the experience of the sea fog, for the moment 
[ ... ]; direct the attention to the features "objectively" constituting the 
phenomenon.'9 Bullough suggests that, if this effort is made, the attention of the 
observer is absorbed by the fog's milky veil, the carrying power of the air, the 
creamy smoothness of the water, the feeling of remoteness from the world. When 
perception is directed to such features for their own sake rather than out of 
concern for the dangers which the atmospheric conditions pose to navigation, 'the 
experience may acquire [ ... ] a flavour of such concentrated poignancy and delight 
as to contrast sharply with the blind and distempered anxiety of its other 
aspects.'10 This difference of outlook is due to the observer's dissociating from the 
utilitarian interests which he or she holds in the situation, and attempting to 
exercise a mode of disinterested attention. Bullough speaks of this abstraction as 
the intervention of a measure of 'psychical distance' between the observer and the 
objects of contemplation. 'Distance [ ... ] is obtained by separating the object and its 
appeal from one's own self, by putting it out of gear with practical needs and 
ends. Thereby the "contemplation" of the object becomes alone possible.m 
Bullough characterizes aesthetic perception as that mode of perception 
which interposes such psychical distance between the observer and his or her 
objects, which puts the object of perception 'out of gear' with the observer's own 
interests in the object. It is the interposition of distance which constitutes a 
characteristic feature of aesthetic perception: aesthetic perception is concerned 
with only the non-utilitarian values in the objects. Thus, a distinction may in 
Bullough's view be drawn between aesthetic values which are non-utilitarian and 
several categories of utilitarian values, which include scientific and ethical values. 
It is Distance which makes the aesthetic object 'an end in itself.' [ ... ] In particular, it is Distance, which supplies one of the special criteria 
of aesthetic values as distinct from practical (utilitarian), scientific, or 
social (ethical) values. All these are concrete values, either directly personal as utilitarian, or indirectly remotely personal, as moral 
values.12 _ 
Bullough thus raises the view that there may broadly speaking exist two modes 
of perception, which differ according to the stance which they maintain in regard 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Bullough (1912), p. 88. 
Ibid., p. 89. 
Ibid., p. 91. 
Ibid., pp. 117-8; emphasis in the original. By 'scientific values' Bullough presumably means the empirical power enshrined in scientific theories which permits inter alta technological application. 
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to the possible utilitarian values of the objects: one mode is the aesthetic, which 
abstracts from such values to consider solely the intrinsic merits of the objects 
(which thus come to be defined as the 'aesthetic values' of those objects) while 
the other mode is the practical, under which the attention is directed to one of the 
several categories of utilitarian values which an object of perception may possess. 
One and the same object is clearly susceptible to being perceived under both 
modes, though presumably not simultaneously; one thus envisages attributing to 
an object of perception a degree of aesthetic value conferred in the course of 
disinterested perception, and separately a degree of practical value - in one of the 
forms that this value can assume - awarded in the act of utilitarian perception.13 
Bullough's treatment of the notion of aesthetic perception constitutes an 
influential contribution to twentieth-century philosophical aesthetics. It has 
naturally not remained immune from criticism, some of which easily finds justification. One of the chief weaknesses of Bullough's theory is the presumption 
that there must exist a special kind of act or state of mind, the specific function of 
which is to make the aesthetic features of objects accessible to the percipient. 
Most subsequent theorists of the aesthetic attitude have considered the 
postulation of these special acts and states of mind as both gratuitous and 
unpalatable on considerations of psychology; these theorists have attributed the 
role which Bullough gives to special mental acts instead to ordinary mental 
attributes functioning in special or perceptually disinterested ways.14 
The conception of the aesthetic attitude as an ordinary action of attending 
which is performed disinterestedly has more recently been pursued in the work 
of J. Stolnitz, who has taken a leading role in promulgating this theory. Stolnitz 
characterizes the 'aesthetic attitude' as 'disinterested and sympathetic attention to 
and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone.'15 
On this characterization, as on Bullough's, aesthetic perception is performed with 
'no concern for any ulterior purpose' .16 
While Stolnitz's formulation of the theory of aesthetic disinterestedness is 
more sophisticated and satisfying than that of Bullough, a well-disposed but 
moderate reader is likely to · conclude that in one respect Stolnitz pursues with 
13 
15 
16 
The juxtaposition of two modes of perception, aesthetic and utilitarian, envisaged by Bullough will come to resemble the distinction between two ways of regarding and evaluating scientific theories which will be pursued in later chapters. 
For criticism of Bullough's theory of disinterested attention - including an attack on his notion of special aesthetic states of mind - see Dickie (1974), pp. 91-112. Stolnitz (1960), pp. 34-5. 
Ibid ., p. 35. 
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clearly excessive zeal the thesis that aesthetic perception may pay regard to no 
end ulterior to the object of perception, and reaches a conclusion which conflicts 
with most intuitive notions of aesthetic perception. Stolnitz identifies as one of the 
ends which transcend the object of perception - and therefore an end the pursuit 
of which is barred to perception which . is fully aesthetic - the aim of applying 
evaluative categories to the object of perception. In his words, if the percipient of 
a work of art 'has the purpose of passing judgement upon it, his attitude is not 
aesthetic.m This statement appears to blur the important distinction between 
evaluations of an object of perception as a means to the accomplishment of an 
end ulterior to itself (for instance, the evaluation of a piece of literature as a 
vehicle for moral reform) and the evaluation of the intrinsic structure or 
significance of the object with no regard for concerns exterior to it. Evaluations of 
the former kind are, on the definition of aesthetic perception elaborated by the 
tradition of Bullough and Stolnitz, foreign to truly aesthetic perception, since such 
evaluations refer essentially to ends exterior to the object and to the aptitude of 
the object to attain them. But evaluations of the second kind pay no regard to 
such exterior ends, and are concerned with what common aesthetic discourse 
considers to be paradigmatically aesthetic values. It therefore seems contrary to 
the spirit of Stolnitz's own approach to rule out the possibility of evaluations of 
this kind in the exercise of aesthetic perception.18 
The present treatment will draw heavily upon Bullough's and Stolnitz's 
conceptions of aesthetic perception as disinterested, but will not pursue the 
further step envisaged by Stolnitz and deny the possibility of aesthetic evaluation 
of objects of perception; indeed, much of what follows will constitute a study of 
the evaluative categories applied by percipients to objects of aesthetic attention. 
3. The rise of the discipline of aesthetics 
While the theory that disinterested attention is a characterizing feature of aesthetic 
perception has attracted much comment in the twentieth century, its original 
17 
18 
Ibid. 
The view aired by Stolnitz that evaluation of an object of perception cannot be performed as part of an act of aesthetic perception is further criticized in Dickie (1974), pp. 127-8. 
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formulation dates from a time 200 years earlier. The present section will briefly 
retrace the historical origin of this aesthetic theory. 
Until the seventeenth century the rules for producing and for evaluating 
works of art were customarily supported by appeal to the works of Aristotle or 
the model of classical writers and artists. The late Renaissance disturbed this 
reliance on authority with two lines of philosophical inquiry which reached their 
height in the Enlightenment.19 One current · was inspired from Cartesian 
rationalism and culminated in the mid-eighteenth century in the works of A.G. 
Baumgarten and G.E. Lessing. This school was animated by the hope that the 
rules for producing and judging art could be attributed a solid, a priori foundation 
by deduction from basic, self-evident axioms, such as the principle that art is the 
imitation of nature. 
The other line was pursued principally by English and Scottish empiricist 
writers. Rather than in the rigorous foundation of aesthetic canons of appraisal, 
these were interested in the psychology of art and especially in the creative 
process and the effect of art on the beholder. Emphasis in the theory of art shifted 
in this tradition from object to subject, from the work of art to its perceiver and 
critic, shadowing the wider transfer of emphasis by the English and Scottish 
Enlightenment (apparent in, for instance, Humean epistemology) from the rational 
to the sensate. 
It is in the work of this school that many elements of the modem discipline 
of aesthetics were forged.20 The first task of aesthetics was to constitute its own 
discipline: it had to be demonstrated that there existed a body of experience not 
accounted for by other philosophical disciplines and which could therefore 
constitute the subject-matter of a distinctive discipline of aesthetics. The 
identification of a peculiar aesthetic approach or attitude to philosophical objects 
was required. 
This search was concluded by the insight that while particular 
philosophical disciplines studied the act of perception of objects in the pursuit of 
given external -values or concerns, as yet none of these disciplines studied pure 
perception or the act of perception detached from ulterior concerns. It is in this 
way that the notion that disinterestedness is consti~tive of aesthetic perception 
19 
20 
On the history of aesthetics from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment see e.g. I<risteller (1952); of that essay pp. 17-24, 32-43 deal with the Cartesian tradition, pp. 24-31 with the empiricist. 
· 
The claim that the British empiricist tradition made in this way an important contribution to the foundation of the discipline of aesthetics is supported in e.g. Stolnitz (1961b), pp. 131-2. Cassirer believes that Shaftesbury founded 'the first really comprehensive and independent philosophy of the beautiful' (1932, p. 312). 
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was coagulated. The use of the term 'aesthetics' to designate a field of study was 
introduced by Baumgarten; but it was in many ways the empiricist school that 
most fully attributed to aesthetics its etymological sense of the pure study of 
perception or contemplation. It is easy to see how such a stance is apt to promote 
the autonomy not only of philosophical aesthetics but also of art criticism: a work 
of art must now be evaluated on its perceptual merits rather than as moral or 
cognitive vehicle.21 
More specifically, the notion of disinterestedness came into prominence 
largely in opposition to two pre-existing philosophical doctrines: the rhetorical 
tradition's view of art-works .as instruments to 'instruct by pleasing', and the 
'intelligent egoism' of T. Hobbes, who had argued that the precepts of morality 
and religion can be retraced to enlightened self-interest. The first philosopher to 
call attention to the notion of disinterested perception was the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury: his writings on this topic mirror the progressive demarcation of 
aesthetic from other philosophical speculation, as the notion of disinterestedness 
originates in his ethical doctrines but soon acquires a purely aesthetic import.22 
Shaftesbury aimed to demonstrate against Hobbes that it is natural to man 
to be unselfish. While Hobbes reconstructed the dictates of morality as the 
codification of a consistent pursuit of self-interest, Shaftesbury insists that 'there 
can be nothing more fatal to virtue than the weak and uncertain belief of a future 
reward and punishrnent.'23 The only legitimate motivation for a man's 
undertaking what is morally righteous is his apprehension of its righteousness: 
Though he may intend to be virtuous, he is not become so for having only intended or aimed at it through love of the reward. But 
as soon as he is come to have any affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such good for its own sake, as good and 
amiable in itself, then he is in some degree good and virtuous, and 
not till then.24 
In cautioning against self-interest as an apt motivation for the pursuit of virtue 
Shaftesbury thus urges in its place not altruism, the common good or some other 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Stolnitz (1961a, p. 100) argues that the notion of aesthetic disinterestedness is not to be found in classical or medieval aesthetic writing and is thus genuinely new to the eighteenth century. The thesis that disinterestedness was a determining principle in the rise of aesthetics in the Enlightenment is forcefully argued by Stolnitz (1961b), on which the present treatment draws. 
Further on Shaftesbury's aesthetics in general see Brett (1951), . pp. 123-44; on his notion of disinterestedness and its ethical forebears see Stolnitz (1961a), pp. 105-13. On the relation between ethical and aesthetic values in Shaftesbury see J.A. Bernstein (1980), pp. 21-60. 
Shaftesbury (1711), vol. I, p. 275. 
Ibid ., pp. 273-4. 
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desirable consequence, but disinterestedness towards all ends. 
The theory of disinterestedness thus originates in the practical domain, for 
it refers to (or, more determinately, rejects as unsuitable to the attainment of 
virtue) actions directed towards certain goals; but the notion acquires a perceptual 
import when Shaftesbury turns to explain how the moral agent can recognize and 
attain rectitude. Virtue, states Shaftesbury, exhibits a harmony or propriety which 
can be apprehended by the agent as perceiver. Shaftesbury explicitly likens this 
perceptual operation to the appreciation of beauty in material objects: 
The case is the same in the mental or moral subjects as in the ordinary bodies or common subjects of sense. The shapes, motions, colours, and proportions of these latter being presented to our eye, there necessarily results a beauty or deformity, according to the different measure, arrangement, and disposition of their several parts. So in behaviour and actions [ ... ]. The mind [ ... ] finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here as in any musical numbers or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things.25 
In Shaftesbury the virtuous agent is conceived as a perceptual subject devoted to 
'the very survey and contemplation' of beauty in morals. While 'disinterestedness' 
thus initially refers to an attitude in moral conduct, elaboration of the notion 
elucidates its perceptual import. Moral rectitude is attained not through the 
cultivation of interests but by dissociating one's conduct from all interests and 
searching for perceptual propriety in moral acts: the attitude of a 'disregard for 
interests' thus comes to characterize the mode of attention exercised in aesthetic 
perception. 
Shaftesbury's most extended discussion of aesthetic disinterestedness occurs 
in one of his later works in which the perceptual commands its own attention 
divorced from moral considerations. Shaftesbury characterizes the attitude of 
aesthetic disinterestedness in contradistinction to a perceptual stance animated by 
a desire to command or use an object of perception to some purpose. Aesthetic 
contemplation, . or the apprehension of beauty, attributes to the object of 
perception no features not intrinsic to the very act of perception, and certainly no 
utilitarian dimension. Shaftesbury suggests that such non-utilitarian perception is 
25 Ibid., p. 251. Hutcheson, Shaftesbury's follower whose views on aesthetic disinterestedness will be discussed below, pursues a similar analogy between the apprehension of moral propriety and the perception of natural beauty: 'The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct than some moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions as we have for the preservation of our bodies. He has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action, and made virtue a lovely form, that we might easily distinguish it from its contrary, and be made happy by the pursuit of it' (1725, p. 25). 
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commonly directed upon elements of the natural world which evade human 
manipulation: 
Imagine [ ... ] if being taken with the beauty of the ocean, which you 
see yonder at a distance, it should come into your head to seek how to command it, and, like some mighty admiral, ride master of the 
sea, would not.the fancy be a little absurd?26 
The fulfilment which would derive from 'possessing' the ocean is 'very different 
from that which should naturally follow from the contemplation of the ocean's 
beauty.'27 
It was remarked in the previous chapter that the characterization of 
aesthetics by reference to a certain mode of perception rather than to a stipulated 
class of 'aesthetic objects' facilitated the extension of aesthetic categories to 
intellectual constructs, and thereby fostered the study of the aesthetic aspects of 
scientific theories. Shaftesbury illustrates the facility with which theories of 
aesthetics of this form can approach the notion of the beauty of intellectual 
objects when he turns from the perception of beauty in nature to the aesthetic 
delight afforded by contemplation of theorems in mathematics: 
There is no one who, by the least progress in science or learning, has 
come to know barely the principles of mathematics, but has found, that in the exercise of his mind on the discoveries he there makes, though merely of speculative truths, he receives a pleasure and delight superior to that of sense. When we have thoroughly searched into the nature of this contemplative delight, we shall find it of a kind which relates not in the least to any private interest of the 
creature, nor has for its object any self-good or advantage of the private system.28 
Shaftesbury's remarks on mathematics appear to foreshadow those of Bullough on 
'scientific values' discussed in the previous section: the formulations of both these 
theorists of aesthetic disinterestedness raise the prospect of the existence of two 
modes of attention which may be directed upon the products of scientific 
26 
27 
28 
Shaftesbury· (1711), vol. II, p. 126. Shaftesbury also rebuts the objections of those who argue that one experiences art for the sake of the pleasure which will derive, by means of a distinction between the aesthetic appreciation of beauty and the second-order (non-aesthetic) awareness of the gratification thereby produced: 
'Though the reflected joy or pleasure which arises from the notice of this pleasure once perceived, may be interpreted a self-passion or interested regard, yet the original satisfaction can be no other than what results from the love of truth, proportion, order and symmetry in the things without' (ibid., vol. I, p. 296). Hutcheson draws a similar distinction: 'It plainly appears that some objects are immediately the occasions of this pleasure of beauty, and that we have senses fitted for perceiving it, and that it is distinct from that jay which arises upon prospect of advantage' (1725, p. 37). 
Shaftesbury (1711), vol. II, p. 127. 
Ibid., vol. I, p. 296. 
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research. One, implicitly allowed in the passage of Shaftesbury reproduced above, 
relates to the interests which the percipient may hold in the use of a theorem or 
theory; the other, which Shaftesbury is concerned to distinguish from the former, 
yields a 'contemplative delight' which is wholly disjoint from prospects of 
utilitarian advantage. Again, the ideas . underlying this partition of concerns 
between modes of attention will be exploited later in the present work to suggest 
that scientific practice commonly evaluates theories separately on a logico-
empirical (and thus utilitarian) canon on the one hand and on an aesthetic (or 
disinterested) canon on the other. 
The aesthetic works of Hutcheson were examined in the previous chapter 
for their references to the application of aesthetic categories to constructs of the 
intellect. It was suggested there that his readiness to extend aesthetic discourse to 
intellectual objects was prompted by his general aesthetic theory, but illustration 
of this connection has thus far been postponed. Hutcheson's views on aesthetics 
in general follow closely those of Shaftesbury, and indeed the treatise containing 
almost all his writings on aesthetics was conceived as a defence of the theories of 
his predecessor. Hutcheson too suggests that the verdicts delivered by aesthetic 
judgements are independent of any thought for the consequences of the act of 
judgement: 
Neither can any resolution of our own, nor any prospect of 
advantage or disadvantage, vary the beauty or deformity of an 
object. [ ... ] So propose the whole world as a reward, or threaten the greatest evil, to make us approve a deformed object, or disapprove a beautiful one: dissimulation may be procured by rewards or threatenings, or we may in external conduct abstain from any pursuit of the beautiful, and pursue the deformed, but our sentiments 
of the forms, and our perceptions, would continue invariably the 
same. [ ... ] Nay, do not we often see convenience and use neglected to obtain beauty, without any other prospect of advantage in the beautiful form than the suggesting the pleasant ideas of beauty?29 
On this basis Hutcheson excludes from the aesthetic stance any concern for 
utilitarian benefit. Such profit may be welcomed and may arouse pleasure; but 
this pleasure is wholly different from the appreciation of beauty. It follows that 
the aesthetic interest is indifferent to the causal and other relationships which the 
object has to things beyond itself. 
29 
Under this conception, nothing is a priori barred from the scope of aesthetic 
Hutcheson (1725), pp. 36-7. Hutcheson's question, whether we do not often 'see convenience and use neglected to obtain beauty', with 'no prospect of advantage' save 'the pleasant', will assume relevance to theory-choice in science in a later chapter where it will be suggested that adherents of degenerating paradigms in scientific revolution pursue beauty in theories to the neglect of empirical virtues. 
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criticism: it becomes an empirical question whether aesthetic interest is aroused 
by a given class of entities. Like Shaftesbury before him, Hutcheson thus 
considers the feelings aroused by the contemplation of a scientific theory and 
concludes that such objects too ought to fall within the domain of aesthetic 
discussion. 
In particular he distinguishes the aesthetic contemplation of a theory from 
an awareness of the narrowly scientific or empirical utility which its application 
affords: 
It is easy to see how men are charmed with the beauty of such knowledge, besides its usefulness [ ... ]. And this pleasure we enjoy even when we have no prospect of obtaining any other advantage from such manner of deduction than the immediate pleasure of contemplating the beauty.30 
It is hoped that the constant recurrence of the distinction between the aesthetic or 
disinterested and the empirical or utilitarian modes of perception applicable to 
intellectual constructs which characterizes the history of this aesthetic theory will 
prepare the ground for the claim in the next chapter that scientific practice 
similarly distinguishes between empirical and aesthetic evaluations of scientific 
theories. 
Aided by the great influence enjoyed by the works of Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, the notion of aesthetic disinterestedness dominated much of the 
remainder of in eighteenth-century British philosophy, finding for instance in A. 
Gerard one of its proponents in the latter half of the century.31 But ·it was I. Kant 
who reformulated and lent rigour to the ideas less systematically discussed by the 
eighteenth-century English aestheticians.32 
Kant brought the theory of aesthetic judgement within the ambit of a 
general theory of 'teleological judgement' by which he believed that he had 
bridged the gulf excavated in his previous works between the concept of Nature, 
which was the realm of law and science, and the concept of Freedom, which was 
the realm of s_elf-imposed rational principles or ends. In the teleological judgement, under which he subsumes the aesthetic judgement, he believed th.?.t 
he had found the link between the spheres of natural science and morality. 
30 
31 
32 
In the opening sections of the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement' Kant casts 
Ibid., p. 51. 
On the later developments of the notion of aesthetic disinterestedness in eighteenth-century British philosophy see Stolnitz (1961b), pp. 134-9. 
On disinterestedness and attitude in Kant's aesthetics see Osborne (1968), pp. 113-30, and McCloskey (1987), pp. 29-49, on which I have drawn. 
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into a logical mould Shaftesbury's discrimination of a specifically 'aesthetic' 
attitude to the world. Where the English aestheticians had been interested in the 
psychological description of the aesthetic attitude and the psychological 
differences between it and practical attitudes, Kant concerned himself with the 
grounds of judgement, differentiating the logical basis of aesthetic judgements 
from that of the judgements we make about the other kinds of pleasure which 
things give us, and from that of judgements about utility and goodness. 
To differentiate aesthetic judgements from moral judgements, judgements 
of utility or judgements of sensual pleasure, Kant turns to Shaftesbury's notion of 
disinterested attention. Kant believed that aesthetic judgements must be entirely 
free of interest. 'Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is 
tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of 
taste.'33 Coherently with this insistence, the First Moment of the Analytic of the 
Beautiful defines the the faculty of aesthetic perception and the quality of the 
object of perception capable of yielding aesthetic pleasure as follows: 'Taste is the 
faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight 
or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful.'34 
With the influence of Kant the notion of aesthetic disinterestedness attained 
a central position in aesthetic speculation. In particular, the idea that disinterested 
pleasure was distinctive of aesthetic experience remained central to Schiller and 
the German Idealists. 
33 
u 
Kant (1790), p. 43. 
Ibid., p. 50; emphasis in the original. The English aestheticians had contrasted the disinterested attitude with 'interest' in the sense of a desire to possess or manipulate a thing. Kant excluded from the aesthetic attitude not merely considerations of advantage but any concern for the very existence of a thing. To reach a pure aesthetic experience, he writes, 'one must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste' (ibid., p. 43). 
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THEORY-EVALUATION ON AESTHETIC GROUNDS 
One can always make a theory, many theories, to account for known facts, occasionally even to predict new ones. The test is aesthetic.1 
Sir George Thomson 
1. A conceptual vacancy is announced and filled 
Here the concerns and approaches of the foregoing chapters will be conjoined to 
yield the conclusion which will engage the central section of the present 
treatment. Chapter 2 surmised that reference to logico-empirical evaluative criteria 
was alone insufficient to reconstruct salient instances of theory-evaluation, and 
that recourse to extra-empirical criteria was required. In an apparent break with 
the concerns of the philosophy of science, chapter 3 suggested the existence in 
scientific and wider cultural circles of a practice of discerning aesthetic value in 
intellectual constructs, and retraced some of the philosophical ancestry of the 
application of aesthetic categories to such objects. Chapter 4 explored the theory 
central to Western philosophy and art criticism that aesthetic perception is 
characterized by disinterested attention; this strand of aesthetic theory views 
perception as an act detached from considerations of the practical utility or 
advantage afforded by the object of contemplation. 
The several investigations in the historiography and methodology of 
science and in the theory of aesthetic perception here briefly summarized bring to 
mind an intuitively attractive synthesis. Logico-empirical evaluative criteria prize 
those theoretical -qualities which are held in methodology to be constitutive of 
observational success, the posited goal of science. The historian's intuition that 
there must sit over theories a jury alongside that composed of logico-empirical 
criteria opens a conceptual vacancy: since its announcement in chapter 2 above, 
the search has been joined for a class of non-empirical evaluative criteria for use 
in the reconstruction of the history of science and in characterizations of scientific 
Thomson (1961), p. 17. 
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rationality. 
The terms of the search stipulate some requirements to be satisfied by any 
class of criteria which aspires to fill the vacancy: one wishes for a class of criteria 
of theory-evaluation which are disjoint from logico-empirical evaluative criteria in 
being unconcerned for the empirical success of the theories to which they are 
applied in judgement. One should in addition like prima facie evidence to show 
that such criteria have been widely applied in · significant instances of theory-
evaluation and choice in history; one may lastly hope that the class of criteria 
which meets these requirements be philosophically interesting, in that it is itself 
susceptible to substantial philosophical analysis or that it contributes to 
elucidating the nature of scientific rationality. 
While chapter 2 announced the vacancy and urged a search for a class of 
non-empirical evaluative criteria by which it might be filled, the two subsequent 
chapters laid the grounds upon which such a class . may be constructed. The 
present treatment will propose that the vacancy be filled by a canon of aesthetic 
evaluative criteria which embody the disinterested perceptual attitude specified in 
chapter 4. Since this attitude is characterized by unconcern for forms of utility or 
advantage, the canon of evaluative criteria which embodies it will fulfill to the 
highest standard the requirement of extra-empiricality: this canon will remain 
aloof from calculations of the technological applicability demonstrated, the 
predictive power exhibited or even - the least nakedly utilitarian of the logico-
empirical concerns of scientists - the observational success aUained by the 
scientific theories which constitute its objects of perception. This second canon 
will evaluate theories by reference to qualities quite unlike those - which are 
constitutive of observational success - of predictive accuracy or the generation of 
novel predictions: it will instead value non-utilitarian, aesthetic qualities of 
theories. 
The suggestion advanced here is thus that in scientific practice there is a 
second jury sitting over theories beside that of the logico-empirical criteria, 
evaluating theories by reference to aesthetic criteria. A scientific community's 
overall canon of theory-assessment - the effects of the application of which to 
instances of theory-choice transpire in the history of science - is composed of the 
two classes of logico-empirical and aesthetic evaluative criteria. Although, as will 
be argued in later chapters, the two classes of evaluative criteria differ in many 
respects including the manner of their historical origin and the degree of their 
temporal variability, · the present treatment intends to attribute to them equal 
prim.a facie methodological dignity, in an even-handedness which demands that 
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serious philosophical attention be directed at the aesthetic evaluative canon no 
less than to the more familiar logical-empirical canon. 
In the intention of the present treatment, this suggestion will itself be judged on the two grounds outlined in the methodological introduction supplied 
in chapter 2: the reader will be invited to test the facility with which a 
philosophical view of science incorporating this suggestion can provide a coherent 
and convincing reconstruction of past science, and separately to gauge the degree 
of the suggestion's philosophical fertility. These two tests will be applied to the 
present suggestion in chapters to come. 
In the matter of philosophical fertility, the suggestion that the historian's 
intuition be married in this way to the aesthetic theorist's insight holds much that 
is new. For instance, chapter 7 will use the nature of aesthetic canons of theory-
evaluation to suggest a mechanism by which elements of scientific methodology 
are constructed by scientific communities from historiographical sources, and 
chapter 8 will present an interpretation of the notion of scientific revolution as 
aesthetic rupture. It will however prove necessary to establish much of this view 
in the teeth of entrenched opposition from conventional schools of philosophy of 
science. While perhaps few writers deny to aesthetic considerations any 
occurrence whatever in science, many attribute to them a severely circumscribed 
role in the expectation that their subsequent neglect will prove justified. It will be 
necessary to demonstrate them wrong. 
In the matter of the power of this suggestion to help account for the 
history of science, detailed evidence will be marshalled below. It suffices here to 
advance some prima fade evidence that there exists a practice of the aesthetic 
evaluation of theories by scientists. While the pronouncements which follow 
cannot be taken as authoritative descriptions of the practice of scientific 
communities at large, they convey a measure of the importance which is 
apparently attributed to aesthetic theory-evaluation by notable members of such 
communities. G.H. Hardy has for instance written: 
The mathematician's patterns, like the painter's or the poet's, must be beautiful; the ideas, like the colours or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly rnathernatics.2 , 
P.A.M. Dirac stipulates for theories a similar aesthetic requirement: 
2 Hardy (1940), p. SS; emphasis in the original. It would not be pertinent to object to the relevance of this quotation on the grounds that mathematics cannot be counted amongst the sciences: the mathematical structure of modern physical theory tends to conflate the notions of mathematical and scientific aesthetics. 
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It is more important to have beauty in one's equations than to have them fit experiment. [ ... ] It seems that if one is working from the point of view of getting beauty in one's equations, and if one has really a sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress.3 
Lastly A. Einstein was thus depicted by his son Hans Albert, himself a physicist: 
He had a character more like that of an artist than of a scientist as we usually think of them. For instance, the highest praise for a good theory or a good piece of work was not that it was correct nor that it was exact but that it was beautiful.' 
It will be noted that the subjects of these passages clearly elevate the requirement 
that theories should possess certain (as yet unspecified) aesthetic features to the 
status of criteria by which they explicitly propose to evaluate the theories which 
come before them. The above testimony also distinguishes unequivocally between 
on the one hand the cognitive or empirical qualities exhibited by theories -
qualities summarized by Dirac as 'experimental fit' and by Einstein as 'correctness 
and exactitude' - and on the other hand the theories' aesthetic features. Thus 
Dirac distinguishes between 'having beauty in one's equations' and 'having them 
fit experiment'; Einstein between 'a correct theory' and 'a beautiful one'. This 
distinction is here taken as preliminary confirmation that the scientific practice 
which makes use of aesthetic criteria in theory-evaluation sees them as quite 
distinct from the logico-empirical evaluative criteria which may simultaneously be 
applied to the same theories, and in particular that the possession of aesthetic 
features by scientific theories is not held to be constitutive of their empirical 
success, as logico-empirical features on the contrary are. 
The above statements contain clear echoes of the distinction promulgated 
by the aesthetic theory of disinterested attention between the utilitarian and the 
aesthetic modes of attention. These echoes are gladly welcomed by the present 
3 
4 
Dirac (1963), p. 47. Throughout his career Dirac attributed an important role to aesthetics in scientific research; reminiscences of and comments on his opinions on this matter appear in Kursunoglu and Wigner eds (1987) and J.G. Taylor ed. (1987), passim. Dalitz (1987, p. 20) for instance recounts an episode during Dirac's tenure of a visiting professorship at the University of Moscow in 1955: 'When asked to write briefly his philosophy of physics, he wrote on the blackboard ''PHYSICAL LAWS SHOULD HAVE MATHEMATICAL BEAUTY" and this has been preserved there to this day.' Dirac's most notable application of aesthetic criteria, in the evaluation of the theory of quantum electrodynamics, is referred to in section 4 of the present chapter. 
Whitrow ed. (1967), p. 19. This character-sketch is corroborated by Bondi ibid., p. 82: 
'As soon as an equation seemed to him to be ugly, he really rather lost interest in it [ ... ]. He was quite convinced that beauty was a guiding principle in the search for important results in theoretical physics.' Dirac appears more insistent: 'Einstein seemed to feel that beauty in the mathematical foundation was more important, in a very fundamental way, than getting agreement with observation' (1982, p. 83). 
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treatment and are here taken as initial vindication of the suggestion that the 
vacancy left open by scientific methodology be filled by aesthetic theory.5 
The remainder of the present treatment will assume that there exist and are 
widely applied in scientific practice such entities as aesthetic canons of theory-
appraisal, the nature, origin and behaviour of which will be elucidated 
progressively. An aesthetic canon will be assumed to be composed of a number 
of 'aesthetic criteria'; each criterion consists of a statement attaching a certain 
preferential weighting to an aesthetic feature or quality apt to be exhibited by 
scientific theories. To apply the canon in an instance of theory-appraisal one 
ascertains the aesthetic features of the theory in question and determines what 
preferential weighting is attached to them by the evaluative canon. The 
weightings which the canon attaches to the aesthetic features of a given theory 
constitute a measure of the degree of preference extended by the canon to that 
theory; in a case of the comparative evaluation of several theories, the theory 
which obtained the greatest preference would be deemed to have been - so to 
speak - nominated by the aesthetic canon for endorsement by the scientist or 
community performing the evaluation. (Whether that theory will at the end of the 
day be chosen for endorsement by the agent depends in part also of course on 
the verdicts independently delivered on the competing theories by the logico-
empirical evaluative canon.) 
2. Positivist denials of aesthetic theory-evaluation 
That the above remarks would raise the hostility of much traditional philosophy 
of science is clear. This section and the next present and rebut some influential 
initial criticism which would be moved against the enterprise sketched out above 
5 The above couple of paragraphs have briefly mustered evidence for the proposition that scientific practice makes use of aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation, and furthermore that such criteria are disjoint from the class of logico-empirical criteria. The evidence adduced in the main text was culled from the words of practising scientists themselves, but clearly some such evidence is transmitted by the mediation of works of historiography. Thus Neyman (1974, p. 9) writes that 'Copernicus introduced a completely novel yardstick for appraising a new theory: conformity with observations and intellectual elegance.' Neyman's remark appears to attribute to Copernicus's work the same distinction between logico-empirical and aesthetic evaluative canons enshrined in the statements of twentieth-century scientists cited above. The incidence of aesthetic features and considerations in the work of Copernicus will further be studied in chapter 10. 
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by positivist philosophy. While the present section outlines the thrust of this 
criticism, the next attempts to respond to it; this manoeuvre will enable some 
further evidence to be presented in favour of the claims made in section 1 above. 
Positivism established a demarcation between two stages of scientific 
procedure which boasted prima facie . plausibility for several decades. It 
distinguished between an arational context of discovery in which theory-
generation occurred by enigmatic intuitions or conjectures and a context of justification where inference from empirical data tested the products of the former 
stage and assured the rationality of science.6 The distinction was voiced by e.g. 
R.S. Rudner: 
In general, the context of validation is the context of our concern when, regardless of how we have come to discover or entertain a scientific hypothesis or theory, we raise questions about accepting or rejecting it. To the context of discovery, on the other hand, belong such questions as how, in fact, one comes to latch on to good hypotheses, or what social, psychological, political, or economic conditions will conduce to thinking up fruitful hypotheses.7 
A bare statement of the distinction between discovery and justification might lead 
a student unappraised of the literature to expect its aim to have been to identify 
the process of discovery as singularly interesting: after all, on positivist grounds 
that process appears to await intricate explanation referring to the circumstances 
and experiences of individual scientists. No explanations are by contrast 
seemingly required by the positivist in the context of justification: a mere 
exposition of the empirical facts would seem sufficient to entail (thus satisfying 
the strictest positivist standards of explanation) the acceptance or rejection of 
theories. As the most cursory reading of positivist literature will persuade, the 
intention of the discovery /justification distinction was in reality the diametric 
opposite: its result was to evacuate the former term of philosophical interest and 
prescribe analysis and explanation solely of the latter.8 K.R. Popper is an advocate 
of both this partition and the attendant apportionment of weight, as demonstrated 
by a passage froin a paragraph characteristically titled Elimination of Psychologism: 
6 
7 
8 
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to. be susceptible of it. 
This distinction originated with Reichenbach (1938, pp. 6-7), though it was foreshadowed in certain aspects by Herschel (1830, p. 164). The history of the distinction and of criticism of it is retraced by Hoyningen-Huene (1987). Rudner (1966), p. 6. The author uses the term 'validation' in place of 'justification'. The differential allocation of interest was first endorsed by the originator of the modem version of the discovery/justification distinction, Reichenbach (1949, p. 289): 'The philosopher of science is not much interested in the thought processes which lead to discovery.' 
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[ ... ] There is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, 
or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be 
expressed by saying that every discovery contains 'an irrational element', or 'a creative intuition', in Bergson's sense.9 
It is by statements of preference of this form that positivism dismisses from 
rational attention the province of scientific discovery. 
Entertaining for one moment the positivist terms of the distinction between 
discovery and justification, to which camp should aesthetic criteria be consigned? 
Aesthetic criteria are intuitively - and with some justice - perceived as non-
quantitative, non-empirical, imprecise and arational, of the same form as the 
'psychological conditions' of scientific thought of which Rudner speaks or the 
'creative intuitions' of Popper. If the positivist demarcation between discovery 
and justification is embraced, one readily conceives the belief that aesthetic 
criteria should operate in the context of discovery but not in that of justification. 
Under this reading of positivist concerns, if Popper forbears from mentioning 
aesthetic criteria in his treatment of scientific method, that silence may be due to 
his implicitly confining their influence to theory-generation in which he believes 
philosophers of science may profess no rational interest.10 
The onlooker's expectation that positivist philosophy of science would first 
consign references to aesthetic considerations in scientific practice to the category 
of phenomena of the context of discovery and secondly presume that in such 
capacity they are not susceptible to rational analysis is confirmed by a study of 
positivist treatments of the subject. One of the most comprehensive and explicit 
illustrations of the positivist attitude towards aesthetic considerations is offered by 
H. Feigl, who endorses the three stages of this progressive denial of their 
consequence. He first entrenches the conventional partition of his subject-matter: 
9 
10 
The distinction [ ... ] between the historicosociological narratives, 
analyses, causal accounts of the origins, developments, conflicts, and Zeitgeists of scientific ideas on the one hand, and the logicomethodological reconstructions of scientific knowledge claims, on the other _hand [ ... ], remains (and, as I see it, should remain) at least a 
most important first approximation if we are to retain even a 
Popper (1959), pp. 31-2. 
In fact Popper devotes a paragraph to the aesthetic concept of simplicity, but only -as one might expect - to dismiss it. He states that a consideration of elegance 'has little interest from the point of view of the theory of knowledge: it does not fall within the province of logic, but merely indicates a preference of an aesthetic or pragmatic character' (ibid., p. 137; emphasis in the original). 
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minimum of clear thinking in these badly confused matters.11 
He initially betrays no predilection for either of the modes of inquiry which this 
passage delineates, but soon there remains no doubt where he believes the choice 
philosophical meat to lie: 
Consider, just as prime examples, the writings of Galileo and Newton. Their formulations usually came 'after the fact' of their discoveries - experimental or theoretical. This is prototypical of all good philosophy of science. In Newton's formulation of his assumptions (postulates), definitions (explications), and regulae philosophandi (precepts), we find one of the truly great masters giving us a rational reconstruction of his theoretical achievements.12 
Having characterized what he understands as 'good philosophy of science' Feigl 
takes pains to bar aesthetic considerations from its domain, confining them to the 
context of discovery where philosophy has no jurisdiction: 
A few words on some misinterpretations stemming from predominant concern with the history and especially the psychology of scientific knowledge. In the commendable (but possibly utopian) endeavor to bring the 'two cultures' closer together (or to bridge the 
'cleavage in our culture') the more tender-minded thinkers have stressed how much the sciences and the arts have in common. The 
'bridges' [ ... ] are passable only in regard to the psychological aspects of scientific [ ... ] creation [ ... ]. Certainly, there are esthetic aspects of science [ ... ]. But [ .. . ] what is primary in the appraisal of scientific knowledge claims is (at best) secondary in the evaluation of works of art - and vice versa.13 
Thus are aesthetic criteria disenfranchised in the positivist view of science. The 
sole merit one may according to the positivist ascribe to aesthetic intuitions is that 
of having a valuable heuristic role in the arational process of theory-generation, 
on a par with dreams and hallucinations.14 
11 
12 
13 
Feigl (1970), p. 4; emphasis in the original. After a so emphatic endorsement of one of the main tenets of logical positivism it is surprising a few pages on to read an abjuration: 'I personally abandoned, long ago, whatever adherence I had to positivistic [ ... ] philosophies of science' (ibid., p. 7). , 
Ibid., p. 6; emphasis in the original. 
Ibid., pp. 9-10; emphasis in the original. This article of Feigl appears in the same collection which contains Buchdahl (1970), cited in chapter 2. It is perplexing to find Feigl's conservative, positivist treatment of evaluative criteria and dismissal of aesthetic evaluations alongside Buchdahl's considerably more innovative perspective. The heuristic role (as opposed to the evaluational role, which is the main concern of this treatment) of aesthetic criteria in science is further studied in Mamchur (1987). I am grateful to Dr E. Mamchur of the Institute for Philosophy of Science, USSR Academy of Science, for illuminating discussions on this subject. 
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3. Transcending the positivist demarcation 
Fiegl is correct to the extent to which he discerns the operation of aesthetic 
criteria in the context of discovery. As the following chapters will illustrate, the history of science indeed teems with instances in which aesthetic criteria appear 
to have directed theory-formulation, at times prevailing in this role over empirical 
criteria. 
One such episode was witnessed in the development of quantum 
mechanics from 1925, independently achieved by W. Heisenberg first and E. Schrodinger shortly afterwards. The story of this episode told in 1963 by their junior colleague Dirac has become a locus classicus of discussions of beauty in 
science: 
Heisenberg worked keeping close to the experimental evidence about spectra [ ... ]. Schrodinger worked from a more mathematical point of view, trying to find a beautiful theory for describing atomic events [ ... ]. He was able to extend De Broglie's ideas and to get a very beautiful equation, known as Schrodinger's wave equation, for describing atomic processes. Schrodinger got this equation by pure thought, looking for some beautiful generalization of De Broglie's ideas, and not by keeping close to the experimental development of the subject in the way Heisenberg did.15 
Popper and Feigl would experience no qualms in accommodating this report in 
their conception of scientific method as an instance of arational theory-generation, 
on the understanding that such a categorization divests it of. philosophical interest. Perhaps because Dirac's account of the development of quantum 
mechanics is so easily reducible to the received or positivistic image of science, it 
is one of the fragments of evidence from the history of scientific practice most 
promptly quoted in brief or oblique treatments of the role of aesthetics in 
science.16 
Aesthetic criteria are . however for some scientists important not only as 
illustrated abov~ in theory-generation - an activity which in the view of proponents of the discovery /justification distinction is arational - but also in 
theory-evaluation and choice, which in this view aspire to full rationality. Dirac, 
who in the passage reproduced above stressed the weight of aesthetic criteria in 
15 
16 
Dirac (1963), pp. 46-7. Krisch (1987, p. 51) testifies that Dirac believed quite generally in the heuristic role of aesthetics in theory-formulation: 'Dirac stated that, " ... the elegance of the formulation was very important in choosing the direction for one's research."' 
Passages from Dirac (1963) are quoted in e.g. Osborne (1964), pp. 160-1, Holton (1973), pp. 255-6, and Wechsler (1978), p. 5. 
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directing research, showed no hesitation in extending their role equally to the 
evaluation of the products of that research, unfavourably rating the non-linear 
spinor theory of Heisenberg in 1967 on a blatantly aesthetic canon: 'My main 
objection to your work is that I do not think your basic (non-linear field) equation 
has sufficient mathematical beauty to be a fundamental equation of physics.'17 
Positivism could judge this comment by an experienced and eminent physicist in 
no way other than deranged, so alien is it from positivist precepts of theory-
evaluation. But positivism is thus compelled to some historiographic evasiveness, 
dismissing Dirac's pronouncement of 1967 as an aberration while acknowledging 
his report of 1963 as typical of the arational process of discovery. The queries 
arise whether there is not more unity in scientific reason than positivism will 
allow, whether aesthetic criteria have not an integral role in both context of 
discovery and of justification, and lastly whether the positivist demarcation 
between the two contexts should not be relaxed.18 
Appeals to aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation come to light almost 
whenever the reasons for the espousal of a consequential theory are ascertained 
by historical inquiry. For instance, the historian of science P.G. Bergmann 
attributes the diffusion of Einstein's general theory of relativity jointly to 
empirical and aesthetic factors: 
From a logical point of view, the progress toward general relativity depended on a number of choices to be made; its eventual adoption, first by Einstein himself and later by the community of physicists, depended on the esthetic appeal of the finished theory and on its 
confirmation by experiment and observation.19 
Dirac's perception of the reasons for which to embrace that same theory attributes 
equal prominence to its aesthetic virtues: 
The foundations of the theory are, I believe, stronger than what one 
could get simply from the support of experimental evidence. The 
real foundations come from the great beauty of the theory. [ ... ] It is 
the essential beauty of the theory which I feel is the real reason for believing_in it.20 
The balance of the evidence surely makes it invidious to confine the impact of 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Quoted in Brown and Rechenberg (1987), p. 148. The passage is contained in a letter 
of Dirac of March 1967. 
A scientist's general discussion of the role of aesthetic considerations in theory-
evaluation is offered in Chandrasekhar (1987), pp. 59-73. 
Bergmann (1982), p. 30. 
Dirac (1980), p. 10. A further discussion of the aesthetic properties of the theory of general relativity is contained in Chandrasekhar (1987), pp. 148-55. 
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aesthetic criteria to the stage of theory-generation, particularly if the purpose of 
this move is to neuter their power by appeal to the supposedly arational character 
of discovery. 
Historically-adequate understanding of the evaluational as well as the 
heuristic roles played by aesthetic concerns points to a limitation of the notion of 
· 'themata' introduced by G. Holton.21 Themata are in Bolton's account the 
fundamental principles that motivate a scientist or a scientific community, 
appearing and re-appearing throughout history. In Bolton's view themata can 
include specific commitments, such as the commitment to the principles of 
conservation of mass and energy, as well as general epistemological or 
methodological principles, such as those which value the attainment of forms of 
beauty or elegance in theories. Bolton's inclusion of the latter possibility raises 
the hope that his treatment may attribute an important role in science to aesthetic 
criteria. Unfortunately Bolton's methodology appears still to be dominated by the 
logical-empiricist model of science, and particularly by the distinction between the 
context of discovery and that of justification. Holton envisages themata as 
operating almost exclusively at the stage of 'science in the making', when the 
scientist is engaged in formulating his or her ideas. Once the theories are in the 
public domain and come to be evaluated, Bolton's repertory of themata have - or 
claim - less relevance: they do not appear to participate in theory-appraisal. By 
limiting the operation of themata to the phase of discovery, Holton gratuitously 
barred his own way to a potentially incisive and novel analysis of theory-
evaluation. 
The limitation imposed by Holton on the domain of operation of themata 
appears particularly regrettable in those themata which are constituted by 
aesthetic concerns, for - as the present treatment hopes to establish - the 
consideration of aesthetic evaluative criteria can transform the methodologist's 
view of theory-appraisal. The power of Bolton's work derived largely from his 
insight that science was in some ways similar to the arts: but this power was 
somewhat dissipated when he admits that in his view science is similar to the 
arts only in the process of creation, and not in the evaluation of the products. It is 
partly in the extension of aesthetic categories to the logical positivist's 'context of 
justification' that the present treatment claims originality over Bolton's dynamic 
of themata. 
21 
The august confines of positivism are transcended in the study of the 
Holton (1973), pp. 21-9. For further discussion of Holton' s thematic analysis see e.g. Losee (1987), pp. 135-41. 
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evaluational role of aesthetic criteria and of their consequent justificatory power 
in scientific practice. 
4. The disjunction of aesthetic and epistemic values 
Heisenberg on one occasion aired the possibility that there might exist what he 
termed 'aesthetic criteria of truth'. The passage in which this suggestion is 
contained is the following: 
If nature leads us to mathematical forms of great simplicity and beauty - by forms I am referring to coherent systems of hypotheses, 
axioms, etc. - to forms that no one has previously encountered, we 
cannot help thinking that they are 'true,' that they reveal a genuine feature of nature. [ ... ] 
You may object that by speaking of simplicity and beauty I am introducing aesthetic criteria of truth, and I frankly admit that I am 
strongly attracted by the simplicity and beauty of the mathematical 
schemes with which nature presents us. You must have felt this, 
too.22 
Although this suggestion has already received an implicit response above, it is so 
distinctive and so contrary to the thrust of the present treatment that it is 
advisable to consider it explicitly. In this section the suggestion concisely 
formulated by Heisenberg will be expanded and elucidated, and three reactions to 
it will be provided. 
By 'aesthetic criteria of truth' Heisenberg presumably intended criteria of 
theory-evaluation which exhibit two characteristics: a) they are properly applied 
to or operate upon features of theories of a bona fide aesthetic or perceptual 
nature, rather than to logico-empirical features of theories; b) their evaluative 
application to a theory yields a judgement or estimate of its likely truth or 
verisimilitude. One may broaden the suggestion of Heisenberg to envisage that 
such putative criteria are applied to gauge not exclusively the likely truth of 
theories but also as an alternative the degree of . the theories' likely future 
observational success: this broadening accommodates the views of those, like 
22 Heisenberg (1971), pp. 68-9. This passage is contained in the transcription of a 
rejoinder which Heisenberg made in conversation to Einstein in 1925. The idea that there may exist aesthetic criteria of truth will be referred to in this section as 
'Heisenberg's suggestion', though it is not implied here that Heisenberg propounded this hypothesis deliberately or on occasions other than the one on which he spoke to Einstein in the terms here reported. 
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antirealists, who believe that it is illegitimate to predicate truth or truthlikeness of 
theories. 
Heisenberg's suggestion would be borne out if there existed aesthetic or 
perceptual features of theories such that their possession by a given theory were 
indicative of that theory's observational success. If - following the discussion of 
chapter 2 above - one considers that there exists a number of logico-empirical 
features of theories which are constitutive of observational success, Heisenberg's 
suggestion reduces to the proposition that there exist aesthetic features of which 
the possession by a theory is correlated with that theory's possession of the 
logico-empirical features constitutive of observational success. In short, according 
to Heisenberg's suggestion, a theory's possession of certain aesthetic features 
would make it more likely that the theory should in future be revealed 
observationally successful.23 
Such a correlation undoubtedly holds, for instance, in the answers to 
questions in university examinations in the natural sciences: the appearance in an 
attempted answer to an exam question of aesthetically displeasing features such 
as irreducible mathematical expressions or equations which admit no analytical 
solution is most often an indication that the attempted solution is ill-conceived, or 
at least harbours a mathematical error some way upstream of the formula 
reached. Similarly the beauty or 'neatness' of the emerging configuration of some 
of the answers essayed by the candidates justifiably persuades them that they are 
on the right track.24 Needless to say, the fact that the attempted solution's 
possession of such aesthetic features can reliably be taken as an indication of its 
accuracy is a consequence of the artificious context in which the question has 
been framed, and possibly of the predispositions of the examiner for simple and 
easily-graded solutions; problems in open-ended scientific research are clearly not 
amenible to the same considerations which one would turn upon examination 
23 
24 
The possibility that a theory's possession of given aesthetic features is somehow correlated with its proximity to the truth is implicitly advanced also in A.M. Taylor (1966), p. 38: 'The elegant beauty of the theoretical edifice [of general relativity] is thought sufficient reason for believing it to be true.' Watson (1968, p. 210) speaks similarly of a theory's being 'too pretty not to be true.' Perhaps the most forthright formulation of Heisenberg's suggestion has come in · the headline to Trefil (1986): 
'The Most Beautiful Theories Are the Truest'. This work is a review of Holton (1986); its title appears to bear little relevance to the content of either Trefil's article or Holton's book, and was doubtless the creation of an editor under the spell of Keats. 
Many university textbooks in the physical sciences explicitly exhort students to awareness for the elegance of the solutions which they propose to examination questions: Pippard (1972, pp. 10-1) teaches his readers two ways - one 
'straightforward' and the other 'elegant' - by which to reach a solution of a typical examination problem in kinematics. 
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questions. The issue here is whether the use of aesthetic features as indicators of 
truthlikeness which is successfully made by examination candidates is equally 
appropriate to the methodology of the research scientist. 
The present treatment confronts Heisenberg' s suggestion with three distinct 
responses. The first refers to the structure . of the investigation pursued in the 
present treatment; the second demands that those who endorse Heisenberg's 
suggestion should · elucidate a view of aesthetic features of theories which would 
enable the suggestion to be realized in scientific practice; the third brings to bear 
historical evidence in an examination of the suggestion's plausibility. 
Consider first the manner in which the above treatment discerned the 
existence of a conceptual vacancy opened by the project of adequately 
reconstructing the history of science. Chapter 2 recounted how the community of 
historians and philosophers of science have come to acknowledge the 
hopelessness of attempting to reconstruct the past record of science by appeal to 
logico-empirical criteria of theory-evaluation alone. In this acknowledgement the 
community recognized that, in order to render justice to the history of science, 
reconstructions are compelled to appeal to a further class of criteria of theory-
assessment. Criteria of this class have to differ from the previously-identified 
logico-empirical criteria: after all, constant recourse has been made in the 
reconstruction of the history of science to the logico-empirical class of criteria, in a 
variety of differing formulations, and that class has been found insufficient. 
Something new is required in the project of reconstructing the history of science. 
Under the impulse of this apprehension the above treatment turned to 
consider aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation. Chapter 4 was able to discern in 
the history . of philosophical aesthetics a tradition which interpreted aesthetic 
perception as characterized by lack of concern for utilitarian features of the 
objects of that perception; but independently of and prior to the historiographic 
discovery of that aesthetic tradition, the search which had been undertaken for a 
further class of criteria of theory-evaluation had stipulated that the criteria which 
constituted the object of the search were non-empirical. 
It is at this stage in the argument that one considers what has above been 
called Heisenberg's suggestion, that there might exist aesthetic criteria of theory-
evaluation which function as indicators of a theory's empirical virtues. Clearly the 
first response which the present treatment must move to such a suggestion is to 
point out the distance which separates it from its own concerns: Heisenberg's 
suggestion is at root the postulation of an association between truth and beauty, 
which - if it is to support rigorous analysis - must allude to a mechanism by 
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which the association is assured. Such a mechanism could be adduced most 
plausibly by demonstrating how a theory's endowment of logico-empirical virtues 
ensures its simultaneous possession of certain aesthetic features. But then a 
theory's lack of specified aesthetic features would be indicative of its lack of 
logico-empirical virtues: so any explanation of the mechanism by which beauty 
and truth were associated would conflate the two categories of logico-empirical 
and aesthetic evaluative criteria, since in virtue of the mechanism one could 
utilize aesthetic criteria to determine the logico-empirical worth of the theory 
under assessment. Since the central thrust of the present treatment is to offer 
aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation in fulfilment of the search for a class of 
evaluative criteria separate from the previously-established logico-empirical 
criteria, it can hardly be expected that Heisenberg's suggestion will be susceptible 
of organic incorporation into the structure of this treatment. Heisenberg's 
suggestion is not merely of an opinion contrary to the ones propounded by the 
present treatment: it is, more radically, foreign to the manner in which the 
problem tackled by the present treatment has been constituted. Someone desirous 
of embracing a view of the incidence of aesthetic considerations in scientific 
practice may of course choose freely between Heisenberg's suggestion and the 
ones advanced here; but the choice between those alternatives must be taken 
before following the present treatment to the point which the reader has now 
attained. From the perspective of the present treatment, thus, Heisenberg's 
suggestion is not a contribution to the debate in hand but rather a denial of the 
terms constituting the current debate and a - fully legitimate - attempt to 
undertake a wholly different conceptual itinerary which happens to share with 
the one pursued here only a concern for features of theories termed 'aesthetic'. 
If the relation between Heisenberg's suggestion and the present treatment 
is understood in these terms, the present treatment's second response to that 
suggestion arises naturally. It is legitimate to demand of those who embrace 
Heisenberg's suggestion that they adduce a mechanism by which the copresence 
of logico-empirical and of aesthetic features in theories is assured, and in virtue of 
which it is possible to envisage the existence of 'aesthetic criteria of truth'. It is 
hardly sufficient for Heisenberg to intimate that given 'mathematical forms of 
great [ ... ] beauty', 'we cannot help thinking that they are "true"': to incorporate 
his suggestion into a characterization of scientific rationality, we must be told 
what is the warrant of this belief, what it is about the beauty of a mathematical 
form which makes it truer than less beautiful ones. Such a mechanism has not so 
far been proposed by those few writers who have followed Heisenberg in this 
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matter; until the details are thus clarified, it is difficult to begin to evaluate the 
merit of Heisenberg's suggestion. 
The third of the responses to Heisenberg's suggestion which were 
promised above brings historiographic data to bear upon the issue. If a model of 
the practice of theory-evaluation which incorporated Heisenberg's suggestion 
were capable of accurately reconstructing substantial spans of the history of 
science, one would expect to find in the historical record instances in which 
scientists referred to a theory's possession of certain aesthetic features as evidence 
for supposing that the theory would demonstrate logico-empirical validity. This 
expectation is not fulfilled by historiographic findings. On the contrary, the 
historical record indicates that scientists generally consider their aesthetic 
judgements of a theory to be autonomous from their empirical verdicts on it: in 
general, their aesthetic and empirical evaluations of a given theory differ. This 
suggests that the intuitions of scientists hold aesthetic criteria to constitute a set of 
evaluative standards altogether disjoint from that of empirical criteria. 
For example, in writing that 'Einstein's theory [of general relativity] has the 
very highest degree of aesthetic merit: every lover of the beautiful must wish it to 
be true',25 H.A. Lorentz implicitly acknowledges that the theory of relativity may 
be beautiful and yet not true, that it may satisfy one of the classes of evaluative 
requirement but not the other. In this belief he is joined by E. Rutherford who in 
1932 wrote 'The theory of relativity by Einstein, quite apart from any question of 
its validity, cannot but be regarded as a magnificent work of art',26. thus endorsing 
the notion that the aesthetic virtues of Einstein's theory were a matter separate 
from that of its empirical validity. 
One of the most celebrated instances of such a evaluative disjunction 
between, to put it briefly, truth and beauty appeared in physicists' reaction of a 
theory in quantum mechanics developed in the 1940s. Quantum electrodynamics 
numbers among the most successful modern accounts of a body of experimental 
data: it gives . values for such physical quantities as the Lamb shift and the 
anomalous magnetic moment of the electron which agree with measurement 
within the bounds of experimental accuracy, which is of a few parts per million. 
However, quantum electrodynamics yields these brilliant predictive results only 
after certain infinities, which appear during the calculations in the values for the 
electron mass and charge, are excised by a mathematical procedure developed by 
~ 
26 
Lorentz (1920), p. 23. 
Quoted in D. Wilson (1983), p. 432; for further details of the context of this remark 
see ibid., p. 594. 
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J. Schwinger, R.P. Feynman, F.J. Dyson and others and named 'finite 
renormalization'.Zl Because of the need for this procedure, quantum 
electrodynamics struck and continues to strike many physicists as aesthetically 
displeasing, especially compared to putative finite field theories which would be 
free of such blemishes. Dirac, who had . himself published outstanding work in 
quantum field theory especially in the 1920s, persistently refused to accept 
renormalized quantum electrodynamics as a satisfactory physical theory. He 
manifested no reservation about its ability to account for experimental data; his 
scepticism was concerned entirely with what he considered to be the unacceptable 
inelegance of the doctoring which is necessary to draw from it determinate 
predictions. He expressly noted the cohabitation in quantum electrodynamics of 
empirical success and aesthetic blemish, and directed his repeated criticism 
exclusively to the latter feature of the theory while remaining ready to pay tribute 
to the purely empirical success of the theory's predictions. He wrote in a 
formulation typical of his concerns: 'Recent work by Lamb, Schwinger, Feynman 
and others has been very successful [ ... ] but the resulting theory is an ugly and 
incomplete one, and cannot be considered as a satisfactory solution of the 
problem of the electron.'28 
There exists also a class of historical instances in which theories judged 
aesthetically pleasing have simultaneously been recognized as empirically 
inadequate. Schrodinger has aesthetic praise but empirical criticism for the 
Lamarckian theory of evolution: he writes that it is 'beautiful, elating, 
encouraging and invigorating', but adds, 'Unhappily Lamarckism is untenable. 
The fundamental assumption on which it rests, namely, that acquired properties 
can be inherited, is wrong.'29 The same disjunction is asserted more recently by D. 
27 
28 
29 
An account of the development of quantum electrodynamics, of the invention of the procedure of renormalization and of its empirical successes is given by Weinberg (1977), pp. 21-30. 
Dirac (1951), p. 291. Shanmugadhasan (1987, p. 53) adduces a similar instance of Dirac's aesthetic repudiation of this theory: he writes that in 1945 Dirac 'emphasized that he did not believe his . quantum electrodynamics was the right theory because it 
was so complicated and ugly.' The role played by Dirac vis-a-vis quantum 
electrodynamics - the role of an esteemed senior physicist who acknowledges the 
empirical power of a new theoretical development' but cannot bring himself to 
accepting its aesthetic features - was played at around the same time by Einstein in 
regard to quantum physics as a whole: while Einstein recognized the empirical 
success of the new quantum theory he found its abandonment of determinism irreducibly ugly. Chapter 8 below, which presents a general theory of scientific 
revolutions with regard to the aesthetic commitments of factions of the scientific 
community, will suggest that this position is frequently and - to some extent -predictably taken by some scientists at times of revolutionary crisis. Chapter 10 will 
outline Einstein's reactions to quantum mechanics at greater length. 
Schrodinger (1958), pp. 21-2. 
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Sciama in commenting on the cosmological steady-state theory of F. Hoyle and 
others: 'It is very beautiful but it is now in serious conflict with observation.'30 J. 
Rosen generalizes the observation that a theory with less aesthetic appeal may 
exhibit superior empirical virtues: 
If we eavesdrop on private discussions among scientists, we might hear expressions such as, 'This is a beautiful theory (of ours)!' or, 
'His theory is rather ugly.' Both theories might be equally good, in 
that they both explain the same natural phenomena equally well. In fact, the 'ugly' theory might even be better.31 
Each such instance lends weight to the proposition, embodied throughout 
the present treatment, that scientists hold the aesthetic evaluation of theories to be 
an act separate from any empirical judgements of them. The correlation between 
elegance and empirical validity which holds so perceptibly in the realm of 
solutions to exam questions does not carry over to scientific theories in general. 
This observation plays an important role in erecting aesthetic evaluations as an 
object of inquiry on the part of philosophy of science autonomous of the study of 
logico-empirical criteria. 
5. Aesthetic criteria and the underdetermination of theory-choice 
There exists a conceptual route of considerable interest, different from those 
explored thus far, by which some methodologists of science have acquired a 
commitment to the beliefs that aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation operate in 
theory-choice and that their verdicts are independent of those handed down by 
logico-empirical evaluative criteria. This route originates in the recognition of the 
problems which would arise for philosophy of science - especially for realist 
doctrines of science - from instances of theory-choice underdetermined by 
empirical data: Logico-empirical evaluative criteria would be insufficient to 
30 
31 
Quoted in Osborne (1986), p. 12. A similar phrase is attributed to Sciama in Kippenhahn (1984), p. 153: 'The steady-state theory has a sweep and beauty that for some unaccountable reason the architect of the universe appears to have 
overlooked.' The import of these statements is identical: the steady-state theory's failure to be instantiated in the universe is revealed by a predictive inadequacy 
which is quite independent of its aesthetic virtue. For bibliographic help on this topic I am indebted to Dr D.W. Dewhirst of the Institute of Astronomy, University of Cambridge. . 
Rosen (1975), pp. 120-1. 
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adjudicate among two or more competing theories which exhibited the same 
predictive power over all possible evidence but possessed some incompatibility 
(e.g. radically different ontological commitments) which prevented their being 
considered alternative expressions of a common theoretical substructure. If this 
underdetermination were not overcome, it would presumably be impossible to 
maintain the realist view of scientific progress as leading to a uniquely-
determined 'truth of the matter' about the natural world.32 
If logico-empirical evaluative criteria are feared to be insufficiently 
discriminating to determine theory-choice in such cases, that unpalatable outcome 
may yet be averted by making recourse to a set of evaluative criteria separate 
from and additional to the logico-empirical criteria, in the expectation that the 
joint application of the two sets of evaluative criteria will prove sufficiently 
discriminating to determine uniquely any case of theory-choice which is refractory 
to logico-empirical criteria alone.33 Those philosophers who have pursued this -
the intuitively most obvious attempt to avert the underdetermination of theory-
choice - have often turned to aesthetic or quasi-aesthetic criteria of choice from 
which to construct the second or supplementary evaluative canon, even if 
generally such utilitarian recourse to aesthetic criteria has not been underpinned 
by a pondered view of the incidence of aesthetic considerations in wider scientific 
methodology. On this prescription, in the event where rival theories appear 
equally truthlike one should like Paris choose the most beautiful for somehow 
that would hold the most promise. F. Rohrlich endorses this course of action: 
There is [ ... ] great beauty in a physical theory. [ ... ] It is that beauty 
which affects the credibility of one theory over another in the 
absence of more stringent criteria. For instance, the general theory of 
relativity is so beautiful that it is preferred over rival theories as long as those rival theories cannot account any better for the 
empirical facts.34 
R. Swinburne entrusts this role of tie-breaker to a criterion of simplicity of which 
the content may be determined partly by aesthetic predispositions.35 Though 
moving from a philosophical perspective very different from that of Swinburne, 
P.K. Feyerabend shares with him both the identification of certain cases of theory-
32 
33 
34 
35 
For a fuller discussion of underdetennination and the dangers which it poses to realism see Newton-Smith (1978). · 
Newton-Smith examines and aperaises this strategy for overcoming the 
underdetermination of theory-choice ibid., pp. 76-7. 
Rohrlich (1987), pp. 13-4. 
Swinburne (1968), p. 21. In the next chapter 'form of simplicity' will be identified as 
a possible component of an aesthetic canon of theory-assessment. 
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choice as problematic and the apprehension that in such cases it is natural to turn 
to aesthetic and similar judgements to break the impasse. Feyerabend describes the 
difficulty of choosing between incommensurable theories as follows: 
None of the methods which Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, Popper or even Lakatos want to use for rationalizing scientific change can be 
applied, and the one that can be applied, refutation, is greatly 
reduced in strength. What remains are aesthetic judgements, judgements of taste, metaphysical prejudices, religious desires, in 
short, what remains are our subjective wishes. 36 
A later chapter will show that Feyerabend errs in considering aesthetic 
judgements as no more than 'our subjective wishes', and more broadly in failing 
to investigate mechanisms for the construction, entrenchment and operation of 
aesthetic criteria of theory-assessment, which would greatly assist the project of 
'rationalizing scientific change'. Nonetheless it is encouraging to discover that 
some philosophers of science have reserved attention for aesthetic categories, 
however tangential their interest in the matter. 
6. The place of aesthetics in Einstein's view of theory-assessment 
Einstein is the author of numerous celebrated adages on the practice of theory-
formulation and assessment. Many refer crucially to aesthetic requirements of 
theories, and the more univocal of these pronouncements are cited elsewhere in 
the present treatment.37 
Alongside all such occasional pronouncements Einstein left a sophisticated 
and complex view of the procedures of theory-evaluation, contained mainly in his 
'Autobiographical Notes'. The degree of coherence between his frequent recourse 
to aesthetic criteria in practice and his more detached perception of theory-
assessment is not clear, for whereas he on occasion quite unambiguously judged 
theories on aesthetic grounds he appears at first sight not to have dedicated an 
36 
37 
Feyerabend (1975), pp. 284-5; emphasis in the original. 
Holton, who has long studied Einstein's methodology, identifies in his practice of theory-formulation and assessment concern for the following set of theoretical desiderata, many of which have an aesthetic or quasi-aesthetic nature (1981, p. 15): 
'Primacy of formal (rather than materialistic or mechanistic) explanation; unity or 
unification; cosmological scale in the applicability of laws; logical parsimony and 
necessity; symmetry (as long as possible); simplicity; causality (in essentially the Newtonian sense); completeness and exhaustiveness; continuum; and of course 
constancy and invariance.' 
79 
I 
I 
I 
1 I 
I' 
I 
I 
CHAPTER FIVE: TIIEORY-EVALUATION ON AESTHETIC GROUNDS 
overt and specific niche to those grounds in his more systematic statements on 
the topic. The methodological portrait of Einstein which implicitly emerges from 
the present treatment would therefore be incomplete without a brief review of 
those statements, which will be followed by an indication of the implicit locus 
within them of aesthetic criteria and a remark on the affinities between Einstein's 
view of theory-assessment and the present treatment. 
In Einstein's view the corpus of science consists of a structure of 
interrelated concepts removed from sense-experience. These concepts are 
formulated by conjecture constrained by experimental data, to which they are 
related by logical implication. A scientific theory thus exhibits two classes of 
relation: the set of relations between the invented concepts, and the set of 
relations between those concepts and items of sense-experience. Corresponding to 
the two sets of relations are the two levels on which theory-assessment may be 
conducted: an internal level evaluating the theory's inherent conceptual structure, 
and an external one pertaining to the relationship of the theory to experiment.38 
Einstein summarizes the requirements of the external appraisal by the 
remark that 'the theory must not contradict empirical facts.' 39 There are however 
according to him two reasons for the insufficiency of concurrence with 
experiment as an evaluative criterion, and simultaneously for the need of an 
internal level of theory-evaluation. First, it is always possible to eliminate 
discrepancies between theory and experiment by means of ad hoe hypotheses, 
which, though at times admirably satisfying the requirements of the external level 
of assessment, reduce the overall scientific worth of the theory.40 Secondly, in 
modern physics the chains of inference from the principles of a theory to its 
observat.ional consequences become increasingly long and complicated, so that 
'the confrontation of the implications of theory by the facts becomes constantly 
more difficult and more drawn out.'41 Einstein's perception that theory-evaluation 
on the external level is becoming more arduous adds a pragmatic reason for the 
use of the internal level, alongside the philosophical reason that the external level 
may on its own underdetermine theory-choice. 
The internal level of theory-assessment 'is not concerned with the relation 
to the material of observation.'42 Einstein mentions two criteria which operate at 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Further on Einstein's two levels of theory-assessment see P . Barker (1981), pp. 138-42, and Miller (1981), pp. 123-31. 
Einstein (1949), p. 21. 
Ibid., pp. 21-3. 
Ibid., p. 27. 
Ibid. 
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the internal level of theory-assessment: the 'naturalness' or logical simplicity of a 
theory, and the definiteness of its descriptions. 
The simplest conceptual system is the one containing the least number of 
arbitrarily chosen elements. Newtonian mechanics contained as fundamental 
statements both principles constituent of. Euclidean space and laws of force.c The 
primary force, gravitation, was described by an inverse-square distance law, 
chosen by Newton from all possible such statements; this choice was arbitrary 
since it was not imposed or suggested by the other elements of the system. 
Einstein argued that this degree of arbitrariness could be reduced by 
reformulating the theory. The least-power spherically symmetric solution of 
Laplace's equation for a potential is an inverse first-power function of distance. 
Differentiation of this potential function yields an inverse-square distance law of 
force. This law has now come to be determined by the geometry of Euclidean 
space: the connection reduces the arbitrariness of the theory. 
While this example is the one adduced by Einstein to illustrate the 
application of a simplicity-criterion to theory-evaluation, a more incisive instance 
may be culled from Einstein's own work. Newtonian theory possessed two 
operational definitions of mass, inertial and gravitational, logically independent of 
one another; Einstein's general relativity posits the identity of the two qualities, 
reducing by one the number of arbitrary variables in the description of a general 
mechanical system. 
The second criterion of internal theory-assessment is the degree of 
definiteness of the theory's assertions: Einstein prescribes that among theories of 
equal simplicity one should prefer that which makes the most definite claims 
about the systems described.44 Einstein offers no example of a theory embodying 
some degree or other of this virtue, but P. Barker suggests that he may have had 
in mind the greater definiteness of the field-formulation of Newtonian mechanics 
respect to its formulation in terms of inter-particle forces."5 The latter formulation 
leaves unspecified the states of a system at instants of particle collisions, an 
indeterminacy not present in the former version. 
Einstein's internal criteria of theory-evaluation are - as he admits - not so 
precise as to permit a quantitative comparison between the conceptual parameters 
of rival theories: Einstein particularly dismisses numerical measures of logical 
simplicity because they require an arbitrary decision on what counts as a logically 
C 
44 
Einstein presents this example ibid., pp. 29-33. 
Ibid ., p. 23. 
Barker (1981), p. 141. 
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independent expression. More modestly Einstein describes his internal criteria as 
involving 'a kind of reciprocal weighing of incommensurable qualities.'46 
As already mentioned, the above speculation on theory-assessment in the 
'Autobiographical Notes' reserves no specific attention for aesthetic evaluative 
criteria. In the light of the evidence of his concerns presented in section 1 of this 
chapter and elsewhere, it would be hazardous to conclude from this apparent 
omission from the 'Notes' that Einstein attributed to aesthetic factors an 
inessential weight, or perhaps a role only in theory-formation rather than 
assessment. The interpretation of the 'Notes' which accords best with Einstein's 
other pronouncements is obtained by reading within them an implicit description 
of the role of aesthetic evaluative criteria. If the external level of theory-
assessment is empirical, it is reasonable to conclude that Einstein located aesthetic 
concerns in the internal level, which pertains to the logical interrelation of the 
concepts of theories. This interpretation coheres with Dirac's view that Einstein 
referred to the twin evaluative categories of 'agreement with observation' and 
'beauty in the mathematical foundation', as well as with Bergmann's ascription of 
Einstein's adoption of a theory to 'its confirmation by experiment and 
observation' and 'the aesthetic appeal of the finished theory.'47 If this reading is 
followed, Einstein's talk in the 'Notes' of the 'naturalness' of a theory assumes at 
root aesthetic connotations, a plausible interpretation. 
While this interpretation of the 'Notes' helps to clarify Einstein's 
methodological dispositions, the present treatment does not seek Einstein's 
blessing with its theses: the view of aesthetic factors developed here is wholly 
separate from that of Einstein. The present view shares with Einstein's the 
partition . of criteria of theory-assessment into two classes, one but only one of 
which pertains to the empirical performance of theories. The characterization of 
the other class differs in the two treatments, and in this treatment includes 
aesthetic factors of a range wider than Einstein probably envisaged. Most 
important, Einstein leaves uninvestigated both the genesis of criteria of internal 
evaluation and the case of conflict between the two classes of criteria in theory-
choice: these topics are the subject of later chapters. 
46 
47 
Einstein (1949), p . 23. Barker twice (1981, pp. 139, 141) erroneously transcribes this 
expression as a 'reciprocal weighing of incommensurable quantities', fuelling the 
confusing impression that Einstein perhaps envisaged some numerical measure of theoretical virtues after all. 
Dirac (1982), p. 83; Bergmann (1982), p. 30. 
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7. Alternative justificatory roles of aesthetic features 
The previous sections suggested that scientific communities adduce a theory's 
possession of certain aesthetic qualities among the grounds for the adoption of 
that theory. A different use of aesthetic features to justificatory ends in scientific 
practice may however be envisaged. Here three alternative ways in which 
justificatory appeal may be made to aesthetic features will be outlined; although 
consideration of these justificatory powers of aesthetic features in science is not 
relevant to the main present theses, and therefore will not be pursued at great 
length, it is valuable to compare the approach of the present treatment with 
certain other views. 
N. Jardine suggests that there may exist two forms of appraisal in scientific 
practice in which reference is made to aesthetic features in order to assist in the 
choice between competing theories, but where the aesthetic features to which 
reference is thus made are qualities not of the theories under evaluation but 
rather of other entities connected to them, as will be explained now.48 The first of 
the two types of aesthetic appraisal envisioned by Jardine attributes aesthetic 
value to phenomena viewed in the light of an explanatory theory, in a procedure 
reminiscent of the perception of aesthetic value of the second degree of 
abstraction discussed by Hutcheson and described in chapter 3 above. The act of 
evaluation which makes use of this device attributes preference to the theory 
under assessment to the degree to which it is able to 'bring out' aesthetic value in 
the phenomena which constitute its subject-matter. For an example of this form of 
appraisal Jardine refers to the final paragraph of Darwin's The Origi.n of Species. 
The intricate but organic structure of the 'entangled bank' is by Darwin attributed 
aesthetic value: in Jardine's view this value - while being a feature of the 
phenomena which constitute the subject-matter of the theory of adaptation and 
natural selection rather than of the theory itself - militates in favour of the 
adoption of that theory as one well able to 'bring out' those features of the 
object.49 
The second form of aesthetic appraisal in science envisaged by Jardine 
confers aesthetic value to theory-based representations of phenomena or 
experimental data, such as graphs and diagrams.50 Each of the competing theories 
48 
49 
50 
Jardine (1988). 
Further on Darwin's perception of aesthetic images in his subject-matter see e.g. Gruber (1978). 
The aesthetic principles involved in the design and perception of such science-based 
representations of phenomena are discussed in Tufte (1983), pp. 177-90. 
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of a sector of reality will generate representations of the phenomena within its 
scope which can be aesthetically evaluated as objects of perception in their own 
right. Jardine suggests that the comparative assessments of these representations 
wiJl reflect upon the theories which spawned them: this form of appraisal 
recommends preference to be given to those theories which produce 
representations of phenomena of the greatest aesthetic appeal. 
It will be noted that although the outcome of acts of evaluation of these 
two forms is an alteration of the degree of preference accorded to theories in 
instances of theory-choice, the objects of the aesthetic judgements passed in these 
acts are entities other than the theories themselves: the objects of the evaluation 
are natural phenomena in evaluations of the first kind and graphic 
representations of the phenomena in the second. The theory which reconstructs 
the incidence of aesthetic considerations in science as the operation of appraisals 
of these two kinds thus does not venture beyond the notion of discerning 
aesthetic value in concrete objects, such as natural scenes or graphic 
representations of phenomena. The perception of beauty in nature or in concrete 
portrayals of nature is familiar to the traditional conception of aesthetics as a 
discipline constituted around the problems of art criticism. The present treatment 
has on the contrary suggested that the extension of the application of aesthetic 
categories to abstract objects or intellectual constructs, including scientific theories, 
might further assist the enterprise of modelling scientific practice. 
The third possible justificatory role of aesthetic features in scientific practice 
to be mentioned in this section is even further removed from the methodological 
concerns of the present treatment. It has been suggested by some that scientists 
see in the aesthetic values of their theories a force justifying not the embrace of 
one theory to the neglect of another, but the pursuit of science: the aesthetic 
gratification caused by the contemplation of a scientific theory is in that 
interpretation deemed not grounds to prefer that theory to others, but a reason to 
engage in scientific research as a whole, as a life's-work in the course of which a 
dose of aesthetic gratification will be obtained. This is a form of transcendental 
justification, in that features of the products of the enterprise come to justify its 
pursuit. This view of the justificatory valence of aesthetic features of theories is 
entertained by R. Penrose who enquires after the 'justification for doing 
· mathematical research' and concludes that 'basically, the motivations turn out 
often to be aesthetic ones; so often a subject is pursued simply for the pleasure 
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that it gives.'51 This motivational use of aesthetic features of theories, which in 
any case is compatible with their use in theory-assessment, departs excessively 
from the concerns of the present treatment and will not be considered further.52 
51 
52 
\ 
Penrose (1974), p. 266. 
The role of aesthetic delight in scientists' motivations for pursuing research is 
mentioned in Chandrasekhar (1987), 'Pfl5Sim. 
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Chapter Six 
AESTHETIC FEATURES 
TO HAVE WON COMMENDATION 
1. The specificity of descriptions of aesthetic canons 
At what level of specificity must an aesthetic canon be described before its effect 
in theory-assessment can be gauged? When the topic of aesthetic evaluations of 
scientific theories is broached in general conversation, the response commonly 
obtained is, 'Oh, you mean scientists' preference for theories which are symmetric 
and simple?'. Let us leave aside for a moment the issue whether symmetry and 
simpUcity are indeed aesthetic properties of theories, and ask instead the 
question: would a description of an aesthetic canon as consisting of preferences 
for theories which exhibit symmetry and simplicity permit a study of the effect of 
applying that canon in cases of theory-evaluation? 
One must answer this question 'no', on the grounds that the description of \ 
an aesretic canon which it proposes is insufficiently determinate for that 
purpose. Any or almost any theory could be said to possess 'symmetry' or 
'simplicity', so the information that a canon consists of preferences for theories 
which exhibit these properties would be insufficient, for instance, to predict the 
verdict of the canon in a case of theory-evaluation. A more specific description of 
the content of the canon is required for that purpose: one needs to be told which 
form or forms of symmetry or simplicity are held by the canon to be especially 
desirable in theories. 
The demand for specificity is made whenever we attempt a description of 
an aesthetic evaluative canon. We are told for instance by E.M. Forster that the 
aesthetic canon by which he judges novels attributes value to symmetries in the 
plot.1 This information does not shed much light on Forster' s actual preferences: 
as far as we have been told, his canon might prompt him to extend preference to 
the novels of Hardy because in them the landscape has a 'mood' which appears 
Forster (1927), pp. 136-7. 
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to mirror the mood of the protagonists, or those of Dickens because in them 
events are recounted from the point of view of more than one protagonist. Before 
we can study the aesthetic evaluations which Forster gives of novels, we must 
know which form of the property 'plot-symmetry' his canon specifies as 
particularly desirable in novels. Foster implicitly provides this information in 
commending The Ambassadors by Henry James because in it two of the 
protagonists exchange places, so that the novel assumes 'the shape of an hour-
glass'. 2 
Just as unqualified talk of symmetry is insufficiently specific to determine 
the preferencces prompted by the aesthetic evaluative canon of the literary critic, 
it is insuffictrnt to specify those of the scientist: the form of the symmetry sought 
by the aesth~tic canon of a community at a given time must be stated before one 
can know tJ e prescriptive content of that canon. · 
In the study of the composition of aesthetic canons of theory-assessment 
which will occupy the greater part of this chapter, entities like a certain form of 
symmetry will be termed 'aesthetic features' of theories and entities like 
symmetry will be termed 'aesthetic feature-classes'. From what has already been 
said it follows that an aesthetic evaluation of a theory will be based on that 
theory's possession or failure to possess certain aesthetic features, not certain 
feature-classes. Two aesthetic evaluative canons which prescribe different forms of 
symmetry to be desirable in theories will be said to differ in attaching value to 
different aesthetic features, but to resemble one another in referring to the same 
feature-class. 
The relation between a given feature-class and a feature which belongs to it 
is similar to that in political theory between the notion of e.g. 'freedom' on the 
one hand and the liberalistic or Marxist notions of freedom on the other. The 
proliferation of notions of 'freedom' to which weight has been attached in 
political thought through the ages resembles the proliferation of forms of 
symmetry to which value has been attributed in the appraisal of scientific 
theories. To know that someone's ideology sets great store by freedom does not 
allow the policy-choices which that agent will make to be predicted: similarly, the 
knowledge that symmetry carries great weight in a s~entific community does not 
reveal the theory-choices to which that community will be prompted. In each case 
knowledge is required of the precise form of the notion to which preferential 
weight is attributed. 
2 Ibid., p. 137. 
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~- Aims of the survey 
The previous chapter established the hypothesis that scientists' appraisals of and 
choices between theories have been affected by those theories' possession of 
certain aesthetic features. The remainder of this chapter will enumerate and 
discuss some of the aesthetic features of theories which have thus influenced 
theory-choice in the history of science. The aesthetic features cited will be 
categorized into four feature-classes: simplicity, symmetry, analogical tractability, 
and consonance with metaphysical presuppositions. It is claimed neither that 
these exhaust the set of feature-classes to which the aesthetic evaluation of 
theories has made recourse in the history of science, nor that the features to 
which scientists have referred in certain cases of theory-choice can appropriately 
be allocated among the four feature-classes in only one way.3 
This chapter will furthermore advance and support three claims about the 
features to which it will refer: 
(i) that these features are aesthetic in nature in the sense required by chapters 4 
and 5, i.e. that their possession by theories is uncorrelated with those theories' 
possession of logico-empirical virtues; 
(ii) that scientists in history have on many occasions evaluated theories on their 
possession of aesthetic features, and that many of these evaluations contributed to 
determine the direction in which the corpus of science was to evolve; 
(iii) that scientists' aesthetic tastes have shown great temporal mutability, or more 
precisely that there have been considerable changes over time of the set of 
aesthetic features which it has been held desirable that theories should possess. 
A few remarks may help to explain why these claims are thought worthy 
objects of advocacy. The list of features of theories contained in the next four 
sections was compiled from historiographic sources: a survey of the history of 
science threw . '!P the items on this list as features of theories of prima facie 
aesthetic or non-empirical nature on which theories were on occasion assessed. 
But that the theoretical features upon which attention was in this way drawn are 
'aesthetic features of theories' in the sense presumed in chapters 4 and 5 above 
requires demonstration. To argue for the truth of claim (i) is to attempt to show 
3 In particular the discussion among Ptolemaic, Copernican and Keplerian astronomers about the degree of harmony afforded by the postulation that celestial bodies traced circular paths may be seen as debates about the feature-classes of simplicity or of the symmetry of astronomical theories or about the feature-class of 
'coherence with metaphysical presuppositions.' 
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that the features suggested by the historiographic survey are indeed relevant to 
the study of the practice of aesthetic theory-evaluation upon which the present 
treatment is embarked. To argue for the truth of claim (ii), on the other hand, is 
to contribute to demonstrating that the practice of aesthetic theory-evaluation is 
an influential component of scientific methodology, that an account of the history 
of science which failed to refer to scientists' aesthetic evaluations of theories 
would be considered incomplete, and hence that this practice demands study by 
the historian and philosopher of science. Finally, that scientists' aesthetic 
evaluative canons have exhibited great mutability over time is the observation 
that will constitute one of the explananda of the next chapter; to argue for the 
truth of claim (iii) is thus to strive to establish the occurrence of some of the 
historical phenomena to be discussed in chapter 7. 
3. Simplicity 
Aspects of the property of simplicity exhibited by scientific theories have been the 
subject of innumerable treatments. Most of these endorse one of two views. The 
first is that in comparative theory-evaluation the degree of simplicity of a theory 
is indicative of its proximity to the truth: a simpler theory is ceteris paribus more 
likely to be true or empirically adequate than a less simple one. On this view the 
degree of simplicity of a theory is a logico-empirical feature of the theory, and it 
is on the basis of a theory-evaluation conducted on logico-empirical grounds that 
one chooses ceteris paribus to adopt the simplest theory among several that may 
be proposed. The present treatment records here its endorsement of this view on 
the grounds of the arguments outlined in the treatment of the logico-empirical 
criterion of simplicity contained in chapter 2.' 
The second view about simplicity which is commonly endorsed is that the · 
form of simplicity of a theory is an aesthetic property of it, or at least a property 
appeal to which is of no use in attempting to establis~ the likely degree of future 
4 Chapter 2 contained also examples drawn from the history of science of the appeal to the simplicity of a theory as evidence of its empirical adequacy. 
89 
I 
I 
I 
I 
CHAPTER SIX: AESTHETIC FEATURES TO HAVE WON COMMENDATION 
observational success of that theory.5 On this view the choice to adopt one theory 
in preference to another in virtue of the forms of simplicity which they exhibit is 
made on criteria of aesthetic taste. 
Many writers appear to believe that the two views cited here are 
incompatible, and more particularly that, . if one accepts the degree of simplicity of 
a theory to be a truth-related, logico-empirical property of that theory, any 
simultaneous attempt to submit a theory to aesthetic evaluation on account of its 
simplicity is illegitimate.6 The attempt to establish that this belief is mistaken, and 
that it is legitimate to attribute to simplicity both logico-empirical and aesthetic 
aspects, will engage the remainder of the present section. 
The argument proceeds initially per absurdum. Those who believe that the 
simplicity of a theory is indicative of the empirical virtue of that theory believe 
also - correctly - that it is the degree of that theory's simplicity which is 
correlated to its proximity to the truth or to its degree of empirical adequacy. 
Under this presupposition, for it to be illegitimate to ascribe to the simplicity of a 
theory any aspects not correlated with the logico-empirical evaluation of the 
theory, a specification of only the degree of simplicity exhibited by that theory 
would have to constitute a complete description of the simplicity of that theory. 
In other words, for it to be illegitimate to ascribe to the simplicity of a theory any 
non-empirical aspects, the specification of the value of one parameter only - the 
degree of the simplicity exhibited by a theory - would have to suffice to obtain a 
exhaustive specification of the simplicity by which the theory is possessed. 
But findings of the history of science suggest that to specify completely the 
simplicity by which a theory is possessed requires much more information than 
this. As evidence for the proposition that the specification of the degree of the 
simplicity of a theory would fail on its own to constitute an exhaustive 
characterization of the simplicity of that theory, consider the following historical 
instances of the appeal to simplicity in theory-evaluation. 
5 
6 
Copernicus wished astronomical theory to be simple in appealing to only 
Einstein for instance appeared to believe that 'simplicity was equivalent to beauty', in the words of Elkana (1982, p. 222); E.O. Wilson (1978, p. 11) considers the simplicity of a generalization to be an important component of its elegance or beauty. The absence of a correlation between the simplicity of a theory and its truthlikeness has been affirmed by among others Bunge (1963, pp. 96-8), and Newton-Smith (1978, p. 77, and 1981, pp. 230-1). On the present treatment, of course, the thesis that the simplicity of theories is not indicative of those theories' observational success is subsumed under the thesis that simplicity is an aesthetic rather than logico-empirical property of theories. 
For statements of the belief in this incompatibility see Popper (1959), p. 137, and Sober (1984), p. 238, footnote 16. Sober's more extensive study of simplicity is of course his (1975). 
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uniform circular motions within explanations of observed planetary positions, and 
expressed displeasure at the Ptolemaic failure to adhere to this methodological 
tenet.7 J. Dalton wished chemical theory to be simple in supposing that the 
molecule of a chemical compound was formed of the smallest possible number of 
atoms of each of its constituent elements, e.g. that a molecule of water was 
composed of one atom of each of hydrogen and oxygen and a molecule of 
ammonia of one atom of each of hydrogen and nitrogen. 8 E. Mach wished 
physical theory to be simple in appealing to only those physical entities of which 
the manipulation was necessary to account for observational data, and thus 
refusing to countenance the appeal to Newtonian absolute space and time.9 Lastly, 
Einstein wished physical theory to be simple in resting upon the smallest possible 
number of independent theoretical postulates.10 
Implicitly described in the preceding paragraph are four forms of simplicity 
which a theory could be said to possess. The degree to which a theory possesses 
one of these forms is uncorrelated with the degree to which it possesses another. 
For instance, a physical theory which is highly simple in the sense desired by 
Einstein will not because of this be highly simple in the sense prescribed by 
Mach: a theory of which the number of independent deep postulates has been 
reduced to a minimum may well refer to a host of observationally-vacuous 
8 
9 
10 
Copernicus wrote in the Commentariolus (Swerdlow ed. 1973, pp. 434-6; emphasis in the original): 'The theories concerning these matters that have been put fortn far and wide by Ptolemy and most others [ ... ] envisioned certain equant circles, on account of which it appeared that the planet never moves with uniform velocity either in its deferent sphere or with respect to its proper center. Therefore a theory of this kind seemed neither perfect enough nor sufficiently in accordance with reason. [ ... ] I often 
. pondered whether perhaps a more reasonable model composed of circles could be found · from which every apparent irregularity would follow while everything in itself moved uniformly, just as the principle of perfect motion requires.' A fuller discussion of the simplicity of the Copernican theory will follow in chapter 10. 
Dalton's simplicity-criterion is examined in Bernatowicz (1970). 
One of the most celebrated formulations of the Machian principle of simplicity is contained in his (1883), p. 586: 'Science [ ... ] may be regarded as a minimal probfem, consisting of · the completest possible presentment of facts with the least possible expenditure of thought' (emphasis in the original). 
Einstein left several formulations of his simplicity-criterion. He wrote for instance (1936, p. 352; emphasis in the original): 'The aim of science is, on the one hand, a comprehension, as complete as possible, of the co~ection between the sense experiences in their totality, and, on the other hand, the accomplishment of this aim by the use of a minimum of primary concepts and relations.' When commenting upon a discrepancy of up to ten per cent between the measured value of a gravitational deviation of a light-ray and the magnitude of the effect calculated from general relativity, he weighed structural simplicity against any empirical deficiency of the theory: 'For the expert, this thing is not particularly important, because the main significance of the theory does not lie in the verification of little effects, but rather in the great simplification of the theoretical basis of physics as a whole' (cited in Holton 1973, p. 236). Further discussion of Einstein's appeal to simplicity-criteria is offered in Hesse (1974), pp. 239-55, or Elkana (1982). 
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entities. Thus, mere mention of the degree to which a theory exhibits one or other 
of these forms of simplicity, accompanied by no specification of the form of 
simplicity to which this degree relates, will fail to constitute a complete 
characterization of the simplicity of that theory. What is required for a complete 
such characterization to be compiled is a specification of the degree to which the 
theory exhibits each of the possible forms of simplicity which may be envisaged 
in a theory. In other terms, an exhaustive characterization of the simplicity of a 
theory would tabulate the degree to which the theory exhibits ontological 
parsimony, the degree to which it exhibits moderation in the appeal to 
independent theoretical postulates, and so on. 
Of course a stipulation of the simplicity which one would wish to see 
exhibited by theories in a certain domain of science need not be as encyclopaedic 
as a complete characterization of the simplicity actually exhibited by a theory. For 
whilst the latter codification must specify the degree to which the theory exhibits 
each of the forms of simplicity which may be envisaged in scientific theories, the 
former codification need stipulate only the degree to which theories ought to 
exhibit each of a limited number of forms of simplicity, viz., those forms to which 
one has resolved to accord particular value in theory-evaluation. Typically a 
normative codification of the simplicity of theories will specify - as did e.g. the 
codification of Mach or of Einstein described above - a single form of simplicity 
which one wishes preferentially to see embodied in theories: such a codification 
will hence be far less weighty than a complete specification of the simplicity of 
any actual theory. 
Even if it is reduced in this way to its least terms, an exhaustive stipulation 
of the simplicity which one wishes to see embodied in theories must consist of 
two independent items of information: it must stipulate the form of the simplicity 
that theories ought to embody, and the degree to which they are to embody 
simplicity . of that form. In consequence, two independent acts of judgement will 
be required in order to gauge the extent to which the simplicity of any given 
theory accords with a canon prescribing the simplicity which theories ought to 
possess: the first act of judgement will be needed to evaluate the extent of the 
agreement between the degree of the theory's simplitjty on the one hand and the 
degree of simplicity prescribed of theories by the canon on the other, the second 
to appraise the form of the simplicity exhibited by the theory by reference to the 
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form which the canon indicates that theories ought to possess.11 
In other words, an exhaustive assessment of the simplicity of a theory will 
require two independent evaluations to be made, and only one of these will be an 
evaluative measurement of the degree of the theory's simplicity: thus, one of the 
two evaluations which form part of a complete assessment of a theory's simplicity 
will consist of the application of a criterion other than the simplicity-criterion 
indicated by philosophers of science as being logico-empirical in nature, or 
correlated to the theory's likely future observational success. 
The further suggestion of this section is that, while the evaluation of the 
degree of simplicity of a theory is an evaluation of that theory on logico-empirical 
grounds and hence a guide to its likely truth or empirical adequacy, the 
evaluation of its form of simplicity is an aesthetic judgement, or a judgement of 
which the verdict is not correlated with the theory's probable degree of future 
observational success. The claim that an appraisal of the form of simplicity 
possessed by a theory is independent of judgements of the likelihood that this 
theory should demonstrate empirical adequacy is supported by the following 
observation: that while the logic of inference suggests that a simpler theory is 
ceteris paribus more likely to demonstrate empirical adequacy than a less simple 
theory, it gives no indication of the form or forms of simplicity apt to maximize 
this likelihood. The logic of inference has no grounds upon which to tell whether 
a theory which exhibits e.g. ontological parsimony is ceteris paribus more or less 
likely to demonstrate empirical adequacy than a theory which exhibits 
moderation in the appeal to theoretical postulates. From among a set of theories 
exhibiting the form of simplicity selected by the evaluative canon which is 
applied to its domain of science, it is justified on logico-empirical grounds to 
choose for adoption the one which exhibits that form of simplicity to the highest 
degree; but the prior choice of which form or forms of simplicity one should like 
to see embodied in theories is taken on grounds other than logico-empirical. 
11 
This observation is evidence for the claim that evaluations of the form of 
There is ample historical evidence for the claim that scientists find themselves forced to express preferences between alternative forms of simplicity which theories may exhibit before the precept of choosing for adoptioh the simplest theory among several available ones can be carried out. For instance, as Holton (1978, p. 299, note 8; emphasis in the original) recounts, 'Einstein and Planck debated strongly in 1914 whether the simplest physics is one that regards as basic accelerated motion (as Einstein had come to believe) or unaccelerated motion (as Planck insisted).' Oearly while this difference of opinion persisted, even if Einstein and Planck had concurred in following the methodological principle of each choosing to adopt that theory which exhibited to the greatest degree the form of simplicity which they wished to see embodied in theories, they would still have failed to agree on which theory to adopt. 
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simplicity exhibited by a theory are independent of empirical evaluations, and 
hence are aesthetic evaluations in the sense required in the present treatment. 
4. Symmetry 
Scientists have on many occasions evaluated theories for their possession of forms 
of symmetry. That the canonical formulation of Maxwell's equations appears to 
reveal hidden symmetries in classical electrodynamics is frequently mentioned by 
physicists as a matter for aesthetic delight which serves to strengthen the 
attachment which they feel to the theory.12 H.G. Cassidy speaks of a pleasure of 
prima facie aesthetic nature which he obtained in perceiving a form of symmetry 
in the structure of a theory of which he conceived: 
While I was listening to a piano concerto, the idea suddenly 
occurred to me that it should be possible to prepare electron 
exchange polymers. I was at once certain that this was feasible, and I felt the fitness of the idea in complementing the already well-known proton exchange polymers. [ ... ] Once the symmetry of the 
relationship became apparent to me I experienced great pleasure and 
excitement.13 
Cassidy's account of this episode suggests unambiguously that the perception of 
the form of symmetry in the theory which resulted from his idea served not only 
as stimulus to pursue the idea further in research, but also as initial grounds for 
the entrenchment of the theory in his system of beliefs, and hence as grounds 
upon which an early favourable evaluation of the theory was passed. 
There exist many other historical examples of the appeal to forms of 
symmetry perceived in a theory as grounds for the adoption or preferment of that 
theory. At the heart of the arguments by which Einstein was led to doubt the 
validity of elements of classical physics and to extend initial support to the theory 
of special relativity lay considerations of the forms of symmetry which it was 
12 
13 
Some of the aesthetic aspects of symmetry-considerations in theory-appraisal are discussed in Rosen (1975), pp. 120-2, and Zee (1986), passim. 
Cassidy (1962), p. 57. Cassidy has recalled his appeal to symmetry-considerations in this episode also in an interview with Alexenberg contained in the latter's (1981), pp. 147-8. In Cassidy (1966), pp. 185-6, the author suggests that his inference was rather an application of analogical reasoning. 
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appropriate to demand of physical theories. u 
Again, some time after Planck's theory of black-body radiation of 1900, the 
idea had gained currency that light exhibited corpuscular behaviour. In 1923 L. de 
Broglie suggested - 'purely on grounds of intellectual beauty', in the words of M. 
Polanyi15 - that material particles correspondingly possessed wave-like properties, 
advancing a relation between the momentum of a particle and the wavelength of 
the associated undulation which exactly mirrored Planck's equation linking the 
energy of the light-wave to its frequency. De Broglie's theory failed to gather 
empirical confirmation until 1927. In the years in which the physics community 
was unable to muster evidence of a logico-empirical kind sufficient to ensure the 
acceptance of the theory, the community's favourable attitude to it was motivated 
mainly by the observation that the theoretical corpus of elementary physics 
demonstrated a striking form of conceptual symmetry if the suggestion of de 
Broglie was incorporated into it. 
The historiographic evidence presented thus far in this section gives some 
idea of the variety of the forms of symmetry of which the possession by theories 
has at one time or another of the history of science been deemed to be desirable. 
The existence of several forms of symmetry each of which it may be appropriate 
to prescribe of theories implies that an evaluative canon which makes mention of 
the feature-class of symmetry will typically indicate a preference for one 
particular form of symmetry: on the application of this canon in cases of theory-
assessment, the theories which exhibit this form of symmetry will receive 
preference over others. 
The decision to accord preference to theories which exhibit a particular 
form of symmetry over theories which exhibit other forms resembles the decision 
to prefer theories which ceteris paribus demonstrate some particular form of 
simplicity: neither of these decisions - it is here suggested - is justifiable on 
logico-empirical grounds. There is no reason to believe that a sequence of theory-
choices performed in accordance with a prescription ceteris paribus to prefer 
theories exhibiting some particular form of symmetry would lead systematically 
to empirical success greater than that which would be attained through a series of 
choices which accorded preference to theories exh_ibiting any other form of 
symmetry. 
14 
15 
A fuller discussion of the role of considerations of symmetry in Einstein's evaluations of classical physics and the theory of special relativity is contained in chapter 10. 
Polanyi (1958), p. 148. 
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Far from constituting a reliable guide to choosing theories which 
demonstrate the greatest logico-empirical virtues, instructions to prefer some 
particular form of symmetry in acts of theory-choice appear mostly to confer a 
retrospective validation or blessing on a past happy decision - taken typically on 
grounds independent of considerations of symmetry - to adopt a theory which 
happened to exhibit that form of symmetry and which proceeded to demonstrate 
great empirical success. A scientific community's canon of theory-evaluation 
appears to take note of the empirical fortune of such a decision by attributing in 
succeeding cases of theory-evaluation an increased weight to the form of 
symmetry which the theory chosen by that decision happened to exhibit. 
Evidence that norms of preference for a particular form of symmetry fail to 
constitute a reliable guide to the logico-empirically most successful theories, and 
on the contrary amount merely to retrospective weighting of the symmetry-
features of theories which have up to now demonstrated empirical success, 
derives from those historical cases in which norms of preference for a particular 
form of symmetry were revised in response to either an empirical failure of a 
theory which exhibited that form of symmetry or the rise of an empirically-
successful theory which possessed some new form of symmetry. M.L.G. Redhead 
notes one of the occasions on which the precept that preference in theory-choice 
be given to theories demonstrating a certain form of symmetry was altered in 
response to a decrease in the apparent ability of some theories exhibiting that 
form of symmetry to account for experimental data: 
The discovery that in the weak interactions of elementary particles 
nature provides an ultimate distinction between right-handed and left-handed reference frames reminds us that the superlaws of 
symmetry, as Wigner calls them, are as liable to empirical revision 
as other laws of physics having a less obviously intuitive character.16 
Even the norms prescribing that preference be given to theories which exhibit the 
most intuitively appealing forms of symmetry are promptly disavowed if theories 
which embody those forms cease scoring empirical successes, or if a theory which 
violates those forms demonstrates great empirical virtues. The fact that a 
community's preference for certain forms of symmetry appears to await 
demonstrations of empirical success by theories which exhibit those forms, rather 
than themselves reliably leading to empirically-successful theories, helps to locate 
symmetry-criteria among the aesthetic rather than the logico-empirical criteria of 
16 Redhead (1975), p. 105. 
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theory-assessment of scientific communities.17 
5. Analogical tractability 
The observation that it is possible to draw relations of analogy between the 
structure or claims of a theory under evaluation and those of a particular other 
(typically, better-confirmed or better-entrenched) theory enters among the grounds 
upon which a community may be drawn to lend support to the new theory. On 
many occasions a theory has either gathered endorsement in virtue of the fact 
that it supported relations of analogy with a particular other theory, or repelled 
members of its community by proving unsusceptible to tractability in terms of 
some analogy which the community has been led to value. The question arises, 
what is the nature of the evaluative grounds to which one appeals when one 
argues that a theory ought to be endorsed in virtue of the fact that it exhibits the 
capacity to support a relation of analogy with a particular other body of theory? 
The 1960s produced some treatments of analogy in science which were less 
dismissive of this device than positivist philosophy had been.18 These more 
modem treatments were in the main concerned to establish that models 
constructed on the basis of analogies between two or more theories in different 
domains of science cannot be reduced to only the role of suggestion or stimulus 
to theory-formulation attributed to them by positivist philosophy of science, and 
carry weight in theory-evaluation also. Such new treatments concentrated almost 
entirely on the logico-empirical aspects of scientific models, however, and 
withheld attention from the feeling of aesthetic satisfaction which commonly 
derives from the perception of analogical relations between, say, theories in 
different domains of science. 
That the discovery of the existence of a possible analogy is an experience 
which carries aesthetic aspects can hardly be in doubt. Analogical reasoning aims 
to reveal the presence in different constructs of common elements, a typically 
aesthetic concern. As a consequence, the devices of metaphor and analogy are 
17 
18 
The susceptibility of the symmetry-criteria of a community to revision in the light of the degree of empirical success won by theories demonstrating various forms of symmetry will be studied and explained in the next chapter, which attributes a metainductive origin to aesthetic canons of theory-assessment. 
See above all Hesse (1966) and Harre (1970), pp. 33-62. 
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possible sources of aesthetic pleasure in science no less than in literary or artistic 
endeavours.19 
The present treatment suggests that to evaluate a theory in virtue of the 
fact that its structure or claims can be analogically related to those of some 
particular other theory constitutes an aesthetic evaluation of that theory. Of 
course, within the present treatment to advance this claim is chiefly to suggest 
that the degree to which a theory supports· analogical relations with some 
particular other theory is not correlated with the degree to which it possesses 
logico-empirical virtues. The truth of this observation may be suggested by a 
study of the development of quantum mechanics from 1913 to 1927, a period 
which witnessed the loss and recovery of analogical tractability on the part of the 
leading theories in the field.20 
In 1913 Bohr proposed a model of the atom which retained its conventional 
visualization as a miniature planetary system. The subsequent decade revealed 
however the incapacity of this model to describe atoms more complex than the 
simplest, that of hydrogen. In 1925 Heisenberg originated a new version of 
quantum mechanics, matrix mechanics, couched in a mathematical formalism 
uninterpreted by models and referring throughout to particles of an 
unvisualizable nature: in this succession the concept of electron had evolved from 
analogue of a miniature billiard-ball to purely abstract entity. Heisenberg asserted 
that he found this formal approach congenial to his nonvisual mode of thought; 
Schrodinger was on the contrary disappointed by the lack of visualizability in the 
theory and in 1926-27, partly in reaction to Heisenberg's work, developed the 
theory of wave mechanics. This theory was logically equivalent to Heisenberg's 
but pictured subatomic particles as wave-packets. Schrodinger described the 
genesis of his theory and his reaction to Heisenberg' s results: 
19 
20 
My theory was inspired by L. de Broglie [ ... ] and by short but incomplete remarks by A. Einstein [ ... ]. No genetic relation whatever 
with Heisenberg is known to me. I knew of his theory, of course, but felt . discouraged not to say repelled, by the methods of transcendental algebra, which appeared very difficult to me and by 
A study of the features common to the use of analogy in science and in literature is Beer (1983), pp. 79-103. Investigation of the similarities between the use of analogy in art and in science has prompted attention for the separate finding that analogies of a literary type feature in some scientific reasoning; the literary metaphors of Darwin, for instance, are studied by Hyman (1959), pp. 14-78, and Gruber (1978). 
For fuller details of these episodes in the development of quantum mechanics see Miller (1984), pp. 125-83, on which the following account draws. 
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the lack of visualizability.21 
What did Schrodinger and many other physicists between his time and the 
present find displeasing in Heisenberg's matrix mechanics and appealing in 
Schrodinger's own wave mechanics? The reason for the differential evaluation 
cannot have been the greater observatio.nal success of the latter theory, or any 
logico-empirical feature of it, for the two theories are logically equivalent and 
consequently equally well supported by any evidence. The reason for the 
preference must thus have been independent of considerations of observational 
success or of logico-empirical features. 
In short, the preference of Schrodinger for his own theory over 
Heisenberg's must have been motivated by non-utilitarian considerations. It must 
have been the expression of an aesthetic canon of theory-assessment, one which 
was not tied to appraisals of the degree of possible utility of the competing 
, theories. It is easy to see what feature of wave mechanics, lacking in matrix 
mechanics, is capable of triggering this non-utilitarian preference: its analogical 
visualizability. On this argument, the requirement that a theory should 
demonstrate analogical tractability in tenns of a given model is a desideratum 
introduced by an aesthetic canon of appraisal of scientific theories. 
In discussing the requirement that scientific theories should demonstrate 
analogical tractability, attention should be paid to the distinction drawn in section 
1 of this chapter between aesthetic features and aesthetic feature-classes. It was 
pointed out there that on this distinction only aesthetic features, and not feature-
classes, were an appropriate object of stipulation by aesthetic canons of theory-
appraisal; in the application of this distinction to the discussion of simplicity, for 
instance, it was remarked that a determinate aesthetic evaluative canon could 
legitimately stipulate preference for theories that exhibit a certain form of 
simplicity but not for theories that are generically 'simple'. The same caveat 
applies to the discussion of analogical tractability. An aesthetic evaluative canon 
which demands that theories demonstrate a generic quality of 'analogical 
tractability' would not possess sufficient determinacy to be applied in cases of 
theory-choice. Since one may erect an analogy between some aspect or other of 
21 Quoted ibid., p. 143. Heisenberg's own account of the rise of wave mechanics is contained in his (1971), pp. 70-3. He appears to agree that wave mechanics possessed some aesthetic appeal not matched by other formulations of quantum mechanics: 'Schrodinger first of all explained the mathematical principles of wave mechanics by using the hydrogen atom as an illustration. All of us were delighted to see his elegant and simple solution by conventional methods of a problem that Wolfgang Pauli had been able to solve only with great difficulty using quantum mechanics' (ibid., pp. 72-3). The meeting here described was held in 1926. 
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any or virtually any theory under evaluation on the one hand and some suitably-
chosen other theory or model on the other, the application of such a generic 
canon would not exercise a determinate influence on theory-choice. An aesthetic 
evaluative canon applied in scientific practice may therefore contain the demand 
that theories should support analogical relations with a set of theories of a certain 
specified kind, but it would be pointless for such a canon to issue a request that 
theories should exhibit generic 'analogical tractability'. In terms of the distinction 
referred to above, this is because 'analogical tractability' is an aesthetic feature-
class: just as 'such-and-such a form of simplicity' is an aesthetic feature which 
belongs to the feature-class of simplicity, 'tractability in terms of such-and-such an 
analogy' is a feature which belongs to the feature-class of analogical tractability. 
Thus, the aesthetic evaluative canon of a community will stipulate that 
theories in a certain domain of science exhibit tractability in terms of analogy 
with a specified model or family of models. When Lord Kelvin insisted, 'I never 
satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing',22 intending to 
apply this test in his evaluation of the acceptability of newly-formulated scientific 
theories, he expressed one of the requirements contained in the canon for the 
aesthetic evaluation of physical theories which ruled at his time. The requirement 
was for theories in physics to exhibit tractability in terms of mechanistic models, 
or by analogy with the previous and well-entrenched theories of Newtonian 
mechanics. 
Clearly the imposition of this requirement upon physical theories will not 
be thought appropriate at all times in the history of science: it would be deemed 
inappropriate, for instance, to require mechanistic interpretability of theories in 
quantum physics today. Thus it is seen that the set of models or of analogical 
relations which it is thought appropriate to require of theories changes in time. 
The process by which this succession occurs will form the subject of the next 
chapter, but some initial observations about the manner in which the favour of 
the scientific community passes from one model or family of models to another 
may be reported here. 
Theory-choice in anatomy since at least the sixteenth century has been 
influenced by an evaluative canon which has prescribed that preference be 
attributed to anatomical theories which exhibited relations of analogy with 
theories in other domains of science, and frequently with theories in the better-
entrenched physical sciences. But the set of theories which were considered the 
22 Kargon and Achinstein eds (1987), p. 206. 
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most appropriate sources for these analogies has changed in time; these changes 
can be interpreted as revisions of the prescriptive content of the evaluative canons 
applied to theory-choice in anatomy. Hesse attributes to N. Wiener the 
observation that 
there have been three stages in the scientific description of human beings according to what was the most typical machine in use during the period - first, in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, clockwork mechanisms described by analogies from dynamics; then in the nineteenth century, heat engines described by 
analogies from thermodynami~; and now communication devices described by analogies from electronics.23 
As the next chapter will argue in greater detail, this succession may be explained 
on the assumption that the scientific community at each moment chose as the 
most suitable source of models in anatomy theories of the domain in the physical 
sciences which had in the immediately preceding period demonstrated the most 
eye-catching empirical success. The observationally most successful theories 
available in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were Cartesian and later 
Newtonian mechanics, both of which looked to analogies with clockwork 
mechanisms in their description of dynamic phenomena such as planetary 
systems: such mechanistic models gathered over time great weight in the 
community's stock of models, and it is of no wonder that this period looked to 
interpret newly-formulated theories in their terms and to evaluate the worth of 
new theories according to whether they admitted or failed to admit such 
interpretations. By the nineteenth century the glory of the observational success of 
Newtonian mechanics had to some extent been eclipsed by that of theories in 
thermodynamics: the community's stock of favoured models was updated to take 
account of the new weighting. In the twentieth century the empirical success of 
solid-state physics has similarly redefined the stock. The aesthetic evaluative 
canon of the community evolved in keeping with these changes.24 
23 
24 
Hesse (1954), p. 140; Hesse refers the reader to Wiener (1948), pp. 39-40, as well as to Young (1951), pp. 24-38, where a similar suggestion is advanced. Hanson mentions an analogous succession of models (1971, pp. 77-8): 'the Saturn-model of the hydrogen atom, the shell-model of the atomic nucleus, the telephone switchboard-model of the human brain, the hydraulic conduit-m:odel of the neural fibers.' 
This account may be read as an explication of Hesse's remark that 'contemporary categories of thought and social conditions may take a hand in moulding [ ... ] scientific analogies' (1954, p. 140). 
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6. Consonance with metaphysical presuppositions 
A scientific theory of more than technical interest will be said to exhibit 
consistency with the members of a certain set of metaphysical presuppositions 
and to conflict with the members of another set of similar presuppositions. It is in 
the nature of a scientific community to express endorsement, even if only tacitly, 
to a body of metaphysical presupposition. Thus among the grounds upon which 
the community evaluates and chooses between competing scientific theories is the 
degree of consistency between the theories proposed and the set of 
presuppositions to which the community pledges allegiance. For instance, the part 
of the natural-philosophical community which in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries professed allegiance to Cartesianism opposed Newton's 
theory of gravitation in virtue of its appeal to attraction at a distance, which 
appeared inconsistent with the Cartesian metaphysical tenet that space consisted 
of a plenum of corpuscles interacting solely by collision.25 
What is the nature of the grounds to which the community appeals when 
it extends or denies support to a scientific theory in virtue of the degree of its 
consistency with some metaphysical presupposition? It has not hitherto been 
customary for philosophers of science to describe these grounds as aesthetic in 
nature; indeed, many philosophers who have considered the appeal in scientific 
methodology to aesthetic arguments have tended on the contrary to number 
aesthetic grounds of theory-evaluation within a more general category of 
metaphysical grounds.26 Yet the property of exhibiting consistency with 
metaphysical presuppositions resembles the other features of theories described in 
this chapter to which appeal is made in theory-evaluation. First, the perception of 
a consonance or harmony between one's metaphysical presuppositions on the one 
hand and a scientific theory with which one has been acquainted on the other 
affords a gratification of prima fade aesthetic kind. Secondly, since - presumably 
as a matter of definition - there is no empirical warrant for one's metaphysical 
presuppositions,. the degree of a theory's consistency with that set of 
presuppositions is uncorrelated with the degree to which that theory possesses 
empirical virtues. For instance, the consistency of the Newtonian theory of 
gravitation with the denial of validity in metaphysics to Cartesian corpuscularism 
25 
26 
The Cartesians' and Leibniz's attack on action at a distance is discussed in Hesse (1961), pp. 157-63. 
Some of the works in philosophy of science which subsume aesthetic grounds for theory-evaluation within a more general category of metaphysical grounds were mentioned in chapter 2 above. 
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does not make Newton's theory more likely to demonstrate observational success 
than a theory which, like Cartesian cosmological theory, is consistent with 
Cartesian metaphysical doctrine: what in point of fact allowed Newton's theory to 
attain a measure of observational success greater than that won by Descartes's 
theory was the difference between the properties attributed to natural agencies by 
the detailed mathematical claims of the two theories. Thirdly - and this 
observation will be investigated in greater detail in chapters to follow - the set of 
metaphysical presuppositions to which scientific communities have lent their 
assent appears to have varied in history in a manner very similar to that of the 
variation of the set of analogical relations, forms of symmetry, or forms of 
simplicity to which communities have attributed weight. That is to say, scientific 
communities appear at each moment to have defined the set of metaphysical 
presuppositions to which to lend assent in part so as to include those 
presuppositions with which the empirically most successful theories of the 
immediately preceding period exhibited consistency. It will be suggested in the 
next chapter that to exhibit this form of historical mutability is one of the 
characteristics of aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation.27 
27 Chapter 10 will contain an extended study of an instance of the evaluation of a theory in virtue of the degree of its consistency with a metaphysical presupposition: it will outline Einstein's reaction to quantum mechanics, which was hostile in consequence of Einstein's allegiance to - and the theory's violation of - the metaphysical requirement that theories should demonstrate causal determinism. There will also be presented further evidence for the claim that the requirement that theories accord with metaphysical presuppositions is aesthetic in nature. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE INDUCTIVE CONSTRUCTION 
OF AESTHETIC PREFERENCE 
1. The determinacy of theory-choice 
Evaluations of a given theory on empirical criteria and on aesthetic criteria are 
according to the analysis of chapter 5 in principle independent of one another: in 
a situation demanding an act of theory-choice the preference indicated by the 
application of empirical criteria will in general differ from that reached by the 
application of aesthetic criteria. A theory's score on, so to speak, the axis of 
empirical adequacy has in principle no systematic correlation with its score on the 
axis of perceived aesthetic virtue. 
The independence of the two canons of evaluative criteria offers both 
benefits and dangers to the scientist. The benefit which accrues from possessing a 
double canon of appraisal of scientific theories is the opportunity that a narrower 
and more discriminating ideal may thereby be constructed of the object of 
research, if - as occurs in this case - the two evaluative canons stipulate 
complementary qualities of theories to be desirable. This opportunity is envisaged 
by those methodologists who would by this means avert the underdetermination 
of theory-choice. At the same time however the very fact that the two canons of 
evaluative criteria prescribe different qualities to be desirable in scientific theories 
opens the possibility that instances of theory-choice should witness a conflict 
between the recommendations yielded by the two classes of criteria, and thus 
remain undecided. 
The prospect of a similar methodological dilemma is not peculiar to models 
of scientific rationality which like the present one envisage two sets of criteria of 
theory-evaluation purporting to refer to two different kinds of features of 
scientific theories: the danger of conflict between evaluative criteria haunts any 
canon which comprises · more than one independent criterion. The same dilemma 
was for instance recognized by P. Frank: 
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It has been made clear by now that the requirements for the 
acceptance of a theory by scientists in the modem sense are 
'agreement with observation' and 'simplicity.' [ ... ] Which of them is the more important one? [ ... ] If we have to choose between a theory that is in agreement with the facts but is very complicated, and a theory that is much simpler but does not agree as well in all details 
with the facts, which theory are we to choose?1 
The concern caused by the possibility of a conflict in theory-assessment between 
two criteria which are both members of a unified logico-empirical canon of 
evaluative criteria - such as Frank's 'agreement with observation' and 'simplicity' 
- is however lessened by the realization that those who formulated such a canon 
intended presumably that its repeated application in theory-choice should 
converge, or lead towards a single well-defined end-point of science, such as the 
realist's the complete true explanatory account of the universe. The uniqueness of 
the intended end-point of the process of repeated theory-choice encourages one to 
suppose that any divergence of the recommendations of two criteria within the 
canon will be recomposed when the canon is applied at a later instance of theory-
choice: at that later stage, one may suppose, the theory which will impose itself to 
the choice of the community will combine within itself the separate virtues which 
caused the recommendations of the criteria of theory-choice to diverge at earlier 
stages. 
Concern at the possibility of a conflict between different criteria of theory-
choice is on the contrary more severe when it occurs between two sets of criteria 
which are not defined by reference to the same end-point of theory-choice, for 
there is then no prima facie expectation that the agreement between the criteria 
will increase as science nears its prescribed end-point. Such is of course the 
uncertainty encountered by the present model of theory-evaluation: while one of 
the classes of criteria which it envisages - the logico-empirical canon - aims at the 
end-point of empirical adequacy much as does Frank's canon of theory-
Frank (1957), pp. 352-3. Frank answers his own question in two attempts. First he suggests that 'if we ask a scientist, he will probably answer that the decisive point is the agreement with the observed facts and that "simplicity'' is of secondary importance' (ibid., p. 353). Upon further consideration he settles on the fence: 'the acceptance of a theory is always the result of a compromise between the requirement of "agreement with facts" and of "simplicity"' (ibid.). Of course the problem - which Frank fails to address, and which will be treated below - is to determine how the compromise between the requirements of different evaluative criteria is, or ought to be, struck by scientific practice. Frank's two-criterion model of theory-appraisal is, incidentally, enriched a little later in his treatment: 'there are actually three requirements that have been admitted by scientists: agreement with observations, simplicity, and agreement with common-sense experience' (ibid.). Frank's model of scientific criteria of theory-assessment nonetheless remains hopelessly simplistic. 
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assessment, the other class - that of aesthetic criteria - does not share that end-
point. This is because the aesthetic criteria express preferences among theories not 
in regard to their logico-empirical virtues but in regard to virtues which are 
defined as non-utilitarian and therefore non-empirical. Hence this account of 
theory-evaluation cannot hope to rule out the prospect of serious conflict between 
evaluative criteria by the route which is on the contrary open to models like that 
of Frank. 
While the independence of the two sets of criteria raises the possibility that 
instances of theory-choice may remain undecidable, this danger does not 
necessarily arise. There are two cases in which this eventuality does not in fact 
occur. The first obtains if, notwithstanding the independence in principle of the 
two sets of criteria, some correlation should subsist between them in practice. The 
second would occur if a scientific community had disposed a procedure for the 
arbitration of any conilict between the two sets of criteria of evaluation, perhaps 
by stipulating the priority of one set over the other in any case of dispute. 
Much of the remainder of this treatment will aim to show that scientific 
communities use both these methodological devices at different phases in the 
history of science to ensure that they retain the capacity to make univocal choices 
among theories: in some historical phases scientific communities maintain a 
correlation between the preferences expressed by their two classes of evaluative 
criteria, while at other times they confer privilege to the recommendations yielded 
by one of the two classes. The conditions under which a scientific community 
turns to one or the other of these ways of resolving the issue will define the 
nature of the two phases of scientific history. 
2. The origin and mutability of methodological precepts 
The model of the methodological history of science to be enunciated exploits the 
familiar distinction between the doctrines of metarationalisrn and 
metainductivism. These doctrines express views on the nature and development 
of methodological precepts in science. According to metarationalism, the norms of 
scientific methodology are formulated a priori by inferences from the nature and 
goals of science: on this foundationalist account a methodological precept 
correctly inferred will remain forever valid. For instance, Popper believes that the 
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norms of refutationalism are inferred from the nature of science, and in particular 
from considerations on the impossibility of inductive validation and the 
asymmetry between confirmation and refutation; if this inference is valid, the 
norms of refutationalism possess necessity and irreplaceability in the scientific 
methodological canon. Metainductivism holds on the contrary that the norms of 
scientific methodology are developed and refined by an induction over those 
amongst .all past proposed norms which have demonstrated the most fruitful 
applicability, so that the battery of norms to which a community adheres may 
evolve in response to a perceived inferiority of its performance relative to that of 
an alternative proposed battery. 
One may initially harbour the hope of adjudicating between these two 
doctrines on historical evidence by gauging the degree of variability which has 
been exhibited over time by the methodological norms actually prescribed and 
followed in science. Metarationalism would naturally anticipate no variability in 
the substance of those norms, whilst perhaps accepting that a scientific 
community may inductively learn to formulate them or come progressively to 
acknowledge them; metainductivism trusts on the contrary to perceive in the 
history of science a succession of inductive changes in the norms endorsed by 
scientific communities. 
The decisiveness of this historiographic test is unfortunately blunted by the 
fact that there exists wide disagreement in the interpretation of the historical 
record on this issue: different observers appear to perceive different degrees of 
historical variability in the methodological canons of science. At one extreme I. 
Scheffler sees in the historical record little or no methodological variability: 
Underlying historical changes of theory, there is [ ... ] a constancy of logic and method, which unifies each scientific age with that which preceded it and with that which is yet to follow. Such constancy comprises not merely the canons of formal deduction, but also those criteria by which hypotheses are 
confronted with the test of experience and subjected to comparative 
evaluation.2 
Clearly this reading of the historical record would lend no assistance to the 
metainductivist supposition that the history of science exhibits significant changes 
2 Scheffler (1967), pp. 9-10. Clark (1962, pp. 103-4; emphasis in the original) expresses a similar conviction: 'Science has already achieved such a sufficiently clear self-conscious awareness of the intellectual structure of its own enterprise that while future operations will surely disclose new and unexpected results through novel and unpredictable techniques, the logical pattern of their production must and will remain basically the same as those of today.' 
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in procedural canons.3 A quite different historiographic finding is reported by L. 
Laudan, who criticizes the approach of those who like Scheffler view the history 
of science as methodologically changeless: 
In some cases, proponents· of such an approach have gone so far as 
to claim that all the actual standards of rational appraisal have 
remained constant through time. [ ... ] We need waste little time on this 
approach. Virtually all the scholarly literature on the history of 
methodology shows unambiguously that such components of 
rational appraisal as criteria of explanation, views about scientific 
testing, beliefs about the methods of inductive inference and the like 
have undergone enormous transformations.' 
The perception of such transformations in science's procedural canons casts doubt 
on the metarationalist account of the origin of such canons and offers evidential 
support to the metainductivist conception, in as much as this doctrine is one of 
the possible range of accounts able to predict and explain variability of 
methodology.5 
If the historical data concerning the degree of variability of methodological 
norms are susceptible to interpretations as different as those of Scheffler and 
Laudan, it becomes difficult to adjudicate between metarationalism and 
metainductivism as accounts of the genesis of norms of scientific procedure. In 
3 
4 
5 
This reading of the historical record has commanded much wider assent in philosophy of science than has the contrary view: indeed Laudan (1979, p. 45) states 
that 'virtually every major philosopher of science, from Aristotle [ ... ] to Carnap [ ... ] has assumed that there is a set of rules for scientific method which are permanent 
and trans-temporal.' Laudan cites as representative of this stance Camap's (1928). 
Laudan (1977), p. 129; emphasis in the original. Laudan's criticism is prompted by 
the same passage of Scheffler (1967) which is quoted above. J.R. Brown (1985, p. 298) . suggests that this thoroughgoing attribution of variability to methodological 
norms sits uneasily with the main concerns of Laudan's (1977), which appears to 
embrace the view that at least some components of science's normative 
methodology are eternal or extrahistorical. This interpretative point does not detract from Laudan's passage cited here as a statement of the position that methodological 
norms have varied in time, and to this extent as an illustration of the reading of the historical record which supports the rnetainductivist account of the genesis of 
methodology. 
Laudan's view that scientific methodology has exhibited a pronounced variability in history finds an extreme echo in Feyerabend's writing, which of course draws also 
the normative conclusion (not pursued by Laudan) that for this reason it is deleterious to science to prescribe any subset of the widest potential range of 
methodological norms to the exclusion of any other ·subset: 'The idea that science 
can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic 
and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man 
and of the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development. And it is pernicious for the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, the idea is detrimental to 
science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence 
scientific change' (1975,J'P· 295-6; emphasis in the original). In the previous chapter 
of that work Feyeraben reports case studies which, he believes, militate against the 
attribution of universal validity to any methodological rule. 
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in procedural canons.3 A quite different historiographic finding is reported by L. 
Laudan, who criticizes the approach of those who like Scheffler view the history 
of science as methodologically changeless: 
In some cases, proponents of such an approach have gone so far as 
to claim that all the actual standards of rational appraisal have 
remained constant through time. [ ... ] We need waste little time on this 
approach. Virtually all the scholarly literature on the history of 
methodology shows unambiguously that such components of 
rational appraisal as criteria of explanation, views about scientifi<;: 
testing, beliefs about the methods of inductive inference and the like 
have undergone enormous transformations.• 
The perception of such transformations in science's procedural canons casts doubt 
on the metarationalist account of the origin of such canons and offers evidential 
support to the metainductivist conception, in as much as this doctrine is one of 
the possible range of accounts able to predict and explain variability of 
methodology. 5 
If the historical data concerning the degree of variability of methodological 
norms are susceptible to interpretations as different as those of Scheffler and 
Laudan, it becomes difficult to adjudicate between metarationalism and 
metainductivism as accounts of the genesis of norms of scientific procedure. In 
3 
4 
5 
This reading of the historical record has commanded much wider assent in philosophy of science than has the contrary view: indeed Laudan (1979, p. 45) states 
that 'virtually every major philosopher of science, from Aristotle [ ... ] to Carnap [ ... ] has assumed that there is a set of rules for scientific method which ·are permanent 
and trans-temporal.' Laudan cites as representative of this stance Camap's (1928). 
Laudan (1977), p. 129; emphasis in the original. Laudan's criticism is prompted by 
the same passage of Scheffler (1967) which is quoted above. J.R. Brown (1985, p. 298) .suggests that this thoroughgoing attribution of variability to methodological 
norms sits uneasily with the main concerns of Laudan's (1977), which appears to 
embrace the view that at least some components of science's normative 
methodology are eternal or extrahistorical. This interpretative point does not detract 
from Laudan's passage cited here as a statement of the position that methodological 
norms have varied in time, and to this extent as an illustration of the reading of the 
historical record which supports the metainductivist account of the genesis of 
methodology._ 
Laudan's view that scientific methodology has exhibited a pronounced variability in 
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these circumstances the suggestion dawns that perhaps each of these models is 
capable of capturing certain aspects of the process of construction of scientific 
communities' methodological canons, so that the way in which communities 
formulate their methodological canons would best be modelled by a combination 
of the two accounts. This conclusion would explain how it is that history yields 
evidence which lends support to both the metarationalist and the metainductivist 
models of method-construction. 
The question then arises of how these two models can suitably be 
combined in a coherent view of the origin of methodological norms. Some 
authors appear determined to pursue the synthesis by leaving their models of 
scientific rationality in ambiguity, suggesting in one context that a methodological 
canon is inferred metarationalistically from the perceived goal of scientific 
research, and in another context that the authority of each criterion is increased 
by the inductive observation of its fruitfulness in research. For instance Newton-
Smith, surveying the 'factors [ ... ] which can serve as fallible indicators of likely 
long-term observational success', asserts that all criteria of theory-choice are 
formulated or selected by an inductive procedure: 
The grounds for including any particular factor will be meta-inductive. If we can locate factors that have guided scientists in 
making theory choices which turned out to be correct on the 
ultimate test, we shall have inductive grounds for operating within 
the constraints of these particular inductive factors.6 
Other passages of the same treatment however appear devoted to undermining 
this view. For instance, having allowed to methodological precepts a variability 
occasioned by the community's inductive reassessment of their effectiveness, 
Newton-Smith minimizes their rate of inductive change - and loses to his model 
of scientific rationality some historiographic flexibility - in averring that 'there 
does seem to be considerable consistency in what the scientific community in 
different cultures and different ages holds to be the good-making qualities of a 
theory.17 Newton-Smith further puzzles the reader by appending to the opinions 
just outlined the further statement that methodological precepts are formulated by 
scientific communities through inferences from the goal of science, an origin 
which appears incompatible with the community's progressively refining its 
6 
7 
Newton-Smith (1981), pp. 224-5. 
Ibid., p. 112. 
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methodological criteria by inductively examining their effectiveness.8 
The ambivalence of judgements of the degree of variability of 
methodological precepts in history, and the consequent difficulty of adjudicating 
between metarationalist and metainductivist accounts of the origin of those 
precepts, merit a response possessed of more internal consistency than one which 
seemingly attributes the origin of one and the same set of methodological norms 
to two different mechanisms. If, as appears from the historiographic literature, 
both metarationalist and metainductivist accounts of the origin of methodological 
norms seem to capture part of the truth, there is a superior method by which to 
incorporate the insights of both these views into the same model of scientific 
rationality. 
Epistemological theorists generally posit that the scientific community's 
complex of methodological norms has in toto either demonstrated past fixedness 
and thus supported a metarationalist view, or undergone evolution and therefore 
been appropriately ascribed to a metainductivist origin. However there is no 
reason why both these modes of method-construction should not operate 
simultaneously in scientific history on separate categories of methodological 
norms. The present treatment, which has already and on independent grounds 
established two differently-defined classes of norms of theory-evaluation, is 
particularly well placed to pursue this suggestion. The thesis that shall be 
expounded here is that whereas empirical criteria of theory-assessment are 
formulated by inferences from first principles characteristic of metarationalism, 
aesthetic criteria are constructed a posteriori by metainductivism. 
3. The aesthetic metainduction 
Metarationalism is -clearly responsible for the genesis of empirical criteria because, 
on the account of chapter 2, their inclusion among the desiderata of theories 
derives entirely from the a priori definition of the goal. of science, the complete 
and empirically adequate explanatory account of the universe. The requirements 
of internal consistency or predictive accuracy are prized not because they have 
8 Ibid., pp. 223-4. Newton-Smith's account of the steps of the inference from a statement of the goal or nature of science to a methodological canon was examined in chapter 2 above. 
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previously, inductively been witnessed to accompany empirical adequacy but 
because they are the elements of an explication of what it is for a theory to be 
empirically adequate. Empirical criteria in other terms do not provide an 
ampliative connotation of empirical success, of which the correlation with 
empirical success might await discovery . by . inductive enumeration: on the 
contrary, they are elements deemed constitutive of empirical success, in the sense 
that for a theory to achieve empirical success is just for it to satisfy the 
requirements of the logico-empirical criteria of evaluation. Therefore the 
formulation of the logico-empirical criteria results from a judgement about the 
nature of empirical success, and is achieved metarationalistically or without 
inductive recourse to the history of science. It remains of course possible for 
formulations of empirical criteria of theory-assessment to be inductively refined 
by a scientific community but this is irrelevant to the a priori logical status of such 
criteria with respect to scientific practice. 
While the attribution of a metarationalist origin to logico-empirical criteria 
of theory-assessment follows naturally if one understands them to prescribe to 
theories features constitutive of the notion of empirical success, aesthetic 
evaluative criteria possess no such link to the goal of science. Hence, the present 
treatment will not attribute a metarationalist origin to aesthetic evaluative criteria 
as well as to logico-empirical criteria. On the contrary, the remainder of this 
section will be devoted to outlining a metainductivist account of the origin within 
scientific communities of aesthetic canons of theory-assessment. 
In order to render intuitively more acceptable such an attribution, consider 
first some of the characteristics of aesthetic evaluations of scientific theories. Such 
evaluations, as the previous chapter has illustrated, have demonstrated 
considerable variability in time. At some stage in the history of science certain 
aesthetic features may have been seen as desirable in theories, and a particular 
theory's possession of those features may have formed part of the case for its 
adoption by the community; but there is no guarantee that those aesthetic 
features will be seen as desirable in theories at other moments in the history of 
science, either before or after the episode mentioned. On the contrary, at some 
other time in history a theory's possession of the same aesthetic features may be 
seen as immaterial or damaging to the case for its adoption by the community. In 
brief, an aesthetic feature - call it feature i - which is present in some theories 
may be seen at different times in history as weighing in favour or in disfavour of 
the adoption of theories which exhibit i. Since the aesthetic feature specified as i 
upon which such variable judgements are passed is not of itself liable to change, 
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the sole entity which by its changes may be held responsible for the changing 
judgements is the community's canon of aesthetic evaluative criteria. The fact that 
a theory's possession of a certain aesthetic feature may be seen as first to the 
theory's credit and then to its discredit would on this assumption be explained by 
a change in the degree of favour attributed to that feature by the community's 
aesthetic evaluative canon. 
The historiographic contention that communities' aesthetic evaluative 
canons change in time, to yield at different times different evaluations of the 
same aesthetic features and of the same theories which exhibit those features, will 
further be supported in chapter 10 to which historical material is devolved. The 
challenge for this section is to construct a model of the origin of aesthetic 
evaluative canons able to explain their variability, and the consequent variability 
of the judgements passed by scientific communities on the aesthetic features of 
given theories. 
The mechanism to which the present treatment attributes the construction 
of an aesthetic evaluative canon operates as follows. A community selects its 
aesthetic canon at a certain date from amongst the aesthetic features of all past 
theories by attributing to each feature a degree of favour proportional to the 
degree of empirical success scored to that date by the set of theories which have 
appeared to embody that feature. The community's aesthetic canon is then 
composed of the set of mutually consistent such features which have won the 
greatest favour. A theory will consequently win support ceteris paribus in the 
measure to which it shares the aesthetic features of past theories which have been 
attributed great empirical success. 
Now, the degree of empirical success which the community attributes to 
long-established theories will in time decrease, either because of the discovery of 
fresh data unfavourable to them or because more recent theories will by 
comparison score greater success. Then the aesthetic features exhibited by the 
long-established theories will win a progressively lessening favour in the aesthetic 
evaluative canon, ·and a new theory's possession of those features will bring it 
less favour in the eyes of those who apply the canon in an instance of theory-
choice. Simultaneously the empirical success of the re(:ently-formulated theories 
will cause the aesthetic features of those theories to win greater favour in the 
canon, and any new theory to come . before the canon will be valued for its 
possession of those new features. Thus evolve in time both the · relative favour 
attributed to different aesthetic criteria in the canon and the preferences which the 
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canon expresses in cases of theory-choice. 9 
The degree of empirical success attributed to the set of theories exhibiting a 
given aesthetic feature may be altered by certain more specific considerations: a 
community may implicitly decide, for instance, to attach greater importance to an 
instance of predictive success gained in the immediate past rather than decades 
previously, or to successes gained in fields of active and vital research rather than 
those which are apparently stagnant. These preferences will exercise an effect on 
the favour which the aesthetic feature embodied by those theories will receive 
within the aesthetic canon. 
In consequence of the mechanism outlined here, a theory which achieves 
significant empirical success will remodel its community's aesthetic canon of 
theory-evaluation to attribute greater favour to its own aesthetic features. Thus 
the achievement of significant empirical success by a theory which exhibits given 
aesthetic features exercises an effect on subsequent theory-choice, since the 
aesthetic canon of theory-evaluation will as a consequence of that theory's 
empirical success receive ceteris paribus a bias towards future theories which 
exhibit that theory's same aesthetic features. By suitably altering the aesthetic 
canon to value its own aesthetic features, an empirically-successful theory will 
tend to replicate its own aesthetic features in the set of future theories which the 
community will come to embrace. A theory's achieving signal empirical success at 
one moment in the history of science can thus influence the later development of 
science, or more precisely can help determine the set of theories which at later 
times of the history of science are embraced by the community in part 
consequence of its aesthetic canon of theory-choice. 
The procedure described in the above paragraphs for the construction of an 
aesthetic · canon is clearly a form of inductive inference, in that by its means the 
community is able to choose for its aesthetic canon the evaluative criteria which, 
under the stipulated definition of 'fruitful', have demonstrated the most fruitful 
applicability in the past. This procedure is however more aptly termed a 
metainduction rather than an induction in view of the level of its operation: while 
the term 'induction' customarily denotes a procedure which formulates or tests 
theories from an examination of past observations, th_is procedure formulates or 
9 The mechanism outlined here for the construction of aesthetic canons of theory-assessment is similar to the mechanism of method-Darwinism by which Rescher (1977, pp. 140-66) suggests that methodological precepts are constructed. However Rescher believes that the precepts thus constructed are predictive of empirical success, while the present treatment holds that the aesthetic evaluative criteria constructed by the metainduction are not so linked. 
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tests methodological precepts from an examination of the empirical performance 
of past theories. For brevity the remainder of this treatment will refer to the 
procedure described in the previous paragraphs as 'the aesthetic metainduction'. 
The treatment which follows will be abbreviated by the adoption of two 
symbols. The function x1(t) will model the degree of empirical success attributed 
by the community to · the set of theories which embody aesthetic feature i; x
1 has 
to be a function of time as both the discovery of new data and the invention of 
new theories which embody feature i will cause the degree of empirical success 
attributed to the relevant set of theories to be altered. The function y
1(t) will 
model the degree of favour which feature i wins within the resulting aesthetic 
canon. The index i ranges over the set of all possible aesthetic features of theories, 
such as all possible forms of simplicity, of symmetry, and so on; there is therefore 
in principle a separate application of each function for each distinguishable 
aesthetic feature to which one might refer in discussing the aesthetic appeal of a 
theory. In this metaphor, the operation of the aesthetic metainduction at time t
0 
consists in the computation of the value of y1(t) for t=t0 from a knowledge of the 
behaviour of x1(t) for t~t0• Although it is probably fatuous to speculate at length 
on the functional by which one imagines the computation to be carried out, and 
which is therefore held to model the process of aesthetic metainduction, a 
suggestion of its form will be given in the following section once some 
characteristics of the metainductive procedure have been elucidated.10 
Fluctuations in the value of x1 are meant in the present treatment to 
resemble, say, variations in the ratings of players of certain competitive sports 
such as professional tennis players. Victories or defeats in tournaments will 
increase or decrease the current rating of a player and his or her ranking in the 
sport; a victory in a Grand Slam final may furthermore be weighted more heavily, 
and thus have a greater repercussion in the ratings, than one in a provincial 
tournament. The resulting numerical rating given to a tennis player is thus an 
indication of current track record. Similarly, empirical success or failure will 
increase or decrease the value of x1 currently attributed to a set of theories; 
furthermore an instance of empirical success in a test regarded as crucial may be 
weighted more in the eyes of the community, and thu.& exercise a greater effect on 
the value of x
1
, than an instance of success in a less significant experiment. Thus 
the current value of x
1 represents the current track record of the set of theories 
exhibiting aesthetic feature i. 
10 The relation between y
1 and x1 is a 'functional' rather than a 'function' because both relata are themselves functions, functions of time. 
114 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE INDUCTIVE CONSTRUCTION OF AESTHETIC PREFERENCE 
It is intended that the mechanism outlined here, and the claim that 
scientific communities use this mechanism to construct aesthetic canons of theory-
assessment, be judged on two grounds: their ability to account for features of the 
history of science and the philosophical interest or fertility of the model of 
scientific rationality of which they form a part. These tests will be applied in later 
chapters, once certain consequences of · the mode of operation of the 
metainduction have been laid out. 
4. Aspects of the evolution of aesthetic canons 
Let us consider the implications of the temporal variation of x, - the quantity 
representing the degree of empirical success enjoyed by theories exhibiting 
aesthetic feature i - upon the construction of the aesthetic canon. The 
computation of the value of y1(t) from a knowledge of x,(t) for tSt0 is a complex 
social procedure. The application of the aesthetic metainduction which is initiated 
by the formulation of a new theory incorporating aesthetic feature i consists 
typically of the following steps: the diffusion of knowledge of the theory through 
the community; the estimation by experiment of the degree of its empirical 
success, a process corresponding in the metaphor to the determination of a value 
of x, which takes cognizance of the empirical success of the newly-proposed 
theory; the ascertainment of its aesthetic features i; and finally the computation of 
the new current value of y1 from the perceived behaviour of xr The steps of this 
procedure each involve intricate social judgement and mediation, and will be 
apportioned among diverse institutions of the community including research 
laboratories, conference audiences and editorial boards. One can thus not expect 
that given a change in the value of x, the corresponding value of y1 will be 
computed instantly, -or that the aesthetic metainduction will be able to respond 
instantly to either the formulation of a new theory embodying feature i or the 
discovery of data which causes a reassessment of the deS!ee of empirical success 
to be attributed to such theories. On the contrary, the nature of the social network 
to which its operation is entrusted ensures that a damping will affect the aesthetic 
metainduction, and the product of the metainduction will react sluggishly to 
changes in the data or 'input' on which the metainduction is set to operate. In 
terms of the relational metaphor, there will be a time-lag between a change in x, 
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and a corresponding change in Ye In particular, the metainduction and 
consequently the aesthetic evaluative canon which it constructs will exhibit a 
delayed response to any unexpected change in the quality of the empirical 
performance of a theory: the unexpected success of the predictions of a low-rated 
theory or the sudden failure of a previously apparently reliable theory will be 
reflected only after some delay in the aesthetic canon of the community. 
The time-lag which affects the functioning of the aesthetic metainduction 
has two consequences which are important for the model of scientific rationality 
under construction here. 
The first consequence derives from the following observation. It has been 
established above that changes in the community's aesthetic evaluative canon lag 
behind changes in the community's perception of the degree of empirical success 
of theories. But the community's perception of theories' empirical success is the 
product of the application of the community's canon of logico-empirical criteria of 
theory-evaluation. Thus the time-lag of which the previous paragraph spoke may 
be seen as intervening between theory-evaluations or theory-choices on logico-
empirical grounds on the one hand and those on aesthetic grounds on the other: 
theory-choices performed on aesthetic criteria will therefore lag behind theory-
choices on empirical criteria, in that the recommendations for theory-choice issued 
by aesthetic criteria at a certain time will tend to resemble the recommendations 
which would have been yielded by empirical criteria at an earlier time in the 
history of science. Aesthetic judgements of theories in a community will tend 
forever to appear conservative or retrograde by comparison · to empirical 
evaluations. 
T.H. Huxley's aphorism about 'the great tragedy of Science - the slaying of 
a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact - which is so constantly being enacted 
under the eyes of philosophers' ,11 although probably penned as a rueful comment 
on the emotional commitment of scientists to their theories, describes one of the 
visible consequences of the lag of aesthetic appreciation behind empirical 
assessment. The perceived beauty of the hypothesis is a reflection of the accord 
between its aesthetic features and the preferences of the community's aesthetic 
evaluative canon, which as a consequence of the canon's metainductive origin lag 
behind the preferences which would be expressed by application of the logico-
empirical evaluative canon; the aesthetic canon has not as yet reached the state of 
development which would enable it to value the aesthetic features of the 
11 Huxley (1894), p. 244. 
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empirically more successful theory, or 'fact', which thus appears aesthetically 
unattractive or ugly. In time the community's aesthetic canon will evolve by 
metainduction to consider more favourably the aesthetic features of the 
empirically-successful theory. 
An aesthetically innovative theory will thus in all likelihood be seen as 
perceptually unappealing for a period after its first airing, since its aesthetic 
features neither conform to the pre-existing evaluative canons nor have yet had 
the opportunity to alter the canon to their favour; on the contrary the sign of a 
long-established theory is its being considered aesthetically pleasing by its 
community, an achievement due to the fact that its long and successful empirical 
track-record has ensured that its aesthetic features are now accorded favourable 
representation in the community's aesthetic canon. An aesthetically original 
theory which in time achieves significant empirical success will therefore tend to 
follow the life-cycle of the bird dismissed as an ugly duckling when juvenile and 
acclaimed as a beautiful swan in maturity: while at first, in its novelty, the new 
theory appears aesthetically less pleasing than other theories of longer-established 
aesthetic form, its empirical success will gradually increase its aesthetic appeal. 
The theory's aesthetic progression differs from that of the cygnet in one 
fundamental respect: the community's aesthetic approval is won by the bird by 
changing its morphology to conform to the existing aesthetic canons of evaluation 
applied to members of its species, and by the theory by redefining the aesthetic 
canons applicable to it in accordance with its own aesthetic features. 
Previous paragraphs introduced the variables x
1 and y1 as elements of a 
possible mathematical representation of the procedure of the aesthetic 
metainduction. Since there is probably no hope of ever associating quantitative 
values to these parameters, great effort directed at proposing a precise functional 
which should be held to model the aesthetic metainduction would be misplaced. 
Nonetheless, the features of the metainduction described above bring to mind a 
particular such functional. An integral of a function over time gives an indication 
of the past behaviour of that function, being - roughly - the cumulative measure 
of the values which the function attained in the period under consideration. An 
integral of x1(t) would thus exhibit the behaviour requir~ here of y1(t) in retaining 
a memory of the past behaviour of x1(t). Furthermore, the existence of a time-lag 
between changes in time of the variable x1 and corresponding changes y1 supports 
the idea that the relation between the two variables will be similar to an integral. 
Integration is well suited to model the damped response of a variable to changes 
in time of another; the behaviour of electronic devices which damp changes in 
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current, for instance, is appropriately modelled by integration. The relation which 
one may envisage between the degree of empirical success of theories exhibiting 
aesthetic feature i and the favour attributed to that feature in the aesthetic 
evaluative canon is therefore of the form y1(t)=Jx1(t)dt. This functional would 
capture some of the characteristics of the aesthetic metainduction, most notably 
the sluggish response of changes of y1 to corresponding changes of x1• 
While the sight of this relation may aid the mathematically-adept reader to 
visualize the operation of the metainduction, no further effort will in the present 
treatment be made to mathematicize the scientific community's construction of an 
aesthetic evaluative canon. 
Since scarcely any works in the philosophy of science devote committed 
attention to aesthetic criteria of theory-assessment, the number of those which 
understand the significance of the time-lag of aesthetic appreciation behind 
empirical judgement is virtually nil. A couple of authors have however expressed 
insights which accord with the above treatment. J. Bernstein has written: 
In science as in the arts, sound aesthetic judgements are usually 
arrived at only in retrospect. A really new art form or scientific idea is almost certain at first to appear ugly. The obviously beautiful, in both science and the arts, is more often than not an extension of the familiar. It is sometimes only with the passage of time that a really 
new idea begins to seem beautiful.12 
The present treatment specifies a mechanism to explain what remains for 
Bernstein merely a phenomenological observation: the 'passage of time' which 
ensures that a novel, empirically-successful theory will appear beautiful is 
required for the social operation of the aesthetic metainduction. The view of 
Penrose is equally consistent with the remarks above: 
Perhaps one's aesthetic judgements will change [ ... ]. Such judgements are, in any case, often to a considerable extent, acquired 
tastes. In these cases one cannot really appreciate the beauty of 
something until some familiarity with it has been gained - one has 
really to have thought about it for quite a while.13 
Of course for a new theory to win the approval of an aesthetic canon of a 
community it is not sufficient to 'think about it' or mull it over: it is necessary for 
the community to alter its aesthetic canon in response to the empirical success of 
the new theory and in accordance with the new theory's aesthetic features. 
12 
13 
A phenomenon which is distinct from the occurrence of a time-lag in the 
J. Bernstein (1979), p. 3. 
Penrose (1974), p. 267. 
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aesthetic metainduction but which nonetheless resonates strikingly with it was 
perceived by B. Russell. His concern in the following passage is for not 
substantive methodological beliefs in science but the literary forms or styles in 
which philosophers choose to couch their ideas. He believes that conventional or 
conservative philosophical doctrines will appear more beguiling than new ones 
through being expressed in well-worn prose: 
Broadly speaking, old conceptions have acquired pleasant literary 
clothes, whereas new ones still appear uncouth. An aesthetic bias in favour of good literary form is therefore likely to be associated with 
conservatism. [ ... ] As a result of many centuries of Platonism, the language of educated men can now express even the most difficult 
of Plato's ideas without crabbiness; but this was not the case in his 
own day. [ ... ] In such ways those who insist upon elegant literary form are compelled to lag behind - often far behind - the best thought of their time. Per contra, conservatives have a great aesthetic 
advantage over innovators, for ideas [ ... ] grow more beautiful as they grow older.14 
The parallelism between Russell's remarks on the prose style of philosophical 
works and the present treatment of aesthetic canons of theory-assessment is clear: 
in both cases the aesthetic garb of the substance is the more appealing for having 
been incorporated into the canons of taste of the community. 
Naturally, the entrenchment of certain aesthetic commitments into the 
evaluative canons of a community is a phenomenon frequently witnessed in 
literary disciplines. As a literary critic, Nicolson has remarked upon the resilience 
of certain aesthetic devices in English poetry. Her interest is attracted by the 
appeal to scientific or natural-philosophical imagery in literary work, and her 
remarks on the time-lag suggest similarities between the behaviour of aesthetic 
canons in literature and that of those in scientific methodology: 
I shall try to explain [ ... ] how and why the Circle of Perfection finally broke under the impact of seventeenth-century science, and at the same time suggest that old habits die hard, and that time-honored ways of thinking about the world and man did not change in a moment. The time-lag has sometimes been as clear in scientists 
as in poets.15 
Nicolson' s explicit reference to a 'time-lag' between the empirical results brought 
to bear in a discipline and the aesthetic canons which. dominate creativity in that 
discipline suggest the intriguing possibility that the same processes of evolution 
of conceptual categories may be at work in literature and in science. 
14 
15 
B. Russell (1940), p; 457. Russell prefaces by these remarks his praise for the literary qualities of the works of Santayana. 
Nicolson (1950), p. 126. 
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The second consequence of the time-lag is the following. The aesthetic 
metainduction was metaphorically represented above as the computation of 
values of Yi for values of xi changing in time. The variable xi represents the degree 
of empirical success currently attributed by the community to the set of theories 
which embody aesthetic feature i. There is clearly in principle no upper limit to 
the rate at which the value of xi can change in time. Its value may increase 
quickly if, for instance, a newly-formulated theory embodying aesthetic feature i 
suddenly solves an outstanding empirical problem of its discipline; conversely the 
value of xi may drop sharply if a previously well-regarded theory exhibiting 
feature i suffers a catastrophic empirical failure. High rates of change of xi may 
however cause difficulties in the metainduction which aims to compute 
corresponding values of Yi· It has already been conjectured that changes in xi are 
reflected in changes in Yi only after a certain time-lag because of the sluggish 
capacity of response of the social institutions delegated to perform the 
metainduction. It is then a plausible further supposition that if the rate of change 
of xi attains excessively high values the metainduction will begin to lose ground, 
and the time-lag which elapses between a certain change of xi and the 
corresponding change of Yi will increase. Even when the time-lag between 
changes in xi and corresponding changes in Yi is minimal, that time-lag may be 
reflected in minor discrepancies between the theory-preferences expressed by 
logico-empirical and by aesthetic criteria: these discrepancies arise from the fact 
that, because of the time-lag introduced by the metainduction, the aesthetic 
evaluative canon has a conservative bias in theory-choice of which the logico-
empirical canon is free. When however the time-lag lengthens, the discrepancies 
between the preferences expressed by logico-empirical and aesthetic canons will 
worsen. When thus the rate of change of xi and hence the length of the time-lag 
attains great magnitude, the practice of theory-choice in the community will lose 
the determinacy which in normal times is assured by the metainductive co-
ordination of th.e preferences yielded by the aesthetic and empirical canons. High 
rates of change of xi will thus render theory-choice controversial, and raise the 
prospect that scientists in the community may be compelled to elect between 
conducting theory-choice on empirical grounds and .maintaining their previous 
commitment to the community's aesthetic canon. 
These observations will be exploited in the account of the advent of 
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revolutionary crises in science to ensue in chapter 8.16 
5. The psychological motivation of the metainduction 
According to the present account of the origin of aesthetic canons of theory-
assessment, aesthetic evaluations of theories are in general of no use in attempts 
to identify the empirically most successful theory among several which may be 
proposed. This incapacity of the aesthetic canon derives in principle from the fact 
that aesthetic canons evaluate theories on criteria unrelated to empirical virtues, 
and in practice from the fact that the metainductive construction of aesthetic 
canons (or, to employ the relational metaphor once more, the computation of 
values of y1 from changing values of x1) requires non-zero time. Because of this 
incapacity, scientific communities cannot legitimately tum to aesthetic canons of 
theory-evaluations to further the utilitarian or empirical interests which they 
repose in science and its progress. 
The problem therefore arises of what rational reason, if any, should be 
attributed to scientific communities for constructing and applying aesthetic canons 
of theory-evaluation. The proposal of the present treatment is that there is no 
such rational reason, and that on the contrary the pursuit of the aesthetic 
metainduction is an arational phenomenon in scientific communities in the sense 
in which for D. Hume the pursuit of inductive inferences is an arational 
phenomenon in the mind of the individual.17 Thus, the present account of the 
origin of aesthetic canons of theory-assessment is explicitly intended to resemble 
16 
17 
There is a degree of independence between two of the claims of this treatment 
which I should like to indicate. The validity of the model developed in the above two sections_ of this chapter to account for the community's construction of a certain 
canon of theory-assessment is independent of the validity of the claim that the 
canons of theory-assessment thereby constructed are aesthetic in nature. The 
mechanism of the aesthetic metainduction may well operate in scientific 
communities for the construction of certain components of the overall canon of theory-assessment even if it is denied that communities make recourse to aesthetic 
evaluative criteria for their assessment of theories. Needless to say there are other 
reasons, adduced in chapters 3 and 4, for which I should be reluctant to withdraw from the full complexity of my view, but the endorsement of the greater part of this 
chapter does not require the acceptance of the chapters that have preceded it. 
I think of Hume (1739), pp. 69-179. The interpretation of Hume's Treatise as at least in part an essay in the natural science of the mind seeking to account for inductive inferences as a .psychological phenomenon - upon which the analogy outlined in this section is predicated - is advanced in e.g. Stroud (1977), pp. 42-95. 
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the Humean explanation of the origin of notions of cause: just as Hume believed 
the inductive apprehension of causal links to be unsupportable by nomological 
data but a nonetheless ineluctable product of a driven mind, aesthetic canons in 
science can boast no systematic relation to empirical virtues but spring from the 
psychological concerns of scientists. 
The psychological motivations of the Humean induction and of the 
aesthetic metainduction are similar. Hume envisaged that the individual would 
pursue inductive inferences out of a tendency to conceive that law-like 
regularities held between events called 'causes' and other events called 'effects'; 
the present treatment similarly envisages that a scientific community pursues the 
aesthetic metainduction out of a tendency to conceive that law-like regularities 
hold between a theory's achieving empirical success and its possession of certain 
aesthetic features. The agent envisaged by Hume's theory, recalling a previous 
occasion on which the sight of flames was accompanied by the sensation of pain, 
is moved to recoil from the location at which flames are again sighted: similarly, 
the scientists contemplated by the present model of scientific rationality, recalling 
a previous occasion on which a theory's possession of certain aesthetic features 
was accompanied by that theory's achievement of empirical success, are moved 
on subsequent occasions to value and pursue other theories exhibiting the same 
aesthetic features. 
In each case an inductive and thus - as Hume would put it - arational 
expectation is conceived: Hume's agent expects arationally that the renewed 
proximity to the flames will bring pain, while the scientists of which ·the present 
treatment speaks believe arationally that the possession by new theories of the old 
aesthetic features will bring renewed empirical success. In each case, however, 
analysis reveals the illusory status of the supposedly nomological correlations 
invoked by the protagonists of the episode. Hume's analysis concluded that the 
notion that there could exist law-like correlations between perceived causes and 
effects was philosophically nonsensical; similarly the analysis contained in the 
above treatment concludes that there exist no law-like correlations between a 
theory's empirical success and its possession of given aesthetic features. In both 
this account and that of Hume, the belief in such correlations cannot be the result 
of an inference from empirical observations but is rather a psychological artefact. 
It is important to acknowledge that neither Hume's account nor this one 
concludes that correlations which are grasped by a process of arational induction, 
and which therefore cannot claim an objectivist derivation, are for this reason 
valueless. Links of cause and effect are an undeniable convenience of the Humean 
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life, and Hume states that appeal to such links in the planning and performance 
of quotidian actions is helpful to their success and indeed to the preservation of 
the life of the agent. Similarly the construction - by means of the aesthetic 
metainduction - of correlations between theories' empirical success and their 
possession of certain aesthetic features is often an aid to the processes of scientific 
decision-making: in phases of science when the value of y1 is reacting promptly to 
changes in x1, the belief in such correlations reinforces the community's tendency 
to make the empirically most fruitful choices among competing theories. 
The pragmatic utility of correlations constructed by Humean inductions 
naturally does not absolve the observer of the process from the obligation to 
remember their subjective nature and to avoid attributing to them any necessity. 
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REVOLUTION AS AESTHETIC RUPTURE 
1. Gradualism and catastrophism in the philosophy of science 
The foregoing treatment of aesthetic criteria of theory-assessment is in principle 
consistent with the thesis that canons of rationality are subject to only continuous 
change. The discussion of the two categories of criteria of theory-assessment in 
the previous chapter attributed to logico-empirical criteria stability through time 
and interpreted aesthetic canons as undergoing a continuous evolution in 
consequence of the process of aesthetic metainduction. These attributions leave 
open within the model the possibility that there will be no discontinuous changes 
in the values pursued by scientists in theory-choice, and hence that canons of 
scientific rationality will evolve only gradually and continuously. If this model of 
rationality were instantiated in scientific practice, then although the effects of the 
small gradual changes might surnmate to yield in time different rational canons, 
any reasonably short interval of the history of science would exhibit ·a continuity 
of methodology and certainly contain no discontinuous substitutions of one 
methodological canon by another. 
The project of reconstructing scientific rationality would probably regard 
this conclusion as eminently satisfactory were it not for the spur of 
historiography. Chapter 2 made reference to the power of historiographic findings 
to undermine the conviction that logico-empirical criteria are sufficient to 
reconstruct scientists' practice of theory-choice: similar findings now shake the 
belief that canons of rationality are immune from discontinuous alteration in the 
history of science.1 The persuasion that the evaluative canons of scientific 
communities must undergo discontinuous changes acquires force from, for 
The influence of the findings of history in persuading philosophical observers that 
scientific progress suffers methodological discontinuities is proclaimed by Kuhn (1962, pp. 1-9) and studied by I.B. Cohen (1985, pp. 389-404). Notes on which 
categories of historiographic findings are most apt to suggest to the historian the 
occurrence of a revolution may be found ibid., pp. 40-7. 
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instance, a study of the nature of the arguments advanced in theory-assessment in 
early-modern Western science. Copernicus adduces among the grounds for the 
heliocentric model of the solar system the observation that, if this model 
constituted an accurate representation of the solar system, an analogy could then 
be drawn between the configuration of celestial bodies and the organization of a 
monarch's court. The analogy postulates that . the pre-eminent being of each 
structure occupy its centre and be surrounded by dependants or satellites: 'Thus 
indeed the Sun as if seated on a royal throne governs his household of Stars as 
they circle round him.'2 For this analogy to possess the advocative force with 
which Copernicus implicitly invests it, Copernicus's methodological canon - or, 
more realistically, that enshrined in his community - must have included a 
precept to the effect that a theory is ceteris paribus to be preferred if the 
mechanisms which it posits admit relations of analogy with contemporary social 
or political institutions. The philosopher appraised of the apparent adherence to 
this precept in sixteenth-century communities of planetary astronomers is likely to 
postulate the occurrence of a discontinuous switch in methodological canons in 
that community between the time of Copernicus and, say, that of Newton.3 
Surely, the philosopher wonders, no process of merely inductively reviewing 
methodological precepts could fashion modern mathematical science from 
medieval scholastic speculation? 
If, on the one hand, in order to account for historiographic findings it 
appears necessary to embrace the catastrophist supposition that . moments of 
revolution have witnessed considerable sudden changes of rational canon, on the 
other hand two gradualist conclusions emerge equally compelling from the 
historical record. The first is that revolutions are separated from one another by 
periods in which theory-succession is governed by an unchanging methodological 
canon. The second is that even in revolution not every norm of scientific practice 
can be abrogated and replaced by a different precept: if revolution visited such a 
thorough metho~ological metamorphosis upon a community, there would 
presumably remain no sense of a unified history of science or indeed of a 
historically identifiable scientific discipline. 
2 
3 
Copernicus (1543), p. 50 (Book I, chapter 10). Copemicus's use of analogies between 
astronomical systems and political structures is studied by Hutchinson (1987), pp. 97-109. 
The historian's reaction to the discovery that Copernicus appealed to arguments of this kind is examined in Hesse (1973), p. 137, where it is suggested that the historiographic practice of assessing the truth and standards of rationality of past 
scientific theories may help to discern the occurrence of revolutions in 
methodological canons. 
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In view of these historically-founded apprehensions, the philosophy of 
science faces the task of accommodating within its model of the historical 
development of science both elements of continuity and elements of discontinuity. 
It would be a considerable achievement for any theory of scientific rationality to 
combine these elements satisfactorily, seeing in science a thread of procedural 
continuity whilst explaining how at times of revolution that thread can be frayed 
and thinned in a partial change of methodological practice. 
The acknowledgement, under the pressure of historiographic findings, that 
continuous scientific progress is punctuated by discontinuous changes in 
evaluative canons has occupied the philosophy of science since at least the 1930s 
when G. Bachelard wrote of ruptures epistemologiques and L. Fleck of the 
alternation of successive Denkstile.' The most influential account of discontinuous 
changes of rational canons is however today undoubtedly that of Kuhn. 
He explicitly recognizes the need for models of science to accommodate 
both phenomena of continuous change embedded in tradition and phenomena of 
discontinuous innovation, between which he believes there endures an 'essential 
tension.'5 Kuhn views intellectual history as sectioned into periods of 'normal 
science' defined by paradigms during the life-span of each of which the progress 
of science adheres to unchanging methodological canons. These periods are 
terminated by instances of 'radical standard variance', or 'changes in the 
standards governing permissible problems, concepts, and explanations.'6 
Some difficulty has however been encountered in fathoming from Kuhn's 
writings in what this variance is supposed to consist, or which specific categories 
of norms of scientific procedure are liable to such discontinuous changes. Kuhn 
has volunteered no adequate elucidation of this matter. On the contrary, the same 
essay of his which introduced the prospect of radical standard variance proceeded 
to offer a 'a preliminary codification of good reasons for theory choice' ,7 a 
tabulation of criteria of theory-evaluation to which Kuhn apparently attributes a 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Bachelard (1934), esp. pp. 50-5; F1eck (1935), esp. pp. 125-45. The history of concepts of revolution in philosophical speculation on science is of course exhaustively charted in LB. Cohen (1985). 
Kuhn (1977), pp. 225-39. 
Kuhn (1962), p. 106. Successive paradigms are in Kuhn's original view separated 
also by a 'radical meaning variance' of the terms which they employ, but this 
variance would not of itself endanger the continuity of canons of rationality and hence will not be addressed here. In any event Kuhn has withdrawn from this 
extreme position to allow for the communication of meaning between proponents of different paradigms: see ibid., pp. 198-9. 
This phrase occurs in Kuhn (1970), p. 261, whereas the passage which this phrase is intended to describe is contained in his (1962), pp. 144-55. 
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validity which is ever-lasting or at least endures through paradigm-changes. 
Clearly the identification of such 'good reasons' would much reduce the prospect 
of radical changes of criteria of theory-evaluation in science. 
Kuhn lent further weight to the gradualist component of his model in a 
later work. He there gave explicit form to the promised codification of science's 
methodological precepts, professing the opinion that there exist five criteria for 
theory-evaluation which will be common to the proponents of all paradigms: the 
qualities of accuracy, consistency, breadth of scope and fruitfulness. 8 Kuhn 
stresses that 'it is vitally important that scientists be taught to value these 
characteristics' :9 the historically indiscriminate reference to 'scientists' as if their 
methodological canons were not bound to some particular paradigm and as if 
their theory-choices were throughout history to be based on Kuhn's five values 
tends further to vanify Kuhn's painstaking earlier work in allowing for the 
possibility of radical variance in their canons. As · long as the values of theory-
choice applied by scientists are reputed to possess trans-paradigmatic validity and 
no complementary class of paradigm-specific norm is identified, it remains 
unclear how radical standard variance could ever arise.10 
From these observations it appears that Kuhn's treatment of criteria of 
theory-evaluation, taken in its entirety, is unable satisfactorily to mediate between 
the radical desire to allow for sharp discontinuities in scientific procedure and the 
moderate realization that some communication and sharing of concerns and 
preferences across such purp01ted discontinuities is revealed in history. Instead of 
combining elements or mechanisms of continuous development and of 
discontinuous substitution within a unified picture of the progression of science, 
Kuhn's writings appear to oscillate uneasily between postulations of outrageous 
catastrophism and of tame gradualism.11 
The root of Kuhn's incapacity to achieve the desired synthesis lies, it is 
here claimed, in his treatment of all norms of scientific methodology as exhibiting 
the same historical nature and behaviour. Kuhn does not draw internal 
distinctions within his repertory of five values of theory-assessment: he does not 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Kuhn (1977), pp. 321-2. 
Kuhn (1970), p. 261. 
Kuhn (1970, p. 262, and 1977, pp. 322-5) attempts to allow for radical standard variance in extremis by supposing that although the parties to a dispute may agree on the criteria of theory-evaluation, they coufd still differ in the application or the relative weighting of such principles in certain cases of theory-choice: but this is patently a case not of a radical variance of standards, merely of their indefiniteness or of the subjectivity of their application. 
I think of Kuhn (1%2), pp. 111-35, as an example of the former tendency; of his (1977), pp. 31-65, as an example of the latter. 
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envisage the possibility that some of these values may possess a degree or form 
of historical variability different from that of certain others on the list. A 
distinction of this kind would allow Kuhn to adduce some criteria as liable to 
radical variance and thus as responsible for revolutionary discontinuities in 
theory-evaluation, whilst leaving to other criteria the trans-paradigmatic validity 
which he is apparently .keen to see in his revised treatment of scientific 
revolutions. A view of criteria of theory-assessment which differentiated amongst 
them along these lines would also possess considerable historical verisimilitude, 
since it could accommodate the views of both metainductivists who perceive in 
evaluational criteria historical variability and metarationalists who maintain that 
at least some such criteria have remained unchanged: these apparently 
incompatible tenets would be seen each to capture part of the complex behaviour 
of methodological norms in history. 
2. Aesthetic canons in normal science 
The reconciliation of elements of continuity and of discontinuity within the same 
model of scientific rationality will be attempted in this chapter by appeal to the 
considerations on aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation laid out so far in this 
work. The attempt will proceed, as anticipated in the previous section, by 
postulating that some but only some of a community's methodological criteria are 
subject to the kind of radical variance which is envisaged by Kuhn. 
The present view of criteria of theory-assessment is well able to erect a 
differentiated model of their operation in scientific revolutions, for it has already 
and on independent grounds distinguished two classes of methodological norms 
which differ in historical origin and behaviour. Logico-empirical evaluative 
criteria were above attributed a metarationalist origin and temporal permanence, 
while aesthetic criteria were reputed to be the product of a continuous 
metainductive updating. In this section and the n_ext, a model of scientific 
revolutions will be constructed which delegates one of these classes of evaluative 
norms to assure the elements of continuity in scientific methodology across 
revolutions, and details the other class to account for the elements of 
revolutionary discontinuity, embodying in their changes the differences between 
pre- and post-revolutionary procedural canons. More specifically, and - by this 
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point - obviously, the present view attributes the elements of historical continuity 
in scientific procedure to the permanence of logico-empirical evaluative criteria, 
and allocates responsibility for the occurrence of revolutionary changes of 
methodology to substitutions of one canon of aesthetic evaluative criteria by 
another. On this view a revolution will consist of a discontinuous change not in 
the criteria of theory-evaluation in their globality, as Kuhn appears to believe by 
default of any more differentiated statement, but solely in the criteria of aesthetic 
evaluation endorsed by a community. The pre- and post-revolutionary states of a 
science will be united by their empirical criteria in consequence of the a priori 
formulation of the latter, but will be distinguished by their appeal to two 
different sets of aesthetic criteria. 
This view will be presented here partly by reference to the terms and 
concepts coined by Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions: this use of an already 
well-known conceptual framework will ease the exposition, and in time will 
render obvious the differences between the present view and that of Kuhn. 
The previous chapter outlined a model of the development of an aesthetic 
canon of theory-appraisal by a scientific community. This development is 
continuous, in that the formulation of the canon is continuously reviewed and 
updated by the procedure of aesthetic metainduction defined in that chapter. A 
community constructs its aesthetic canon at a certain date from among the 
aesthetic features of all past theories by attributing to each feature a degree of 
favour proportional to the degree of empirical success scored up to that date by 
the theories which have appeared to embody it. The collection of aesthetic 
features thus constructed assumes a normative role, becoming a canon of theory-
assessment: a newly-formulated theory will be evaluated by the community partly 
for its accord with the aesthetic canon thus constructed and partly for the degree 
to which it satisfies the logico-empirical desiderata separately imposed upon 
theories by the community. 
It was further explained in the previous chapter how this procedure 
ensured that aesthetic evaluative canons were tendentially conservative: they will 
forever tend to prefer, and to recommend for preference by the community, 
theories which are 'more of the same' in conforming to the aesthetic features 
embodied by the empirically most successful theories of the recent past. In some 
instances of theory-choice the in-built conservatism of the aesthetic evaluative 
canon may dissuade the community from readily embracing the empirically most 
successful theory, if that theory faces a competitor which is aesthetically more 
acceptable in better conforming to the community's aesthetic canon: such a case, 
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which holds great significance for the consummation of a phase of scientific 
revolutions, will further be explored below. 
There equally exists a possible period of scientific history, which it is best 
to consider first, in which on the contrary the conservatism of the aesthetic canon 
exerts no undue brake on the logico-empirical progress of science, or more 
precisely in which the aesthetic canon to no extent weighs against or hinders the 
scientific community's adoption of the scientific theories which are at each 
moment exhibiting the greatest empirical success. This state of affairs persists 
while there remains, as a matter of contingent fact, agreement between the 
theory-choices recommended by application of the logico-empirical criteria and 
those recommended by application of the aesthetic canon of the community. This 
requirement may be more concisely expressed by once more representing the 
aesthetic metainduction as the social computation of values of y
1 (the degree of 
favour attributed to aesthetic feature i in the community's aesthetic canon) from 
changing values of x1 (the degree of empirical success attributed by the 
community to the set of theories which embody aesthetic feature i). As was 
shown in the previous chapter, a community's logico-empirical and aesthetic 
canons of theory-evaluation will maintain reasonable agreement in cases of 
theory-choice as long as the time-lag between changes in x
1 and corresponding 
changes in the values of y1 computed by the process of aesthetic metainduction 
remains reasonably short. This result is due to the fact that, under such 
conditions, changes in the community's judgement of the empirical success of 
their theories will be reflected reasonably promptly in the preferences expressed 
among the same theories by the community's aesthetic canon. Whilst the time-lag 
remains reasonably short, theory-choices performed on the community's aesthetic 
canon would not yield theories other than those which would be selected by the 
separate application of the community's logico-empirical criteria: the joint and at 
times not explicitly distinguished application to problems of theory-choice of both 
sets of criteria would naturally further reinforce the choices of each. 
Thus, for this phase of scientific history to endure, the rate of evolution of 
a community's aesthetic canon must be sufficiently high to ensure that the time-
lag mentioned above remains 'reasonably short', and therefore that theory-
judgements yielded by the application of the aesthetic canon and those passed by 
application of the logico-empirical canon remain in reasonably close agreement. 
For the rate of evolution of the aesthetic canon to be 'sufficiently high' to ensure 
this result, it need not be especially high: the aesthetic canon's agreement with the 
logico-empirical carion is equally assured if, say, the aesthetic canon remains 
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unchanged during a period in which all empirically successful theories to be 
formulated are aesthetically conservative, i.e. satisfy the requirements of the 
extant aesthetic canon. The accord between a sequence of newly-formulated 
theories and the dominant aesthetic canon may in other terms be obtained equally 
by a combination of a static aesthetic canon and a low degree of aesthetic 
innovativeness in theory-formulation, or by a combination of high aesthetic 
innovativeness in the latter practice and a sufficiently high rate of evolution of the 
aesthetic canon: on the present account those two cases do not differ essentially. 
Of course the agreement in theory-preference between the logico-empirical 
and the aesthetic canons breaks down as soon as the community encounters a 
scientific theory which a) violates the stipulations of its aesthetic canon, and b) 
exhibits empirical success superior to that of its competitor-theories which 
conform to the canon. At such a time one canon would recommend adoption of 
one theory and the other would express preference for its rival. Yet, because of 
the mechanism of the construction of the aesthetic canon, a persistence of the 
state of agreement between the two canons is likely to entrench itself in the 
community's patterns of theory-choice. As long as there remains a coincidence 
between the aesthetic features prescribed by the canon and those embodied by 
the empirically most successful proposed theories, two mechanisms of positive 
feedback will manifest themselves. First, the empirical success of each newly-
proposed theory will - under the operation of the aesthetic metainduction -
further increase the degree of favour attached to the aesthetic features exhibited 
by those theories within the aesthetic evaluative canon: for its part, and in 
consequence of this first phenomenon, the aesthetic evaluative canon will attach 
increasing value to the same aesthetic features which happen to be exhibited by 
the empirically most successful theories proposed during the period. Thus, 
though the persistence of this period of agreement between the logico-empirical 
and the aesthetic evaluative canons depends on a continued coincidence, this 
coincidence is liable to entrench itself and the resulting acts of theory-preference 
in the behaviour ·of the community. 
The phase of science which has thus far been described corresponds, it is 
here stipulated, to a period of 'normal science' in the Kuhnian model of scientific 
history.12 A period of normal science is on this view, as on Kuhn's, one in which 
theory-choices are uncontroversial and acts of theory-choice generally attract the 
consensus of the entire community. This view attributes the consensual nature of 
12 Kuhn's characterization of 'normal science' is to be found in his (1%2), pp. 23-34. 
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theory-choice in periods of normal science to the fact that in such periods theory-
choices based on empirical criteria and those founded on aesthetic criteria 
coincide and hence there does not arise the dilemma of choosing between the 
aesthetic appeal of some theories and the observational success of others. This 
view explains also how the consensus is entrenched in the community, by the 
mutual reinforcement of the choice o{ a sequence of aesthetically similar, 
empirically-successful theories on the one hand and the aesthetic evaluative canon 
on the other, in the manner described in the previous paragraph. 
The explanation of the consensus achieved in normal science which is 
offered by the present treatment attains a level deeper than that invoked by 
Kuhn's model: whereas that model limits itself to postulating the occurrence of 
periods of community-wide satisfaction about the speed and manner of the 
progress of a branch of science, this view reconstructs the satisfaction as the 
rational recognition of a persisting agreement in cases of theory-choice between 
the logico-empirical and the aesthetic classes of evaluative criteria. 
This characterization of periods of normal science permits historians of 
science to form certain expectations about the manner in which such periods will 
appear to them in the historical record. A period of normal science defined in the 
way suggested here will spawn a sequence of theories which displays unchanging 
or smoothly varying aesthetic features. The historian aiming to discern a period of 
normal science will thus search for a run of theories united by aesthetic 
resemblance. For instance, it will be argued in chapter 10 that the development of 
Western planetary astronomy in the interval from the work of Ptolemy to and 
including that of Copernicus constituted a period of normal science since the 
empirically successful theories formulated in that discipline and in that interval 
exhibit significant common aesthetic features, viz. principally the metaphysically-
backed canon of simplicity or symmetry which attributed to celestial bodies 
circular paths. 
The 'paradigm' which Kuhn sees as characterizing work within a period of 
normal science · -is on this account defined by the aesthetic canon which 
contributes to theory-choice within that period. Once this identification is made, a 
difference readily emerges between the content of Kuhn's notion of a paradigm 
and that of the corresponding notion promulgated here. Kuhn at least implicitly 
attributes to a paradigm a degree of rigidity or fixedness in time, and certainly 
his model of the progression of science omits to mention a mechanism by which a 
paradigm may evolve: in Kuhn's model, changes in canons of theory-preference 
are attributed entirely to revolutionary exchanges of one paradigm for another, 
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and the phases between revolutions are intended to witness only increases in the 
problem-solving capability of the set of theories which satisfy the evaluative 
stipulations of the paradigm then current. In the present model, on the contrary, a 
paradigm is attributed a mechanism by which to evolve during its own period of 
dominance of a community. The process of aesthetic metainduction by which - in 
the account of the previous chapter - an aesthetic canon of theory-evaluation is 
constructed does not terminate with the canon's attainment of dominance in a 
community, but continues to update the canon in accordance with the 
community's changing judgements of the degree of empirical success scored by 
its theories. Since the prescriptive content of a paradigm is in this treatment 
defined by the criteria enshrined in the aesthetic evaluative canon which 
characterizes that paradigm, it follows that the prescriptive content of a paradigm 
may undergo evolutionary change - owing to the operation of the aesthetic 
metainduction - even during the period of recognized dominance of that 
paradigm. 
Kuhn terms 'puzzles' the staple problems of normal science which are 
solved within the precepts of the dominant paradigm.13 If now a paradigm is 
defined by an aesthetic evaluative canon, it follows that on this view puzzles 
must be found solutions constituted by theories or extensions of theories which 
accord with the aesthetic canon in force. On this view, as on Kuhn's, while such 
solutions may be difficult to find, their acceptability is not generally a matter of 
controversy as it is the essence of such contributions that they should accord 
closely - if need be in a pedestrian, derivative manner - to the stipulations of the 
paradigm. Again, chapter 10 will depict the Copernican planetary theory as such 
a solution to a puzzle, which accorded deliberately with the requirements issued 
by the aesthetic canon then current. 
Difficulties encountered by the community in attributing to 'puzzles' 
solutions which satisfy the dominant aesthetic canons may herald a crisis in 
normal science, as the next section will indicate. 
13 Kuhn discusses the procedures of puzzle-solving ibid., pp. 35-42. 
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3. The abandonment of aesthetic commitments 
As long as a community in a phase of normal science remains able to meet the 
problems thrown up in research with theories of which the choice is 
recommended by both its aesthetic canon and its logico-empirical criteria of 
theory-assessment, those problems retain the status of 'puzzles', the solutions 
which are attributed to them are accepted without controversy, and the mode of 
normal-scientific work continues uninterrupted. During such a period, the 
community entrenches the habit of demanding that its theories accord both with 
the logico-empirical criteria of theory-assessment and with the aesthetic evaluative 
canon which has dominated the period: the imposition of these two separate 
constraints on theory-acceptance poses no difficulty for theory-choice as long as 
the empirically most successful theories proposed within the community accord 
also with the dominant aesthetic canon. 
In time however the community will encounter a kind of problem which is 
new and harder to solve.14 The difficulty will manifest itself in the following 
manner. Each problem of this new kind, just as any other problem, will attract a 
variety of proposed solutions; while however problems typical of the preceding 
period of normal science readily admitted solutions of which the adoption was 
recommended by both classes of evaluative criteria, for problems of the new kind 
the community's two canons of criteria appear unable to agree upon which 
member of the class of proposed solutions to recommend. In the set of proposed 
solutions of a problem of the new kind, the one which accords best with the 
dominant aesthetic canon demonstrates less empirical success than do at least 
some of the proposed solutions which violate the canon.15 
It appears that theory-choice cannot now satisfy the conjunction of the 
constraints separately imposed by the two evaluative canons. Out of the class of 
proposed solutions of a problem of the new kind, one will be recommended for 
adoption by the application of the logico-empirical criteria of assessment, and 
another will be .preferred by the aesthetic evaluative canon. The previously 
enduring coincidence in acts of theory-choice between the recommendations of 
14 
15 
As will become clear, problems of this kind correspond to Kuhnian 'anomalies', discussed by him ibid., pp. 66-76. 
The sentence to which this note is appended is to be regarded as the definition of the expression 'problem of the new kind.' Thus, the present treatment envisages that a crisis of the type described in the remainder of this section will occur when the community encounters a problem which satisfies the stipulations of this sentence. The sentence which precedes the one to which this footnote is appended is on the contrary a characterization of the manner in which problems of this new kind will be recognized by the community. 
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the logico-empirical criteria of theory-assessment and those of the aesthetic 
evaluative canon is dissolved. The repercussions of this occurrence in the 
community are obvious: while the consensual nature of theory-choice in the 
period of normal science was assured by the agreement of the two classes of 
evaluative criteria, their conflict under the conditions described here will bring 
controversy to theory-choice. 
The cause of this crisis can be retraced to the rate at which the community 
has found it possible to update its aesthetic evaluative canon by means of the 
rnetainduction. The previous section specified that the two evaluative canons of a 
community would continue, and therefore a period of normal science would 
persist, as long as changes in x, were reflected reasonably promptly by the 
metainduction in changes in yi" A failure of the metainduction to maintain the lag 
short enough means that changes of the aesthetic canon will fail to keep pace 
with the evolution of the aesthetic features exhibited by the community's 
empirically most successful theories as these are formulated. As the time-lag 
between changes in x, and corresponding changes in y1 increases, scientists will 
find that the aesthetic features of their empirically most successful theories 
increasingly diverge from the features required by the aesthetic evaluative canon, 
and thus that their empirically most successful theories come into deepening 
conflict with that canon. 
When theory-choices based on the aesthetic canons of the paradigm have 
deviated from simultaneous judgements founded on empirical criteria so far that 
it becomes impossible for scientists involved in theory-choice to ·recompose or 
overlook their conflict, the scientists of the community are faced with the 
dilemma of choosing from between their evaluative canons the one of which to 
follow the directives. At first they may well deem that they can afford to suspend 
judgement on the issue, evading the embarrassment of adjudicating between the 
conflicting recommendations of their two classes of criteria for theory-choice. It is 
unlikely however that such an option will be considered legitimate indefinitely, 
and scientists will in time be forced to a choice between the conflicting evaluative 
canons and thence between the competing theories. 
This is the moment of revolution. Under the conditions described, two 
factions of scientists will coalesce within the community, each of which will 
choose to resolve the crisis in theory-choice by relaxing one of the two sets of 
constraints imposed by the joint application of the two evaluative canons. This 
relaxation will in the case of each faction amount to suspending the application of 
one of the two evaluative canons, and conducting theory-choice exclusively by 
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application of the other canon. 
Of the two factions of scientists, one will persist in adhering to the 
aesthetic norms characteristic of the paradigm in which they have intellectual 
commitment and will execute theory-choices under the guidance of the aesthetic 
canon alone, even though such a policy will generally cause them to pursue 
theories which are empirically less successful than those embraced by their rivals. 
The attitude of this group of scientists is captured by the pronouncement of H. 
Weyl: 'My work always tried to unite the truth with the beautiful: but when I 
had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the beautifu.1.'16 Since an aesthetic 
canon tends by reason of the time-lag introduced by the metainduction to be 
more conservative in theory-choice than is the logico-empirical evaluative canon, 
this group of scientists will here be termed the 'conservative faction'. 
The decision of this faction to suspend application of the logico-empirical 
canon and conduct theory-choice under the guidance of the aesthetic canon alone 
will be rejected by the other, more progressive party. Members of this party will 
make the opposite choice: they will suspend allegiance to the aesthetic canon, and 
conduct theory-choice on the exclusive basis of empirical criteria. Since this course 
of action relaxes the extra-empirical constraints on theory-choice, it will permit the 
progressive faction to adopt theories empirically more successful than those of 
their conservative adversaries. 
The abandonment by a faction of scientists of the previously dominant 
aesthetic canon, and their conduct of theory-choice independently of aesthetic 
criteria in the exclusive pursuit of logico-empirical success, is the · revolutionary 
act. In accordance with one's intuitive expectations of revolutionary measures, this 
act consists largely of a disavowal of the erstwhile commitments of the 
community in which it is hatched: the progressive faction in the revolutionary 
phase perceives the previous aesthetic commitments of the community to have 
constrained theory-evaluation in such a way as to have hampered the 
achievement of the greatest logico-empirical success, and thus to have 
compromised the progress of science during its period of domination. The faction 
believes justifiably that the relaxation of those constraints on theory-choice will 
enable the community to perform the empirically m~st fruitful choices among 
competing theories, and thus to impress the greatest speed upon the growth of 
the empirical power of science. 
16 
The two factions of scientists may coexist in the community for a period. 
Quoted in Tonietti (1985), p. 8. The passage is contained in a letter of Weyl to Dyson. 
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However the difference between the degree of empirical success of the set of 
theories embraced by the progressive faction and that of the set of theories 
advocated by the conservative faction will continue to grow in favour of the 
former. One imagines that for some sufficiently great magnitude of this difference, 
the former set of theories will overcome the residual aesthetic resistance of 
conservative members · of the community and impose itself as undeniably more 
attractive than the latter set. Scientists relax their commitment to the pre-existing 
aesthetic canons of their community in accepting to decide cases of theory-choice 
in favour of the theories which are empirically the most successful among those 
proposed, but which accord less well than do other proposed theories to the pre-
existing aesthetic canons of the community. When the entire community has, as 
advocated by the progressive faction in its midst, relaxed its commitment to its 
pre-existing aesthetic canons of theory-assessment, the revolutionary phase is 
terminated. 
The effect of the revolutionary interlude as described here has been to strip 
the scientific community of one of its two canons of criteria of theory-assessment: 
by the time of the completion of this phase, the community no longer recognizes 
a commitment to a canon of aesthetic criteria of theory-assessment and in its 
theory-choices is governed solely by the logico-empirical canon. Indeed, scientists 
working in the phase immediately after the abandonment in a revolutionary crisis 
of a previously dominant aesthetic canon may harbour resentment against the 
canon which they have abjured: they may see in it an influence which - at least 
in the latter stages of the period of its dominance - diverted the efforts of the 
scientific community from the pursuit of empirical success by imposing aesthetic 
and thus non-empirical commitments on theory-choice, hindering the empirical 
progress of science. They may in consequence nurture the positivistic hope that 
their community will dispense for evermore with aesthetic criteria of preference 
and conduct theory-evaluation with the sole aim of maximizing the empirical 
success of the community's theories. 
The present treatment suggests that their hope that science will from that 
moment onwards be guided by a methodological canon free of extra-empirical 
criteria of preference will be disappointed. After the. end of the revolutionary 
phase which dislodged the aesthetic criteria from the community's canon of 
theory-evaluation, the psychological concerns responsible for driving the aesthetic 
metainduction will return to affect the preferences of scientists. Scientists will 
begin arationally - and possibly unthinkingly - to postulate a correlation between 
the aesthetic features of the theories which have been adopted since the end of 
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the revolutionary phase and the empirical success demonstrated by those theories. 
They will, like true Hurneans, come further to believe arationally that a new 
theory will be assured of empirical success by its possession of the aesthetic 
features associated with success in theories of the immediate past. Scientists will 
consequently hope to increase the empirical success of the set of theories to which 
their community lends assent by searching· for those same aesthetic factors in new 
theories. To some of these features - feature i, say - will be associated great 
empirical success - that is, a high value of x, - and scientists will tend to prefer 
theories exhibiting feature i in subsequent instances of theory-choice, in a 
procedure which amounts to increasing the value of y1 in accordance with 
increases in the value of x,. 
By this psychological association and projection, the community 
recommences the operation of the aesthetic metainduction and undertakes the 
construction of a fresh canon of aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation. A new 
phase of normal science is thus inaugurated, during which theory-choice will be 
conducted in part on the criteria of its characteristic aesthetic evaluative canon. In 
time, of course, divergences will begin to appear in cases of theory-choice 
between the preferences of the logico-empirical criteria and the new aesthetic 
canon, until a new revolutionary crisis and ultimately a further revolution 
precipitate.17 
4. The aesthetic interpretation of revolutions 
The present model of scientific revolutions attempts to fulfil the requirement 
enunciated at the outset, that any such model should combine in the dynamic 
17 From the vantage-point now reached, the present treatment is able to comment on the hope nurtured by some methodologists and reported in chapter 5 that the introduction of aesthetic criteria among the grounds for theory-choice will assure the 
scientist of sufficient reason upon which to choose between any two theories, and 
even between a pair of empirically equivalent theories. The observation that the 
aesthetic evaluative canon which a community embraces is peculiar to a certain phase of normal science and is abandoned upon the advent of a revolution suggests that any decision on aesthetic grounds between empirically equivalent theories will in general be thought by the community to retain validity onf y for the duration on the period of normal science in which the decision was taken; once the aesthetic 
canon which reigned at the time of the decision is repudiated, the choice taken will in general appear unjustifiable and the need will be perceived for the new aesthetic 
canon to be applied to the case of theory-choice. 
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which it attributes to revolutions both features of continuity and mechanisms of 
discontinuous change. In this attempt, the present model lends weight to some of 
Kuhn's insights into revolutions but disputes certain other of his affirmations. 
This model offers an explication of Kuhn's intuition that whereas in normal 
science there is widespread agreement within the community on what constitutes 
solutions to the problems in hand, during revolutionary crises there is no similar 
consensus among scientists over the principles of theory-choice that ought to be 
applied. According to the present view, the former phenomenon is explained by 
the accord which persists during a period of normal science between the two 
canons of theory-assessment; the latter phenomenon ensues when one group in 
the community follows the directives of the empirical evaluative criteria while 
another favours the aesthetic criteria then current. 
However, the characteristic feature of the present model is its interpretation 
of revolutions as discontinuous changes in a part and in only a part of a scientific 
community's methodological canon. Whilst a revolution effects a discontinuous 
substitution of one aesthetic evaluative canon by another, the community's canon 
of logico-empirical evaluative criteria endures unaltered through the commotion. 
This view therefore does not vindicate Kuhn's stronger claim that theories 
embedded in rival paradigms cannot be compared since, as he believes, there are 
no paradigm-neutral principles relative to which this comparison could be 
executed: the trans-paradigmatic continuity of science is assured by its empirical 
criteria even despite their repudiation by aesthetically conservative factions at 
times of revolutionary crises. It is on the present model definitely untrue that 'the 
normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only 
incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone 
before':18 scientists of all paradigms share the values encapsulated by science's 
empirical criteria. 
A consequence of the interpretation of revolution as a change in only a 
component of a community's methodological canon is the attribution of an 
element of historical continuity to rationality. While scientists in different 
paradigms reason differently in that they adhere to different canons by which to 
perform the aesthetic evaluation of theories, they ackn~wledge the same canon of 
rationality in as far as they share another set of criteria for theory-choice, the set 
composed of the empirical evaluative criteria. Communication of reasons across 
revolutionary discontinuities is therefore not wholly impossible, while aesthetic 
18 Ibid., p. 103. 
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reasons for theory-choice would not be shared by the participants in such 
communication, each would acknowledge the other's concern for logico-empirical 
features of theories such as logical consistency or predictive accuracy. 
This model is consequently able to offer a moderate interpretation of 
Kuhn's view that a revolution consists of a switch of Gestalt or of world view.19 A 
revolution, in as far as it consists of an exchange of aesthetic canons, and in as far 
as aesthetic canons determine a perceptual outlook, is a change of the 
expectations with which a scientific community perceives its scientific theories: to 
this extent Kuhn's view of revolutions as changes of perspective is justified. The 
interpretation of scientific revolutions as a change of aesthetic canons explains 
how J.H. Wheeler could think of extending to contemporary physics what 
Gertrude Stein said of modern art: 'It looks strange and it looks strange and it 
looks very strange; and then suddenly it doesn't look strange at all and you can't 
understand what made it look strange in the first place.'20 By 'a strange look' one 
readily intends, in science as in art, a violation of the dominant aesthetic canons 
of a time; a work of art or a theory cease to look strange when they convert the 
aesthetic aversion which they initially encounter in their community into aesthetic 
approval or acclaim. The procedure by which a theory converts its community to 
appreciation of its own aesthetic features captures some elements of an exchange 
of Gestalt; but since under this interpretation the effects of a paradigm-change do 
not implicate the community's logico-empirical evaluative canon, the resulting 
rupture is less perturbing of science's methodological canon than would be a 
genuine, all-pervasive, switch of world view. 
Finally, the present treatment conflicts with the construal which Kuhn gives 
of revolutions, in at least his catastrophist writings, as irremediably irrational 
transitions governed by what his critic Lakatos has termed 'mob psychology.'21 
Kuhn is led to this construal by his belief that, since there is no continuity of 
canons of rationality outside the temporal and conceptual bounds of a paradigm, 
there can be no 'rational reasons' for choice outside those bounds, and thus in 
particular there · can exist no rational reasons on which to choose between 
competing paradigms. The present view on the contrary assures the existence 
outside the temporal and conceptual bounds of a . paradigm of at least that 
component of the canon of scientific rationality composed of logico-empirical 
19 
20 
21 
Kuhn's conception . of 'revolutions as changes of world view' is promoted ibid., pp. 111-35. 
Wheeler (1983), p. 185. 
Lakatos (1970), p. 178. 
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criteria of theory-evaluation. The independence of such a component from the 
conceptual context of any paradigm opens the possibility that there may exist 
rational grounds on which to choose to repudiate one's commitment to a 
paradigm. In the present model, such grounds are precisely of what the 
progressive faction in a revolutionary crisis avails itself in deciding to relax its 
commitment to the previously dominant paradigm: that faction believes, on 
paradigm-independent logico-empirical grounds, that the progress of science will 
be better served by the relaxation of the constraints on theory-choice imposed by 
the aesthetic canon. While Kuhn believes that the substitution of one paradigm by 
another in a scientific community is an entirely arational process, this model 
envisages that the abandonment of a paradigm may be decided by rational 
judgement. If aesthetic canons of theory-assessment constitute arational ruts 
which scientific progress marks out, requiring for a while that theories display 
certain aesthetic features which there are no rut-independent reasons to require, 
at least the desire to escape from the current rut admits sound rational 
justification. 
5. Quarrels with the Kuhnian view of aesthetic factors 
Although the present view of the dynamics of scientific revolutions has been 
expounded on the cues offered by the writings and terminology of Kuhn, to the 
extent that the previous sections were concerned largely with reconstructing 
Kuhnian concepts such as that of 'normal science' or of 'revolutionary crisis' in 
terms which appeal to the role therein of aesthetic theory-evaluation, there is 
sharp disagreement between this view of scientific revolution and that of Kuhn. 
Some areas of disagreement were pointed out during the above exposition. 
Another set of disagreements emerges however between this treatment and the 
brief remarks which Kuhn devotes to the operation of aesthetic features in 
science, and which have not yet been examined. These· areas of contention are of 
interest as they illuminate both characteristic features of the present model of 
scientific rationality and the shortcomings which the present treatment perceives 
in other works. In this section, three lines of criticism of increasing generality will 
be moved against Kuhn's conception of the operation of aesthetic concerns in 
science. 
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The first concerns the role played by aesthetic considerations in times of 
paradigm-switch. Kuhn appears to believe that scientists will embrace a new 
paradigm at least partly in consequence of the appeal of the new paradigm's 
aesthetic features, and that this transfer of allegiance will often occur despite the 
technical or empirical superiority of the pre-existing paradigm. Surveying possible 
'arguments for a new paradigm', Kuhn writes that advocacy based upon the 
competing paradigms' comparative ability to solve empirical or technical 
problems does not compel paradigm-switch, and that the reasons for which 
scientists adopt a new paradigm lie in a different class of arguments: 
These are the arguments, rarely made entirely explicit, that appeal to 
the individual's sense of the appropriate or the aesthetic - the new 
theory is said to be 'neater,' 'more suitable,' or 'simpler' than the 
old.22 
Having stated that arguments which draw their advocative force from the 
aesthetic features of a set of newly-formulated theories are apt to gain adherents 
to their paradigm, Kuhn suggests that such aesthetic appeal can play a role 
sufficiently important to determine the paradigm's fate: 
The importance of aesthetic considerations can sometimes be decisive. Though they often attract only a few scientists to a new 
theory, it is upon those few that its ultimate triumph may depend. If 
they had not quickly taken it up for highly individual reasons, the 
new candidate for paradigm might never have been sufficiently develo~ed to attract the allegiance of the scientific community as a 
whole. 
. 
Kuhn stresses that on at least some occasions arguments based on aesthetic 
grounds counteract the weight of logico-empirical considerations which favour the 
continued adherence of the community to the pre-existing theories: 
Something must make at least a few scientists feel that the new proposal is on the right track, and sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations that can do that. Men have been 
converted by them at times when most of the articulable technical 
arguments- pointed the other way. When first introduced, neither Copernicus' astronomical theory nor De Bro§lie' s theory of matter had many other significant grounds of appeal.' 
In the passages here reproduced Kuhn sketches the nature of the arguments 
which he believes weigh on one side and the other of debates on paradigm-
choice. He expects that on at least some such occasions the mustered technical or 
22 
23 
24 
Kuhn (1962), p. 155. 
Ibid ., p. 156. 
Ibid., p. 158. 
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logico-empirical considerations will tell in favour of the retention of the pre-
existing paradigm, whereas 'personal and inarticulate' aesthetic considerations 
will tend to prompt the adoption of the new paradigm. This view of Kuhn's is 
unequivocally contradicted by the proposal developed here, in which it is argued 
that in confrontations between an old and a new paradigm the logico-empirical 
arguments which bear upon the issue will tend to speak for the adoption of the 
new paradigm while the aesthetic considerations - possessing a conservative bias 
owed to the inductive manner of their construction - will recommend fidelity to 
the old paradigm. The balance of the historical evidence drawn from times of 
competition between long-established and novel paradigms strongly supports this 
treatment's attribution of aesthetic arguments to the conservative camp and of 
logico-empirical arguments to the progressive one in debates on theory-choice. 
The difference of opinion with Kuhn does not render agreement with some 
of his historiographic judgements impossible, but it alters the significance to be 
read into some of the episodes on which he pronounces. For instance it is 
probably indubitable that, as Kuhn states in the last of the passages quoted above 
and as will be further investigated in chapter 10 below, Copernican theory found 
in aesthetic considerations a large part of its appeal to the community of 
mathematical astronomers. What is, on the contrary, subject to doubt is Kuhn's 
implicit interpretation of Copernican theory in that same passage as a 
revolutionary innovation, and consequently the legitimacy of his use of this 
episode to support his contention that revolutionary theories attract adherents 
largely through the appeal of their aesthetic features. The present treatment will 
maintain contrary to Kuhn that Copernican theory was not a revolutionary 
departure from the doctrinal context in which it was conceived, and further that 
it was able to attract adherents through the appeal of its aesthetic features 
precisely because of its aesthetic conservatism, its aesthetic conformity to the 
canons of pre-existing Ptolemaic astronomy. 
Once the specific differences of opinion between Kuhn's view of the role of 
aesthetic considerations in theory-choice and that of the present treatment are set 
aside, a more deep-seated difference of approach to the notion of aesthetic factors 
in science emerges between the two treatments. Kuhri' s brief writings on these 
factors are constrained by his rather inexplicably thinking of them as irremediably 
personal: he speaks of 'the individual's sense of [ ... ] the aesthetic', of aesthetic 
considerations as 'highly individual reasons' for which to embrace a paradigm, of 
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aesthetic considerations as 'subjective', 'personal'.25 It is not surprising that, as a 
methodologist keen to stress the social phenomena which determine and 
accompany paradigm-switch, Kuhn should devote less attention to any factor 
affecting theory-evaluation which could be shown to be truly individual, 
idiosyncratic to the point of evading social analysis. What is on the contrary 
surprising is that Kuhn should have come to . regard aesthetic canons as the 
product of the taste of the individual scientist rather than as the construct of the 
community, which characterizes the community's theory-preferences and 
determines the individual's acts of theory-choice. The present treatment attributes 
the formulation of aesthetic canons not to the whim of the individual but to a 
communal metainduction over the performance of the community's past theories, 
and suggests that this interpretation ensures that the phenomenon of aesthetic 
theory-assessment conforms to a Kuhn-like analysis of theory-choice to a far 
deeper degree than does the phenomenon of theory-assessment on logico-
empirical criteria. 
The third strand of criticism which the present treatment moves to Kuhn's 
conception of the role of aesthetic criteria in science could equally be directed 
against virtually all models of scientific rationality proposed since the first 
appearance of Kuhn's essay on scientific revolutions. None of these works 
appears to envisage the possibility that the construction or application of aesthetic 
criteria of theory-assessment may occur through a systematic mechanism, the 
study of which could hold lessons for the understanding of the dynamic of 
scientific progress as a whole. Where these works deign to allude to aesthetic 
evaluative criteria, they consign them to the category of unsystematic and 
inscrutable preferences. The abandonment of such an important component 
mechanism of scientific procedure to the margins of philosophical attention 
cannot but impoverish the accuracy or scope of models of scientific rationality, a 
limitation which the present treatment hopes to help overcome. 
25 These expressions occur ibid., respectively on pp. 155, 156, 156 and 158. On the latter page Kuhn additionally calls aesthetic concerns 'mystical', a dismissal which cannot aid a rational or sensitive investigation of their genesis. 
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6. Boltzmann's model of scientific revolutions 
If the models of science propounded by philosophers have generally dedicated 
insufficient attention to the operation of aesthetic factors, one often encounters a 
greater awareness in those embraced by scientists. The expression of this 
awareness is frequently confined to unsystematic or fragmentary descriptions of 
the speaker's own scientific practice, but in some more reflective writings 
scientists have delineated sophisticated views of the incidence upon scientific 
method of aesthetic considerations which extend to their role in scientific 
revolution. 
One such model is contained in an article by L. Boltzmann which has been 
accorded insufficient attention by subsequent scholars.26 The paper comments 
incisively on several issues in scientific methodology, including the role of models 
in physics, the relative merits of realist and instrumentalist interpretations of 
theories, and the prospect of the underdetennination of theory-choice by data.27 It 
is however with Boltzmann's view of scientific progress and of the nature of the 
revolutions by which that progress is punctuated that this section is concerned. 
That view accords closely with the treatment of scientific revolutions displayed in 
the present chapter, and it is of interest to this treatment to observe similar 
concerns aired by a practising scientist. 
Boltzmann's understanding of the history of science shows greater 
sophistication than was attained by the positivist views which prevailed in 
professional historiography for years even after his death. He first warns against 
too readily conceiving the mode of scientific progress as linear or continuous, and 
suggests that the past development of science does not appear to have been 
26 
27 
The article is Boltzmann (1901). The sole discussion of it which I have found is Feuer (1974), pp. 335-41. It is neglected even by Scheibe (1988) - an otherwise praiseworthy treatment of the conceptions of scientific progress and revolution held by some nineteenth- and twentieth-century working physicists which discusses Boltzmann on pp. 141-5 - despite the fact that Boltzmann's paper of 1901 plainly would bolster its argument Scheibe's understanding of Boltzmann's views is 
apparently culled entirely from an obituary composed by him for J. Stefan in 1895. 
Boltzmann's remarks on the problem of underdetermination are brief but have a highly modem ring: 'It is not inconceivable that two quite different theories should exist which are equally simple and which accord equally well with the phenomena, 
and which therefore, although they are totally different, are yet equally correct. The assertion that a given theory is the only correct one is merely the expression of our subjective conviction that there is no other theory so simple and according so well 
with the facts' (1901, p. 244). Boltzmann appears to view this prospect as offering an 
argument for instrumentalism: 'The object set us is not to discover an absolutely 
correct theory, but rather to light upon some constructive model which shall be as 
simple as the circumstances admit and represent the phenomena most adequately' (ibid.). 
145 
CHAPTER EIGHT: REVOLUTION AS AESTHETIC RUPTURE 
guided exclusively by the application of logical criteria: 
If we scrutinise the development of theory closely, it will be immediately apparent that its course has been by no means so 
continuous as we might have been inclined. to believe, but rather that it is full of gaps and has not taken place, to appearances at least, along the simplest and most logical paths.28 
One expects any divergence of the history of science from 'the simplest and most 
logical paths' to be caused by scientists' adherence to extra-logical procedural 
criteria, by which scientists may have been tempted to wander from the theory-
choices yielding the greatest empirical success. Boltzmann not only advances an 
explanation of this form for the divergence between the actual or historical 
development of science and its ideal or logical path, but also hints that the extra-
empirical considerations which attract scientists may possess an aesthetic 
dimension: 
Certain methods have frequently yielded the most beautiful results, 
and many persons have been tempted to believe that the development of science to the end of all time would consist in the 
systematic and unremitting application of them. But suddenly they begin to show indications of impotency, and all efforts are then bent 
upon discovering new and antagonistic methods. There then usually 
arises a conflict between the adherents of the old method and those 
of the new. The point of view of the former is characterised by its 
opponent as antiquated and obsolete; whilst its upholders in turn look down with scorn upon the innovators as perverters of true 
classical science.29 
Encapsulated in this brief passage is a view of revolution very similar to that of 
the present treatment, in which several stages of scientific procedure are 
discernible. Boltzmann ventures the suggestion that the apparent beauty of some 
theories would prompt scientists to advocate the continued. application in future 
of the methods which yielded such theories, presumably in the hope that the 
same beauty would be reproduced. in new theories. The present chapter suggested 
similarily that an aesthetic canon of theory-appraisal would entrench itself in the 
28 
29 
Ibid., p. 229. Cf. Boltzmann's piece of 1895: 'The layman may have the idea that to the existing basic notions and basic causes of the phenomena gradually new notions and causes are added and that in this way our knowledge of nature undergoes a continuous development. This view, however, is erroneous, and the development of theoretical physics has always been one by leaps' (quoted in Scheibe 1988, p. 143). 
Boltzmann (1901), ibid. Cf. again his treatment of 1895: 'In many cases it took decades or even more than a century to articulate fully a theory such that a dear picture of a certain class of phenomena was accomplished. But finally new phenomena became known which were incompatible with the theory; in vain was the attempt to assimilate the former to the latter. A struggle began between the adherents of the theory and the advocates of an entirely new conception until, eventually, the latter was generally accepted' (quoted in Scheibe 1988, ibid.). 
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procedures of a community, with the effect that scientists in the community 
would come to believe that all theory-choices should be decided in part by the 
application of the aesthetic canon to which they currently lend assent. Next, 
Boltzmann suggests, those previously apparently reliable methods show signs of 
empirical failure, a discovery which prompts a search for an alternative battery of 
methods or criteria. In the corresponding stage of the present model of scientific 
rationality, the crisis of theory-choice leads a faction of the community to relax its 
aesthetic commitments and embrace a new methodological canon shorn of 
aesthetic evaluative criteria. The progressive faction in this controversy regard the 
old theories explicitly as 'obsolete', the term used by Boltzmann to describe the 
corresponding judgement in his model; the adherents to the formerly dominant 
aesthetic canon see the new developments as a 'perversion of true classical 
science' or as a repudiation of cherished aesthetic commitments. 
Boltzmann adds weight to the aesthetic dimension of the revolutionary 
rupture in science by likening it to similar discontinuities in fields of artistic 
endeavour: 
This is a process, moreover, which is by no means restricted to theoretical physics, but to all appearances recurs in the history of 
every field of intellectual activity. [ ... ] In like manner in art the Impressionists and Secessionists stand arrayed against the old 
schools of painting, and the Wagnerian school of music against the 
schools of the ancient classical masters. There is accordingly no 
occasion for surprise that theoretical physics does not form an 
exception to this general law.30 
The interest of Boltzmann's model of scientific development is heightened 
by the role which he attributes within it to himself. He writes not as a victor of 
history, a member perhaps of the progressive faction in a revolutionary crisis to 
whom history has accorded the privilege of scorning his opponents as 'obsolete'. 
Boltzmann may well have witnessed a revolutionary crisis in theoretical physics, 
but he sees his part within it as having been that of the conservative partisan of 
the old doctrines · :repudiated by the progressive and eventually victorious faction: 
30 
31 
When I look back over the manifold developments and transformation that have taken place, I seem to myself like a veteran 
on the field of science; nay, I might even say that I alone am left of those who embraced the old doctrines heart and soul; at least I am the only one who is still sturdily battling for them. [ ... ] I appear before you, therefore, as a reactionary and belated thinker, as a 
zealous champion of the old classical doctrines as opposed to the 
new.31 
Boltzmann (1901), pp. 229-30. 
Ibid., p. 233. 
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If Whig history is 'the tendency [ ... ] to praise revolutions provided they have been 
successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce 
a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present' ,32 
Boltzmann's melancholy testament offers a valuable insight into the concerns of 
the defeated. It is a matter for admiration that the disillusionment which 
Boltzmann must have suffered in his work in physics did not prevent him late in 
life from holding a view of scientific revolutions which captures the most 
progressive and innovatory impulses in scientific methodology. 
7. The analogy with revolutions in art 
Boltzmann suggested in one of the passages cited in the previous section that the 
development of the sciences and the arts is punctuated by revolutionary 
discontinuities of the same form. Analogies have frequently been drawn between 
the manner of the progress traced by artistic and scientific disciplines. The 
problem which has bedevilled most such analogies has been their lack of 
specificity, which has prevented determinate and illuminating conclusions from 
being drawn about the dynamic of either of the relata. The lack of specificity has 
in turn been occasioned by the unavailability of determinate models of revolution 
in either the sciences or the arts, able to predict the sequence of phases within 
revolution more determinate than stages labelled generically 1oss of consensus' or 
'break with the past'. 
The construction earlier in this chapter of a highly determinate model of 
revolutions in science restores interest to an intellectual historian's revisiting the 
issue. This section will briefly sketch an analogy between revolutions in science as 
interpreted above ~nd revolutions in certain art forms. 
The model of scientific progress developed in the present treatment pays 
regard to the development of three entities within science: the empirical power of 
the sequence of theories embraced by a community, the aesthetic features 
displayed by those theories, and the aesthetic evaluative canon of the community. 
Briefly, continuous development will be obtained while the evolution of the 
aesthetic canon of the community roughly maintains pace with the evolution of 
32 Butterfield (1931), p. v. 
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the aesthetic features exhibited by the sequence of theories embraced by the 
community; if, however, theory-succession governed by empirical criteria 
communicates too high a rate of evolution to the aesthetic features of the 
community's set of theories, the community's aesthetic evaluative canon will fail 
to accommodate those changes: in order to . restore accord in theory-choice the 
community will be forced · to exchange its old aesthetic evaluative canon for a new 
one. 
Analogies are readily suggested between the operation of this mechanism 
in science and the development of art forms characterized by both aesthetic 
canons and technical capability. Examples of such art forms are architecture and 
industrial design.33 
In architecture a certain material or technique of construction fosters the 
establishment of a certain aesthetic canon. For instance, the technological 
exploitation of steel and plate glass is clearly both necessary to and supportive of 
the aesthetic canon of modernism: it is necessary for that canon since modernist 
projects could not have been realized without the use of steel and plate glass, and 
it is supportive of that canon since given such technological means the 
community of architects will naturally be driven to exploit them in buildings 
which utilize them in aesthetically distinctive ways. In time the aesthetic canon 
thus constructed will assume normative functions, and buildings which fail to 
satisfy the canon will be criticized on those grounds. Aesthetic canons thus 
emerge in architecture at least partly from technological capability . . One may 
speak literally of the aesthetic of, say, reinforced concrete, meaning by that 
expression the aesthetic canon which naturally springs from the architectural use 
of that material.34 The aesthetic which arises from the use of a certain 
constructional technique is analogous to the aesthetic canons which arise from the 
empirical success of scientific theories exhibiting certain aesthetic features. In each 
case the community's technical capability supports or fosters the formulation of 
specific aesthetic canons and their subsequent prescriptive imposition upon the 
33 
34 
Strictly speaking the development of any art form, not only that of forms like 
architecture or industrial design, is determined partly 'by advances in relevant technical capability: the aesthetic canons of oil painting or · of . the performance of 
music are affected by innovations in the technology of pigments and musical instruments. For instance the evolution of the aesthetic canons of keyboard music from Bach to Beethoven has been determined partly by innoyations in the harpsichord and piano. However the effects of advances in technical capabilities is 
more readily apparent in art forms which make more crucial use of technology: the 
succeeding treatment will refer to architecture as one such form. 
An example of a textbook which lays out the architectural aesthetic canon associated 
with a particular material or technique is Michelis (1963). 
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practice which first achieved that technical capability. 
Naturally architecture witnesses a constant evolution of its technical 
capabilities: new materials and techniques are constantly devised. One imagines 
that if this rate of technical innovation is sufficiently low, it will be matched by 
the rate of evolution of the community's aesthetic canon: similarly in science if 
the rate of aesthetic innovativeness of the sequence of theories embraced by the 
community is low, the community's aesthetic canon will maintain its accord with 
current theory-choice. If however a new material or technique is suddenly 
introduced which affords architects radically different aesthetic possibilities, the 
community may well perform a discontinuous exchange of its aesthetic canon for 
a new one as it turns to explore the . constructional possibilities opened by the 
new technique. This procedure is closely analogous to the scientific community's 
exchange of one aesthetic canon by another which better accords with current, 
empirically-driven theory-choice. 
8. The analogy with political revolutions 
Kuhn's imagery strongly evoked analogies between revolution in science and in 
society.35 This correlation was not altogether original to his work: the connections 
between discontinuities in science and in social formations have been traced since 
the mid-seventeenth century.36 As in the case of connections drawn between 
scientific and artistic revolutions, the chief difficulty attendant upon such 
analogies is the achievement of a degree of determinacy sufficiently great to 
ensure interest. The problem is alleviated in this case by the existence of a 
determinate model of political revolutions, that proposed by Marxian political 
economics. That model is a promising candidate as an analogical relatum of the 
present model of scientific revolutions, for it correlates the development of the 
technical capabilities of a community on the one hand and the evolution of 
constructs which derive from those capabilities on the oth.er. 
35 
36 
Marx's theory of economic history locates the technical capabilities of a 
Kuhn (1%2), e.g. pp. 92-4. 
For notes on the history of the analogy, see J.B. Cohen (1985), pp. 7-14, 473-7 and passim; Feuer (1974, pp. 252-68) interestingly explores the disanalogies of political 
and scientific revolutions. 
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community in an economic substructure which leads to the establishment of a 
particular social formation. Generally in history, the social formation given to 
iteslf by a community is appropriate to the current state of the community's 
technical capabilities, in that it permits the full and efficient exploitation of those 
capabilities to the benefit of members of the community. But developments in the 
available technical means continue apace. The social formation typically possesses 
sufficient flexibility that its structure and institutions can accommodate the 
exploitation of some new technical capabilities; in time however the members of 
the community will discover that full exploitation of newly-developed technical 
capabilities is impossible within the existing social structure. The social formation 
has now begun to hamper the technical progress of the community. In the 
resulting crisis the old and counter-productive social structure is overthrown and 
replaced by one more attuned to the new technical means. Thus the economic 
substructure engenders, consolidates, is gradually hampered by and ultimately 
overthrows and replaces a superstructure composed of, in Marx's term, relations 
of production.37 
One may in science analogously conceive of empirical progress constituted 
by increasing empirical power as the substructural motor which accommodates 
successive superstructures consisting of aesthetic canons. As empirical progress is 
continuously achieved, the prevailing aesthetic canons will be first strengthened 
or entrenched by the accord which is manifested between them and the empirical 
evaluative canon. If however the empirical progress of the community's theories 
is too swift, tensions will arise between the theory-choices of the aesthetic and the 
logico-empirical canons which will undermine and ultimately destroy the 
prevailing . aesthetic canon. The periodic overthrow of successive aesthetic canons 
is due to the fact that soon after their formulation they switch to a conservative 
evaluative tack and in time inevitably begin to hamper scientific progress, exactly 
as state institutions once erected crystallize a fleeting order and thus tend to 
hinder continued . social evolution. 
37 A detailed description of this model of economic history and revolution is contained in G.A. Cohen (1978). 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR HISTORIOGRAPHY 
1. The possibility of writing history 
The present model of scientific revolutions, which identifies such events with 
discontinuous changes in communities' aesthetic canons of theory-assessment, 
holds some important consequences for the practice of the historiography of 
science. In this chapter, two historiographic consequences will be discussed. The 
next section will analyze what suggestions the model advances on the method by 
which the occurrence of a revolution may be discerned in the historical record; 
the current section will address the prior question of the extent to which it is at 
all possible to write the history of a science of which the progression is 
punctuated by revolutions. The discussion will include comparisons between the 
stance taken on each topic by Kuhn and that of the present treatment. 
Kuhn's views on the occurrence of scientific revolutions stand in an 
ambivalent relationship to historiographic investigation: if, on the one hand, he 
proclaims that studies of science would be transformed by a more accurate 
portrayal of the history of its practice, on the other the characteristics which he 
attributes to scientific revolutions appear to preclude the possibility of answering 
many of the most interesting classes of questions which the discipline of history 
of science has taken it upon itself of posing both before and since the publication 
of Kuhn's monograph. Thus a thoroughgoing acceptance of Kuhn's views would 
tend to impede the accomplishment of the project which those views prescribe. It 
may be for this reason that Kuhn's two extended works of historiography, which 
seek to reconstruct episodes of theory-succession w~ch were in his opinion 
revolutionary, appeal to a notion of 'scientific revolution' no more laden with the 
theoretical apparatus of his model of revolutions than is the notion of revolution 
invoked by many a philosophically untutored treatise in history of science. 
The difficulty which in Kuhn's model would attach itself to the work of the 
historian of science derives in part from his insistence that successive paradigms 
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are separated by instances of radical standard variance. Consequences of this 
phenomenon for analytical philosophy of science were reviewed in the previous 
chapter, but its historiographic implications were there devoted scarce attention. 
Because of standard variance, those relationships between reasons for and 
outcomes of theory-choice which hold in the canon of rationality characteristic of 
the scientist of one paradigm may fail to hold in the canon proper to the historian 
in a later paradigm: in particular, a reason which in the former paradigm will 
suffice to determine the choice of a certain theory over its competitors may prove 
inadequate to force the similar choice in the later paradigm. In consequence of the 
gradual opening of this inferential gap, even if the arguments of scientists 
constitute a sufficient explanation of their theory-choices within their own 
paradigm, they may not in a paradigm successive to their own. What is a 
sufficient argument to compel theory-choice in its own paradigm becomes an 
argument insufficient to communicate an understanding of that theory-choice in a 
paradigm which follows. Hence on Kuhn's model even (or especially) a historian 
versed in the theories of the modern paradigm will be unable satisfactorily to 
understand episodes of theory-choice in a paradigm of the past. 
The conclusion appears to preclude the success of the historian's work or, 
at least, to circumscribe its scope. This observation counts in some respects to the 
disfavour of Kuhn's model: conceptual models generally gain favour if they 
extend the scope of philosophical enquiry or demonstrate the possibility of its 
success. The model of scientific methodology contained in the present treatment 
does not purport to show that the past practice of science is opaque to 
historiographic understanding to the extent to which Kuhn believes it to be. The 
greater scope which the present treatment attributes to historiography is opened 
by its assertion that only some of the criteria of theory-choice of a community 
vary at the exchange of one paradigm for another, while another component of 
the overall canon of criteria persists unchanged across paradigm boundaries. 
More specifically, the present treatment believes that at times of revolution only 
the canon of aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation changes while the battery of 
logico-empirical criteria remains unaltered. 
As a consequence of the partial invariance of criteria of theory-assessment, 
all paradigms share one of the two components of science's overall canon of 
theory-appraisal. What constitutes a strong logico-empirical reason for preferring 
one theory to another in a given paradigm will retain its strength in the 
paradigms of successive times. Hence at least part of scientists' overall grounds 
for preferring one theory to another will be as readily comprehensible and as apt 
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to be judged conclusive to later historians as they seem to the very scientists who 
first made that choice. It is for this reason that the splitting of criteria of theory-
evaluation into two classes exhibiting different historical behaviour renders the 
past record of science more accessible to historiographic understanding than 
Kuhn maintained. 
For sure, the identification of revolutions with discontinuous changes in 
aesthetic canons of theory-assessment vindicates Kuhn's warning that the 
reconstruction of instances of theory-choice in paradigms previous to our own 
may be arduous. After all, we no longer acknowledge the aesthetic canons which 
defined those paradigms and contributed to decide the theory-choices performed 
within them: we have constructed in their stead our own aesthetic canons by 
metainduction over the performance of theories developed between the time of 
the paradigm under reconstruction and today. For example, we cannot credit as 
justified Copernicus' s predilection for the circle as the geometrical form of 
planetary orbits because there is not now a commitment to Pythagorean 
simplicity or to Aristotelian natural philosophy in our aesthetic canon for the 
appraisal of theories in mathematical science; again, we dismiss as unwarranted 
much of Einstein's opposition to quantum mechanics because we no longer count 
among our metaphysical commitments the tenet that physical theories should be 
deterministic. Nonetheless, the reconstruction of past instances of theory-
preference is not thereby rendered impossible, for we share the logico-empirical 
criteria of theory-evaluation proper to past paradigms. 
The chief task for the historian of scientific revolutions is therefore that of 
identifying the aesthetic canons of a paradigm in pre-revolutionary times and of 
charting the theory-choices performed in accordance with those canons which 
depressed the observational success of the theories of that paradigm and 
ultimately led to its demise. 
2. The recognition of scientific revolutions 
The model of scientific revolutions presented in the previous chapter implicitly 
contains precise advice for the recognition of the occurrence of a revolution in the 
historical record. If a historical interval has witnessed the adoption of a succession 
of theories by a community, and the historian determines the nature of the 
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grounds considered by the community to have weighed for and against the 
adoption of each of those theories, then the occurrence of a scientific revolution 
within that interval is revealed in a temporary change (to be described below) in 
the nature of those grounds, and the theory at the time of which that change took 
place is the revolutionary innovation. The change in the grounds for theory-
adoption which is associated with a revolution occurs as follows. 
According to the previous chapter, a non-revolutionary theoretical 
innovation will be able to gather adherents in the community both on the 
strength of its empirical success and in virtue of its aesthetic features. This is 
because an innovation which falls short of effecting a revolutionary rupture with 
the past will continue to adhere to the pre-existing aesthetic canons of the 
community: the community will therefore value a theory which constitutes a non-
revolutionary innovation by dint of its continued adherence to the extant aesthetic 
canons as well as on the strength of such empirical success as it may achieve. On 
the contrary, a theoretical innovation which effects a revolutionary innovation 
may certainly gather adherents by reason of its empirical success, but will 
generally be unable to attract endorsement in virtue of its aesthetic features. This 
is because a revolutionary theory - on account of the above definition of what 
constitutes a revolutionary innovation - will violate the existing aesthetic canons 
of the community and thus be perceived at least at first as aesthetically 
displeasing. 
As a consequence, in order to decide whether on the definition developed 
here a certain theory constituted at the time of its proposal a revolutionary 
innovation or an innovation which effected a shallower rupture with past science, 
it is helpful to examine the nature of the grounds considered by members of the 
community of the time to weigh in favour of and against the adoption of that 
theory. If the historian perceives that a community comes to adhere to a new 
theory entirely or partly on aesthetic grounds - i.e. on the strength of that 
theory's accord with the community's pre-existing aesthetic canon of theory-
evaluation - then the introduction of that theory will not have constituted on the 
present analysis a revolutionary departure from pre-existing theoretical tenets. On 
the other hand, if members of the community adhere to the new theory on the 
grounds of its perceived empirical success but express displeasure or unease at its 
aesthetic features, or state that they find it necessary to suspend their faculties of 
aesthetic theory-evaluation in order that they may be allowed without inner 
conflict to reap the predictive benefits of the adoption of the new theory, or if the 
same theory is embraced by one faction of the community on empirical grounds 
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but resisted. by another on aesthetic grounds, then the present analysis interprets 
that theory to have effected. a revolutionary break with the pre-existing aesthetic 
canons of the community and thereby with earlier scientific practice as a whole. 
By examining which of these two cases holds for a certain past theory, the 
historian may determine whether on the present account that theory initiated. or 
not a scientific revolution. The signs of a scientific revolution in a community are 
thus visible in the nature of the community's grounds for theory-adoption. 
Thus, on the present model of scientific revolutions, the occurrence of a 
revolution can be discerned in the historical record by examining only historical 
evidence concerning the practice of science at the time of the revolution itself, and 
in particular evidence about the grounds considered. by the community at the 
time to have weighed for or against the adoption of the theories then being 
proposed. On the present treatment, historiographic reports about the nature of 
the grounds on which a past theory gathered adherents in its community indicate 
whether that theory constituted. a revolutionary or non-revolutionary innovation 
in its community. In other terms, the task of detecting the occurrence of a 
revolution in the historical record is on this model accomplished. by reference to 
data drawn solely from within the historical record itself. On the present model 
this task requires no non-historiographic consideration of the theories concerned: 
it requires, for instance, no retrospective investigation of the logical 
interdependence of successive pairs of the theories proposed during the historical 
interval being examined for the occurrence of a revolution. 
That on this model the historian can - purely as historian - detect the 
occurrence of a revolution in the historical record is a distinctive feature of this 
model, since it is shared neither necessarily nor - as will shortly be seen - in fact 
by other models of scientific revolutions. It is furthermore a feature of some 
interest, since it renders the project of discerning the occurrence of a past 
revolution less subject to retrospective or ahistoricist judgement: if the project is 
to be accomplished .by reference to data from the historical record alone, rather 
than by appeal to subsequent rationalizations of scientific method, the resulting 
judgements are likely to achieve greater historiographic authenticity. 
The value of being able to detect the occurrence of a scientific revolution 
by reference to data from the historical record alone is best revealed by 
considering the manner in which the same task is accomplished on the Kuhnian 
model of revolutions. Kuhn believes that 'the transition from Newtonian to 
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Einsteinian mechanics illustrates with particular clarity the scientific revolution.11 
What according to Kuhn is the nature of the evidence for supposing that these 
two contributions to physical science are indeed separated in the historical record 
by a revolution? Kuhn believes that the required evidence is to be found in 'the 
relation between contemporary Einsteinian dynamics and the older dynamical 
equations that descend from Newton's Principia.'2 The particular relation that 
Kuhn believes is indicative of the occurrence of a revolution appears to be one of 
logical inconsistency: 
From the viewpoint of this essay these two theories are 
fundamentally incompatible in the sense illustrated by the relation of 
Copernican to Ptolemaic astronomy: Einstein's theory can be 
accepted only with the recognition that Newton's was wrong.3 
Kuhn drives home this point by tackling the positivist counterargument to his 
view that Newtonian and Einsteinian dynamics cannot have been separated by a 
revolutionary discontinuity since Newtonian dynamics is a special case of 
Einsteinian dynamics and can be inferred from the later theory for the particular 
conditions in which the velocities are much smaller than that of light. Kuhn 
rebuts to this objection that the physical referents of the Einsteinian notions of 
space, time and mass are not identical from those of the Newtonian notions 
which bear the same name; hence 'we cannot properly be said to have derived 
Newton's Laws.'4 For Kuhn the fact that the derivation fails to carry is a 
demonstration of the logical incompatibility of the two theories, and this in turn 
is as conclusive an indication as may be required for the proposition that a 
revolution separated the Einsteinian theory of dynamics from that of Newton. 
For all Kuhn's valuable insistence on the value of historiographic insight in 
the philosophy of science, it is clear that the nature of the evidence which Kuhn 
takes to support the suggestion that Einsteinian physics is separated from 
Newtonian physics by a revolution is profoundly ahistoricist. The relation of non-
deducibility between the two theories which he takes as indicative was not a 
concern of the community of physical scientists at the time of Einstein: if that 
community perceived itself to be traversing a revolution, this perception was not 
held in virtue of the observation that from Einstein's theory it was impossible to 
2 
3 
4 
Kuhn (1962), p. 102. 
Ibid., p. 98. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 102; emphasis in the original. 
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derive Newton's theory as a special case.5 Thus, in order to discern the occurrence 
of a revolution in the historical record Kuhn relies on evidence which, far from 
being historiographic in origin, pertains to observations on intertheory relations 
which were not pursued in the communities caught in the revolutions which 
Kuhn claims thereby to have detected. By contrast, the present treatment proposes 
to discern the occurrence of a revolution on the basis of evidence gleaned from 
the historical record itself: this evidence concerns judgements passed by the 
communities themselves, and concerns in particular the grounds on which the 
communities justified their adoption or rejection of theories. 
5 On the contrary, physicists from the time of Einstein to the present day have seen it 
as a reason for satisfaction in the state of the science of mechanics that Newton's laws emerge from relativistic mechanics as an approximation under special 
conditions. 
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Kirk was as much overcome by the beauty, simplicity and economy · 
of this solution as Copernicus must have been when he first thought 
of putting the sun in the centre of the Solar System and saw all the planets, instead of describing complicated and ugly geometrical 
capers, move onward in orderly and dignified circles. He sat and 
contemplated it with affection for nearly ten minutes before 
venturing to examine it. He was afraid of knocking the bloom off it.1 
Dorothy L. Sayers 
1. The test of the model 
The conceptual field is now set for the performance of a war game. The 
beginning of this treatment likened part of the work of the _philosopher of science 
to the re-staging of episodes of military history in which the actions of characters 
personating the original protagonists are directed by a tactical canon compiled by 
the organizers of the war game. Case studies in scientific methodology are 
similarly the arena in which the methodologist's proposed inferential canon 
directs the actions of characters representing or personating historical scientists. 
Such case studies aim to re-enact episodes of scientific history in which it is 
presumed that the proposed inferential canon played a determining part, and 
thereby to test the inferential canon as a model of the original participants' canon 
of rationality by examining the agreement of the re-enactment with historical data 
independently gathered on the episode. 
The past chapters have sought to elaborate an inferential canon for the 
operations of theory-assessment and choice: the canon developed there appeals 
distinctively to aesthetic evaluative criteria. The treatment has already advanced 
on behalf of this canon both systematic justification, drawn from aesthetic theory 
and considerations of scientific methodology, and historiographic justification, 
aiming to demonstrate scientists' use of the canon in their work. A systematic 
Sayers (1937), pp. 205-6. 
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case study - the metaphorical equivalent of a pitched war game - has however 
lacked. 
Some brief considerations are able to guide the choice among historical 
episodes to those most suited to reveal the operation of aesthetic canons of 
theory-assessment. The previous chapter has . made it clear that the juncture at 
which aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation assume the most critical role - and 
therefore also the phase of scientific progress in which most promisingly to study 
their operation - is the scientific revolution. The reason is the following. A non-
revolutionary period in a scientific discipline is defined - on the account of 
chapter 8 - as a time-span in which the empirically successful theories of that 
discipline conform to a common aesthetic canon, or in other terms preserve 
aesthetic continuity with each other and with their immediate predecessors in the 
period. Such a period is obtained in the history of a discipline for as long as, as a 
matter of contingent fact, the aesthetic metainduction yields an aesthetic 
evaluative canon which attributes favour to the aesthetic features embodied by 
the empirically most successful of the theories newly formulated in that 
discipline, i.e. for as long as the aesthetic evaluative canon of the community 
continues to recommend in acts of theory-choice the adoption of the same 
theories to which preference is accorded by the community's logico-empirical 
evaluative criteria. In that time-span theory-evaluation is thus non-controversial, 
as the logico-empirical and the aesthetic evaluative canons will agree in their 
recommendations for theory-choice. 
A scientific revolution occurs on the contrary when theory-choices 
performed on logico-empirical criteria depart from theory-choices performed on 
aesthetic criteria, following the revolutionary emergence of new theories which do 
not conform to the hitherto dominant aesthetic canon but demonstrate empirical 
success greater than the success of those of their competitors which do so 
conform. Theory-choice will then become controversial, since the theory-
evaluations performed on empirical criteria will disagree with those performed 
under the dominant aesthetic canon. It is at such times that aesthetic criteria - so 
to speak - escape from the shadow of empirical criteria, and yield different 
recommendations for theory-choice. The junctures at which one may most 
sensitively discern the operation of aesthetic criteria of theory-evaluation are thus 
times of revolution, at which one will expect them to play a conservative role in 
advocating the retention of theories conforming to the hitherto dominant aesthetic 
or stylistic canon and the rejection of their new, aesthetically-innovative 
competitors. 
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As an application of these historiographic principles, and in order to test 
the capacity of the present model to account for past scientific practice, the 
remainder of this chapter will examine two pairs of episodes in the history of 
science. The first pair - of which the discussion will extend over sections 2 and 3 
- is constituted by the Copernican and Keplerian contributions to planetary 
astronomy, the second - of which a survey will occupy sections 4 and 5 - by 
Einstein's enunciation of special relativity and the development of quantum 
mechanics. That these episodes are extensively discussed in extant historiographic 
literature adds to the interest, for the interpretations to follow will cast doubt on 
some such treatments. 
The first episode of each pair is commonly considered revolutionary: one 
speaks naturally of a 'Copernican revolution' and of the revolutionary impact of 
special relativity. Under the perspective erected in the previous chapters, 
however, both these innovations preserved continuity with decisive elements of 
pre-existing aesthetic canons: briefly put, Copernicanism fulfilled the existing 
metaphysically-justified requirements of simplicity (principally the notion that the 
circle was the elemental path of celestial bodies, not necessitating explanation), 
while special relativity satisfied the requirements - generated by nineteenth-
century physics - of theoretical symmetry and of consistency with metaphysical 
commitments (viz., the tenet of the compatibility of mechanics and 
electromagnetism and the doctrine of causal determinism). It will be argued 
below that because these innovations retained such significant continuity with 
pre-existing aesthetic canons, neither constituted a scientific revolution in the 
sense of that notion elaborated in the present treatment, which interprets a 
revolution as the abandonment of commitments to a pre-existing aesthetic canon. 
It will be argued that on the contrary Copernicanism is most appropriately seen 
as the culmination of the programme of Ptolemaic astronomy (which, in 
conjunction with Aristotelian natural philosophy, enunciated and entrenched the 
commitment to the .notion that circular motions were the sole proper for celestial 
bodies) and special relativity as the culmination of the programme of nineteenth-
century physics. 
Each of these two episodes will be contrasted with the second member of 
the pair of episodes to which it belongs, which constituted a genuine rupture of 
aesthetic canon and hence, on the present view, a revolution: the Ptolemaic 
commitment to circular celestial motions was broken by Keplerian introduction of 
ellipses and the Einsteinian commitment to determinism was relaxed by those 
who developed quantum mechanics. There will further be adduced evidence that 
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the scientists who in each episode retained a commitment to the pre-existing 
paradigm explicitly regarded the revolutionary theories of their time as 
aesthetically displeasing: Ptolemaic or strict Copernican astronomers abhorred 
Kepler's ellipses as imperfect and improper to the celestial domain just as Planck 
and Einstein considered quantum mechanics aesthetically repugnant in 
consequence of its indeterminism. 
The treatment to follow will therefore address the problem of discerning 
rupture in the historical record: it will deny that certain innovations constituted a 
rupture in scientific progress and assert that on the contrary certain other 
developments represented breaks of the stipulated kind. The task might reduce to 
the banal enterprise of tidying and labelling facts on the chronological axis were 
the project not guided by a theory of the dynamics of scientific revolutions.2 
2. Aspects of continuity: Copemicus's contribution to astronomy 
That there occurred a revolution in mathematical astronomy at some time during 
the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries appears highly plausible: if the notion of a 
discontinuity in theory-succession has any application, one such fracture surely 
intervened between the Ptolemaic conception which dominated Western 
astronomy in 1500 and the theoretical scene upon which strode Newton.3 The 
issue for philosophical historiography is to discern which of the theoretical 
innovations which took place during this span were of sufficent moment and of 
the appropriate nature to have constituted a revolutionary discontinuity. 
Since the mid-eighteenth century it has been customary to settle this issue 
by associating a revolution with the work of Copernicus.' Even Kuhn, whilst 
2 
3 
4 
The four studies to follow do not presume to bring to light any previously unknown historical fact, but rather - true to their nature of rational reconstructions 
- seek to ascertain the degree of coherence between a model of scientific practice and what is known independently of that model about certain historical episodes. Furthermore, it would clearly have been impossible to refer to even a substantial proportion of the available secondary literature on such episodes as the reception of Keplerian astronomy or of the theory of special relativity: judgements of the relative importance and relevance of material play a large part in determining the content of the remainder of this chapter. 
For advice on the topic of this section and the next I am grateful to Dr J.L. Russell of Heythrop College, University of London. 
For a history of the early historiography of the 'Copernican revolution' see 1.B. Cohen (1985), pp. 498-9. 
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somewhat qualifying the degree of originality which he attributes to Copernican 
astronomy by raising the question 'whether Copernicus is really the last of the 
ancient or the first of the modem astronomers' ,5 nonetheless accepts the 
customary view: 'The publication of Copernicus' De Revolutionibus Orbium 
Caelestium in 1543 inaugurates the upheaval in astronomical thought that we call 
the Copernican Revolution.'6 
A historian approaching such long-standing unanimity runs the risk of 
supposing that the characterization of Copernicus's work as revolutionary is a 
brute or incontrovertible historiographic fact, and of forgetting that the register of 
events which are taken to count as scientific revolutions is determined by the 
philosophical theory against which one views the historical record. The present 
treatment approaches historiography armed with a theory of revolutions different 
from that which bequeathed the notion of 'the Copernican revolution': it must 
hence settle on its own judgement of the depth of the innovation constituted by 
the work of Copernicus. 
As was intimated in the previous section, this judgement will be formed by 
investigating the nature of the grounds on which the Copernican theory was 
embraced. Before however that investigation in theory-adoption is undertaken, it 
is necessary to limit its scope by drawing a disciplinary boundary, distinguishing 
the innovative effect of Copemicanism in mathematical astronomy from its effect 
in general learning. Much conventional historiography saw Copernican astronomy 
as revolutionary in virtue of its most eye-catching innovation, the displacement of 
the earth from the centre of the universe; and there is no doubt that this change 
exercised a revolutionary effect in wide intellectual matters both at the time of its 
first broaching and for centuries to follow.7 But the history of mathematical 
astronomy is concerned not primarily with such evolution in general mentality 
but rather with innovations in the technical elements of theories, those aiming at 
the prediction of observational data or the elucidation of the physical 
configuration of the universe. The mere switch from geocentrism to heliocentrism 
5 
6 
7 
Kuhn (1957), p. 182. 
Ibid., p. 134. Kuhn transcribes the last word of the short title as Caelestium instead of in the more usual form, Coelestium. Kuhn emphasizes the purportedly revolutionary 
character of Copemicus's contribution still further in his later monograph (1962, e.g. pp. 149-50), which, as perhaps befits a work of philosophy of science rather than of historiography, treats the phenomenon of scientific revolution at a higher level of generality. 
· 
Two hundred years later for instance Kant took the 'Copernican revolution' as the 
archetypal example of an intellectual development which had the effect of 
reappraising the relation between the human mental or cognitive faculties and 
external reality. 
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can be counted as one of the innovations wrought by Copernicus in general 
learning, but not in technical planetary astronomy. What differences there were 
between the predictive consequences of Ptolemaic theory and those of Copernican 
theory were not due simply to the difference between the identity of the bodies 
which occupy the centres of the two systems: they are due instead to the 
difference between the specific arrangements of circles freely chosen in each of the 
two theories within the constraints of geocentrism and heliocentrism respectively.8 
The mere substitution of heliocentrism for geocentrism cannot hence of itself 
count as an innovation introduced by Copernicanism within the domain of 
mathematical planetary astronomy.9 
The distinction between its effect in mathematical science and its 
repercussions in general mentality locates much of what is commonly considered 
to be the revolutionary impact of Copernicanism outside the boundaries of 
planetary astronomy: this distinction thus greatly reduces the degree to which 
within the discipline the work of Copernicus can be considered revolutionary. 
The determination of this degree will be completed now by the method intimated 
in section 1 of this chapter, i.e. by an analysis of the nature of the grounds 
considered by the early adherents to the Copernican theory to have weighed in 
favour or against its adoption. 
Classical historians have typically assumed that Copernicus's theory gained 
adherents on the strength of its predictive accuracy and its degree of simplicity, 
and in particular that it won adherents from the pre-existing Ptolemaic theory in 
virtue of its possession of these two features to a degree greater than that of its 
8 Evidence for the proposition that a switch from geocentrism to heliocentrism is not sufficient to determine changes in the predictive consequences of planetary theory is contained in the following observation: that it is not the case that any geocentric theory will yield-predictions different from those yielded by any heliocentric theory. This in tum is demonstrated by a comparison between the heliocentric Copernican and the geocentric Tychonic systems. These are mathematically equivalent and so yield precisely the same empirical predictions. Hence there is at least one geocentric theory which yields the same predictions of planetary positions as a heliocentric theory. On the Tychonic system and its mathematical equivalence to the Copernican system see e.g. Kuhn (1957), pp. 201-4. The switch from geocentrism to heliocentrism effected by Copernicus differs in this respect from the transition from circular orbits to non-circular, elliptical orbits promulgated by Kepler: the latter 
change, unlike the former, is a condition sufficient to determine changes in the predictive consequences of planetary theory. 
The distinction between the domains of philosophical cosmology and of 
mathematical astronomy is further discussed in Hanson (1961), pp. 169-72. 
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competitor.1° Chapter 8 showed how a theory which constitutes a revolutionary 
innovation in its discipline will be unable to gather support on the strength of its 
aesthetic features since these will be perceived to violate the then-dominant 
aesthetic canons of theory-appraisal. Thus the sole features in virtue of the 
possession of which a theory that constitutes a revolutionary innovation will be 
able to gather endorsement will be logico-empirical. Now, the (high or relatively 
high) empirical adequacy and degree of simplicity to which classical 
historiography attributes the Copernican theory's attraction of adherents are on 
the present account just such logico-empirical features. Thus, the report by 
classical historiography that Copernican theory gathered supporters in virtue of 
its possession of such features is consistent with, and may suggest the truth of, 
the proposition that Copernican theory constituted a revolutionary innovation in 
its discipline. But could Copernican theory possibly have gathered support on the 
strength of the degree to which it possessed empirical adequacy and simplicity? 
First, predictive accuracy. There are two classes of predictions for which 
the Copernican theory might hope to claim an accuracy superior to that of the 
Ptolemaic: quantitative predictions of the positions of the planets, and qualitative 
predictions of the appearance of the night sky to the earth-bound observer. 
Copernicus pronounces himself content in the Commentariolus with the 
accuracy of the predictions of planetary positions yielded by Ptolemaic theory, so 
it does not appear at least that he was impelled in his research by an urge to 
improve on the accuracy of the quantitative predictions of astronomical theory. 11 
The quantitative predictions of the Ptolemaic and the Copernican theories have 
been compared by several historians of mathematical astronomy, and - as if to 
confirm the expectation raised by the previous sentence - the latter have been 
found no more accurate than the former.12 Furthermore, to decide between the 
Ptolemaic and Copernican models on the basis of accuracy of prediction would 
have required more precise data than existed at the time of Copernicus, or for 
10 
11 
12 
Examples of histories of astronomy which make this assumption are given in the text and notes below. In a somewhat more exhaustive treatment of this issue than it is possible to give here, Palter (1970, p. 105) discusses the comparative merits of the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories in terms of three criteria: simplicity, accuracy, 
and physical plausibility. He argues that to gauge the appeal of Copemicanism in such terms is historiographically legitimate, in that these criteria for the assessment of astronomical theory were not introduced retrospectively by historians but prescribed by practising astronomers from the time of Eudoxus to that of Copernicus. 
· 
Copernicus states in the Commentariolus that 'the theories concerning these matters that have been put forth far and wide by Ptolemy and most others L ... ] correspond 
numerically [with the apparent motions]' (Swerdlow ed. 1973, p. 434). 
See e.g. Price (1959), pp. 209-12; Gingerich (1975), pp. 85-6; Cohen (1985), pp. 117-9. 
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decades afterwards. Thus even if the Copernican model had yielded quantitative 
predictions more accurate than its Ptolemaic competitor, this superiority would 
not have been apparent to the discussants at the time and hence could not have 
weighed as a factor determining theory-choice.13 
The alleged superior accuracy of the Copernican theory manifests itself no 
more strongly in the domain of qualitative · predictions about the appearance of 
the solar system A comparative test of the accuracy of the qualitative predictions 
of the Copernican and Ptolemaic theories is offered by the observed approximate 
constancy of the brightness of Venus during the course of its and the earth's 
orbits. As both Copernicus and Osiander note in the De revolutionibus, the 
difference between the maximum and the minimum values attributed by 
Ptolemaic theory to the distance of Venus from the earth is comparatively very 
large. One would expect that if the universe were as Ptolemaic theory said, the 
brightness of Venus as observed from the earth would undergo large variations. 
While the variation in the apparent brightness of the other planets accords 
reasonably closely with the variations attributed by Ptolemaic theory to the 
distances between those planets and the earth, there is no such close accord in the 
case of Venus: the apparent brightness of Venus varies surprisingly little. This 
observation counts in principle as a failure of one of Ptolemaic theory's 
qualitative predictions of the appearance of the night sky, and hence - in a case 
of comparative theory-evaluation such as this is - as an instance supporting 
Copernican theory. Copernicus and Osiander hail the observational report 
presumably as such a confirming instance. But the fact which they seem to 
neglect is that Ptolemaic theory and Copernican theory happen to predict the 
same values for the fluctuations of the distance between Venus and the earth, and 
that the Copernican theory offers no separate explanation for the observed 
constancy of the Venusian luminosity. So the extent to which the observational 
report disconfirmed the Ptolemaic theory was roughly the extent to which it 
disconfirmed the Copernican theory.1' 
13 
1' 
The extreme historiographic thesis that by the mid-sixteenth century the Ptolemaic 
theory was in a state of generalized 'empirical crisis', which Copernicus resolved, is 
examined and rejected by e.g. Burtt (1955, pp. 36-56) and Gingerich (1975). 
For further details see Price (1959), pp. 212-4. The true explanation for the constancy 
of the apparent luminosity of Venus lies in a coincidental compensation between the 
effects on its brightness due to its distance from the earth and those due to its phases; this explanation was attained only with Galileo's telescope observations. Galileo discusses the matter in his (1632), pp. 328, 339, where he expresses 
astonishment at Copernicus's seeming failure to appreciate the fact that his own 
theory - as well as Ptolemy's - entailed the prediction of a wide variation in the 
apparent luminosity of Venus. 
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On the basis of such considerations Palter concludes that Copernicus's 
system is not, in its historical context, perceptibly superior to Ptolemy's in 
predictive accuracy.15 'In order to square this fact with the putative reality of a 
"Copernican revolution'", according to Palter, 'one is constrained to fall back on 
the criterion of simplicity.'16 
That the chief virtue of the Copernican theory was the degree of its 
simplicity - and, frequently, that this was the · theory's sole virtue - has been 
suggested by many who have surveyed the period.17 Historians' attempts to 
decide which was the relative simplicity of the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories 
have almost invariably been based on a straightforward count of the numbers of 
circles postulated by the geometrical constructions to which the two theories 
appeal. Two figures issue from most such discussions: historians have calculated 
that Ptolemy's or a later formulation of the geocentric theory has need of about 
80 circles, whereas the Copernican theory is reputed to appeal to some 34 only.18 
If computation of these figures exhausted the question of the comparative 
simplicity of the two theories, little doubt could remain about the great 
improvement effected by the later theory over the earlier. But the issue is surely 
more intricate than this: the procedure of counting circles is insufficient to gauge 
the degree of simplicity of an astronomical theory. While it is plausible to assume 
that the number of circles to which an astronomical theory is compelled to appeal 
is a factor contributing to determine the overall simplicity of that theory, it is 
wrong to believe that this number on its own constitutes a measure of that 
simplicity. Palter makes the reasonable point that 'comparative counts of circles in 
astronomical systems can be taken as significant measures of simplicity only 
when certain definite conditions are satisfied by these systems.119 He suggests a 
more general view of what constitutes simplicity in an astronomical system: 'it is 
the number of independent parameters rather than the geometrical details which 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Palter (1970), p. 114. Palter denies also the suggestion that the Copernican theory 
was superior to the Ptolemaic in physical plausibility. 
Ibid., pp. 114-5. 
For instance Reichenbach writes: 'Copernicus [ ... ] was able, in fact, to cite as a distinct advantage only the greater simplicity of his system' (1927, p. 18). 
This is roughly the view of e.g. Kordig (1971, p. 109), who states that Copernicus simplified Ptolemaic astronomy by reducing the number of epicycles 'from 84 to 
about 30'. For further details and examples of the count see Palter (1970), pp. 94, 113-4, or Cohen (1985), p. 119. The strictly analytical aspects (as distinct from its historiographical aspects) of the question of determining the degree of simplicity of the Copernican system have been addressed by Rosenkrantz (1977), pp. 135-61. 
Palter (1970), p. 94. 
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is significant.'20 On this advice, discussions of relative simplicity ought to focus on 
the numbers of parameters of which the values require independent specification 
in order for each of the theories to be constructed or applied to a problem in 
planetary astronomy. 
In attempting to determine the relative simplicity of the two theories on 
this generalized basis, an important difference between the aims of Ptolemaic and 
Copernican astronomical practice comes to light. The Ptolemaic theory did not 
aspire to constitute a systematic model of the heavens: it consisted of a set of 
logically independent schemes each of which aimed to describe the motions of 
one of the seven known celestial bodies. True, in the scheme dedicated to each 
body there appeared a point which, in consequence of its definition, was common 
to all the schemes: this point is the centre of the deferent, at which was situated 
the earth. But it lay beyond the intentions of the Ptolemaic astronomers that these 
schemes should be superposed at this point to yield an exhaustive and systematic 
model of the heavens. To this feature of Ptolemaic astronomy there correspond an 
ontological disadvantage and a methodological advantage. The disadvantage is 
that the Ptolemaic theory fails to constitute a truly unified model of the heavens; 
the advantage is that the solution to a problem of observational planetary 
astronomy requires less than the full panoply of Ptolemaic constructions, and is 
hence attained more simply than if the theory possessed greater 
interconnectedness. No single calculation confronting the Ptolemaic astronomer 
required the use of all 80 epicycles; in fact, no single planetary problem ever 
necessitated appeal to more than the six epicycles governing the motions of the 
planet to which the problem referred. Copernicus's astronomy on the contrary 
was intended as and amounted to an all-embracing model of the planetary 
system. This difference had practical repercussions: calculations of planetary 
positions on the Copernican model possessed an interconnectedness not shared by 
the analogous computations on the Ptolemaic model. A Copernican could not 
compute the apparent position of Mars at some time without reference to the 
position of the earth.in its orbit at that instant.21 In this sense, as a set of solutions 
to individual problems, Ptolemaic .astronomy is much simpler and convenient - if 
20 
21 
Ibid., p. 97. 
In this spirit Price (1959, p. 199) identifies the originality of Copernicus's 
contribution in the construction of a mathematical planetary system, as distinct from a mathematical theory of the individual planets. Further on this difference between Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy see Hanson (1961), pp. 175-7. In view of the fact that Ptolemaic astronomy stops short of constituting a system, Kuhn's customary use of the expression 'the Ptolemaic system' (1957, e.g. p. 71) is 
somewhat misleading. 
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rather less systematic - than the Copernican system. 
There is good evidence for believing that the mature Copernicus realized 
that he could claim on behalf of his system a degree of simplicity no greater than 
that of the Ptolemaic theory. His early work, the Commentariolus, had referred to 
the degree of simplicity of the Copernican system as indicating its superiority to 
the Ptolemaic theory.22 If Copernicus had persisted in the belief that his theory 
was superior to its competitor because it was . simpler, he would surely have 
repeated and elaborated on the claim in his more systematic treatise, the De 
revolutionibus, in the same way in which most of the other claims in favour of the 
Copernican theory which appear in the Commentariolus receive an extended 
treatment in the later work. Instead, the De revolutionibus omits to claim the 
degree of simplicity of the Copernican theory as a respect in which it 
demonstrated superiority to the Ptolemaic alternative. In fact, the claims to 
simplicity which figure in the Commentariolus appear to be replaced in the later 
publication by claims that the Copernican theory was preferable to the Ptolemaic 
on the strength of its superior internal harrnony.23 One concludes from such 
observations that at the time of its enunciation the Copernican theory was neither 
simpler nor reputed to be simpler than the Ptolemaic theory.24 
Both predictive accuracy and degree of simplicity are thus revealed as 
features in which the Copernican theory could not have hoped to demonstrate 
superiority over the Ptolemaic theory. Kuhn agrees that whatever superiority the 
Copernican theory may have demonstrated, it could not have been a matter of 
predictive accuracy or simplicity: 'Judged on purely practical · grounds, 
Copernicus' new planetary system was a failure; it was neither more accurate nor 
significantly simpler than its Ptolemaic predecessors.'25 
It does not appear from the above that the Copernican theory either could 
have legitimately acquired or in fact did acquire adherents in its community on 
the strength of its possession of the two logico-empirical features, its degree of 
predictive accuracy and the degree of its simplicity, or at least in virtue of its 
22 
23 
24 
25 
For the passage of the Commentariolus which advances on behalf of the Copernican system the claim of simplicity see Swerdlow ed. (1973), pp. 434-6. 
The shift of Copernicus's claim from the supposed simplicity of the geocentric system, as in the Commentariolus, to its internal harmony, as in the De revo1utionibus, is further discussed in Pera (1981), pp. 157-9. The significance of the De 
revolutionibus's claim to internal harmony is discussed below. 
Additional grounds in support of this claim have been adduced by Cohen (1960), p. 58, Neugebauer (1968), and Lakatos and Zahar (1975), pp. 360-4. Gingerich (1975, p. 87) concludes that 'the Copernican system is slightly more complicated than the 
original Ptolemaic system.' 
Kuhn (1957), p. 171. 
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possession of these features to a degree markedly greater than that of the 
Ptolemaic theory. The present treatment will proceed to suggest that the grounds 
upon which the Copernican theory won adherents from the Ptolemaic were 
aesthetic. 
From the time of classical Greek astronomy to the sixteenth century, 
planetary astronomy was founded on two principles: the principle of 
geocentricity, and the principle of uniform circular celestial motions.26 Copernicus 
wrought a break with one component of this tradition in repudiating the 
commitment of planetary astronomy to the principle of geocentricity but 
maintaining that to the principle of circularity: he retained the notion that the 
planets move uniformly in orbits that are circular, or compounded of Ptolemaic 
epicycles. The principle of geocentricity had been rejected by many astronomers 
before Copernicus, as the De revolutionibus itself took pains to stress in order to 
reduce the apparent novelty of the work. In relaxing adherence to this principle 
Copernicus thus followed a relatively familiar methodological path. The 
commitment to the principle of circularity had on the contrary not been weakened 
for 2,000 years. The reason for this was in part its entrenchment in Aristotelian 
natural philosophy. Aristotle had allotted celestial bodies to the superlunary 
sphere; because of their location, only a certain and perfect type of motion could 
legitimately be attributed to them. Circular motion possessed the required 
perfection in virtue of its following two characteristics. First, circular motion does 
not admit of an end-point, and hence is on the Aristotelian view the motion of a 
self-contained or perfect mover and not motion towards that which the mover 
lacks; second, motion of a sphere in a circle is the only form of motion in which 
the mover remains forever superposed to its own previous positions. Motion in a 
circle thus pertains to the very essence of a celestial body.27 
26 
27 
28 
Copernicus signals his acceptance of this Aristotelian view: 
It is impossible for a heavenly body which is simple to move irregularly in a single sphere. That would have to be due either to 
changes in the moving power, whether derived from elsewhere or from its intrinsic nature, or on account of unevenness in the 
revolving body. Both these possibilities are unacceptable to the 
reason, and it is inappropriate to attribute such a thing to bodies 
which are established in an ideal state.28 
· 
See Hanson (1961), pp. 172-5. A further discussion of the principle of uniform 
circular celestial motions is contained in Mittelstrass (1972), pp. 206-7. 
Further on the place of circular motions in Aristotle's cosmology see Randall (1960), pp. 153-62. 
Copernicus (1543), p. 39 (Book I, chapter 4). 
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Copernicus appeared to find it an inderogable requirement of planetary theory 
that it should subscribe to the principle of the circularity of celestial motions. He 
attacked Ptolernaic astronomy in both the Commentariolus and the De revolutionibus 
not as a heliocentric theorist criticizing a geocentric theory, but because Ptolemy 
had adhered insufficiently strictly to the precept that all celestial motions must be 
explained only by uniform circular motions or combinations of such motions. 
Ptolernaic astronomers had surmised that, within the constraints of geocentrism, 
accuracy of representation of planetary motions necessitated the relaxation of this 
precept, and the attribution to planets of non-uniform circular motions, the 
fluctuations of which are determined by the location of the so-called pundum 
aequans.29 The introduction of the equant point permitted the most accurate 
representations of planetary motions that would be attained by Western 
astronomy until the time of Kepler. Copernicus however considered appeal to 
equants a violation of a fundamental principle and devised a system in which 
celestial bodies moved in uniform motion along circles or combinations of circles. 
This he achieved in the De revolutionibus. 
Copernicus seemed to believe that the restoration of the principle of 
uniform circular celestial motions was not only a notable achievement in 
planetary astronomy, but also the feature of his theory which indicated its 
superiority to its Ptolernaic competitor. In the intentions of Copernicus, the more 
faithful adherence by his theory than by that of Ptolemy to the principle of 
uniform circular motions was a feature of the sort required to encourage the 
transfer of allegiance from the Ptolernaic theory towards his own. 
There is evidence to suggest that indeed it was this feature of Copernican 
theory rather than any other which attracted adherents in his community. For 
instance, the favourable opinion of the work of Copernicus held by one of the 
leading astronomers of his time, E. Reinhold, appears to have been motivated 
more by its elimination of the equant and its return to pure uniform circular 
motion than by its substitution the sun for the earth at the centre of the 
universe.30 
Now, what sort of theoretical feature is the quality of adhering to the 
principle of uniform circular celestial motions? Chapter 5 subdivided features of 
theories into the two classes of empirical and non~mpirical, or aesthetic. 
29 
30 
The punctum aequans was a point positioned so that the radiant vector centered upon it which traces the motion of the planet in its orbit rotates with uniform angular 
velocity. 
See Gingerich (1973), pp. 55-9. 
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Empirical features of theories were those deemed constitutive of the attainment of 
the goal of science, observational success. The quality of adhering to the principle 
of uniform circular celestial motions is not constitutive of observational success: 
the degree of observational success attained by theories in planetary astronomy 
appears not to be correlated to the strength with which they affirmed this 
principle.31 If one accepts the bipartition advanced in the present treatment, this 
suggests that the feature of Copernican theory which contributed most to winning 
adherents to its side was aesthetic in nature. 
Copernicus's expectation that his theory would win support on its aesthetic 
virtues is visible in the De revolutionibus itself. Its text claims as the chief merit of 
the theory a quasi-aesthetic internal harmony greater than that of the Ptolemaic 
theory: 
Those who have devised eccentric circles [ ... ] have not been able to discover or deduce from them the chief thing, that is the form of the 
universe, and the clear symmetry of its parts. They are just like 
someone including in a picture hands, feet, head, and other limbs from different places, well painted indeed, but not modelled from 
the same body, and not in the least matching each other, so that a 
monster would be produced rather than a man. 32 
Kuhn too perceives an aesthetic concern in the arguments deployed in the De 
revolutionibus: 
31 
32 
33 
Each argument cites an aspect of the appearances that can be 
explained by either the Ptolemaic or the Copernican system, and each 
then proceeds to point out how much more harmonious, coherent, 
and natural the Copernican explanation is. [ ... ] Copernicus' 
arguments are not pragmatic. They appeal, if at all, not to the 
utilitarian sense of the practicing astronomer but to his aesthetic 
sense and to that alone. [ ... ] The harmonies to which Copernicus' 
arguments pointed did not enable the astronomer to perform his job better. New harmonies did not increase accuracy or simplicity. Therefore they could and did appeal primarily to that limited and perhaps irrational subgroup of mathematical astronomers whose Neoplatonic ear for mathematical harmonies could not be obstructed by page after page of complex mathematics leading finally to 
numerical predictions scarcely better than those which they had known before. 33 
In point of fact, of course, the greater observational success in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century planetary theory was attained by a theory which violated the principle of uniform circular celestial motions, the theory of Kepler. 
Copernicus (1543), p. 25 (Prefatory letter to Pope Paul ill). Copernicus returns to praise the internal harmony displayed by his theory later in the same work (ibid., p. 50; Book I, chapter 10): 'We find [ ... ] in this arrangement the marvellous symmetry 
of the universe, and a sure linking together in harmony of the motion and size of the spheres, such as could be perceived in no other way.' For yet another similar formulation see ibid., p. 233 (Book V, preface). 
Kuhn (1957), p. 181; emphasis in the original. 
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Neugebauer appears to agree that the entrenchment of Copernicanism was 
achieved not through logico-empirical strengths of the theory such as its degree 
of simplicity, but through its aesthetic virtues, or the degree to which it appeared 
'pleasing to the mind': 'Had it not been for Tycho Brahe and Kepler, the 
Copernican system would have contributed to the perpetuation of the Ptolemaic 
system in a slightly more complicated form but more pleasing to philosophical 
minds.'34 
On such a basis one concludes that the grounds upon which the 
Copernican theory gained endorsement in the period after its first formulation 
were aesthetic rather then logico-empirical in nature.35 
If a theory garnered adherents on the strength of its aesthetic features 
rather than or as well as in virtue of its logico-empirical qualities, it must have 
constituted according to the present treatment a non-revolutionary innovation: for 
only an innovation which effected with · past science a break less profound than a 
revolution could hope to find its own aesthetic features valued by the pre-existing 
aesthetic evaluative canons of the community into which it is received. According 
to the historiographic findings mustered above, the Copernican theory maintained 
aesthetic continuity with previous theories in its discipline, and thus cannot have 
constituted a revolutionary innovation. On the present treatment the Copernican 
theory amounts merely to a non-revolutionary - albeit perhaps very important -
innovation in the fabric of mathematical planetary astronomy. The return to the 
Greek canons of circularity and uniformity could not have constituted a 
revolution except in the sense of a return to the ideals of the past.36 
The conclusion that Copernicanism constituted something less than a 
revolutionary innovation in planetary astronomy has been reached here by the 
application · of a definite model of scientific revolutions, which suggests inter alia 
that the question whether or not a certain theory amounted to a revolutionary 
break with past science can be decided by an examination of the grounds on 
which that theory gained adherents in its community. This conclusion is 
nonetheless shared_ by several historians of science who, setting aside the received 
35 
36 
Neugebauer (1968), p. 103. The remainder of that paper amounts to a masterly 
study of the dependence of Copernican theory upon ·Ptolemaic. Contributors to Neyman ed. (1974) also examine the extent to which Copernicus constructed a theory which was 'pleasing to the mind.' 
The aesthetic features of Copernican theory which may have encouraged its 
adoption have been studied by Gingerich (1975, pp. 89-90) and by Hutchinson (1987, pp. 109-36). In the work cited here Gingerich presents the Copernican theory as a 
resolution of a state of aesthetic dissatisfaction which had been accumulating with the development of Ptolemaic astronomy. 
This thesis is argued also by Cohen (1985), pp. 123-5. 
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belief in the occurrence of a 'Copernican revolution', have investigated afresh the 
nature of the transition from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy.37 Since the 
judgements of these historians were reached on grounds different from those 
adduced in the present treatment and by arguments which do not depend on the 
application of the present model of scientific revolutions, their conclusions offer 
an independent check of the .historical verisimilitude of this model. 
Broadly speaking, two series of historiographic studies have tended to 
suggest that Copernican theory maintained with pre-existing astronomy a degree 
of continuity too great for that contribution to be termed 'revolutionary' without a 
severe dilution of the concept. Studies of the first series have examined internal 
features of Copernican theory for evidence of its intellectual derivation from or 
continuity with Ptolemaic astronomy: they have remarked on such matters as the 
Ptolemaic inspiration of the text of De revolutionibus or the Aristotelianism of the 
doctrine of the spheres to which Copernicus appeals. 38 In both these respects as in 
several others the conclusions appear to endorse Hanson's characterization of the 
De revolutionibus: 'It was a comprehensive attempt to make the science of that day 
work better; it was not explicitly a plan for a new science of tomorrow.'39 
Studies of the second series have investigated the reception accorded to 
Copernican theory to gauge the degree to which the theory was perceived as 
ground-breaking or unorthodox by the community of mathematical planetary 
astronomers. RS. Westman concludes that, far from being perceived as 
iconoclastic, the Copernican theory was respectfully welcomed into what Kuhn 
would term the 'normal science' of Ptolemaic astronomy.'° Westman points out 
that if Copernicanism truly effected a revolutionary break with Ptolemaic theory 
and constituted a new paradigm in mathematical planetary astronomy, then his 
historiographic findings about the manner of the reception of this theory in the 
community contradicts Kuhn's view of the genesis of new paradigms at times of 
disciplinary crisis: Kuhn had after all predicted that new paradigms would be 
37 
38 
39 
40 
One of the earliest consequential histories of astronomy to suggest that the work of Copernicus is best interpreted as the culmination of a long-standing project is that 
of Pedersen and Pihl (1974), pp. 299-314. 
The striking textual similarities between the presentation of Copernican theory in the De revolutionibus and the exposition of Ptolemaic astronomy in the Almagest have been noted by Neugebauer (1952, p. 206): 'chapter by chapter, theorem by theorem, table by table, these works run parallel.' One may from this formal resemblance 
seek to infer that Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy shared elements of the same 
methodology, or intended to confront the same complex of problems. Copemicus' s doctrine of· the spheres and its resemblance to Ptolemy's is examined in Jardine (1982). 
Hanson (1967), p. 220. 
Westman (1975), pp. 191-2. 
174 
I 
I r I 
11 
I 
CHAPTER TEN: APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL TO HISTORY OF SOENCE 
whole-heartedly either embraced or resisted, but would in no case be susceptible 
to accommodation within the framework of the pre-existing paradigm. Westman 
thus suggests that the transition from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy may 
constitute an unfavourable test-,case for Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions. 
The view taken on this matter by the present treatment is different from 
Westman' s: on the present account the Ptoleinaic-Copernican transition fails to 
constitute a counterexample to Kuhn's theory of the manner in which revolutions 
unfold, but merely because that transition did not constitute a revolution and 
hence is immaterial to any test of this component of Kuhn's model.41 
3. Aspects of revolution: the Keplerian ellipses 
The previous section suggested that Copernican theory did not represent a 
revolutionary innovation in mathematical planetary astronomy, and that this is 
shown by the fact that it was able to gather support in its community on the 
strength of its aesthetic features. This section will proceed to consider the second 
transition in early-modem astronomy, that wrought by Kepler's theory of 
planetary motions.42 This treatment will investigate the identity of the grounds on 
the strength of which Kepler's theory was able to gamer support, and surmise 
from such historiographic data the nature of the innovation which that theory 
constituted. 
Enunciations of Kepler's first two laws of planetary motion are contained 
in his Astronomia nova of 1609. They were the fruit of the author's 'war on Mars', 
his effort between 1600 and 1605 to discover a law describing the motions of the 
sun's fourth planet.'3 This work was an prolonged attempt to formulate a 
mathematical description of the orbit and motions of Mars which would 
demonstrate consistency with the data collated from observations of the positions 
of the planet by Tycho Brahe. These data boasted an accuracy of around 1 ': they 
were substantially more accurate than any similar data pr~viously collected, and 
41 
42 
43 
Of course the present treatment contradicts another component of Kuhn's overall 
view of the history of science, viz., his belief - expressed in both his (1957) and (1962) - that the Copernican theory constituted a revolution. 
This treatment will consider not the doctrines contained in Kepler's Mysterium 
cosmographicum of 1596, but those of the Astronmnia nova of 1609 and his later works. 
The chains of reasoning which led Kepler to his first law of [lanetary motion are retraced in Whiteside (1974); those which led him to his secon law in Aiton (1969). 
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their precision would not be bettered until the advent of the telescope. Kepler 
appears to have attained his first law - the proposition that the planets move in 
an ellipse with the sun at one focus - by, roughly speaking, an alternation of 
theoretical hypothesis and empirical test: he proposed a succession of candidate-
paths for the orbit of Mars and gauged the accuracy with which the quantitative 
implications of each hypothesis cohered with Tycho's data. 
Kepler tested at the outset the hypothesis, typical of strict Copernicanism, 
that Mars moved in a circular orbit. The trajectory which in this event Mars 
would have traced departed from the planet's observed path by an angular 
distance of up to 8'. This discrepancy, the magnitude of which is much greater 
than the margins of error claimed for Tycho's data, was in Kepler's view 
sufficiently large for a circular orbit to be ruled out." 
The distribution of the discrepancies between the observed path of Mars 
and its path on a putative circular orbit suggested to Kepler in 1602 the curve 
which he should next consider: 'The orbit is not a circle, but [passing from 
aphelion] enters in a little on either side [at quadratures] and goes out again to 
the breadth of the circle at perihelion, in a path of the sort called an oval.'45 
However the putative oval orbit too diverged from from the true orbit as this had 
been established from observations. The sign of the crucial divergences exhibited 
by the oval orbit was opposite to that of the divergences introduced by the 
circular orbit. Kepler concluded from this in 1604 that the path of the true orbit 
was a curve contained between the circle and the oval, and in the same breath 
suggested which curve this might be: 
In the middle longitudes [ ... ] the perfect circle prolongs [the true 
orbital path] by about 800 or 900 [parts in 152350, the mean radius 
of orbit] too much. My ovality curtails by about 400 too much. The 
truth is in the middle, though nearer to my ovality [ ... ] just as 
though Mars's path were a perfect ellipse." 
Kepler found that the hypothesis that the orbit of Mars was an ellipse bearing the 
sun at one of the foci led to a close accord with the data. The content of the first 
law of planetary motion which Kepler published in the Astronomia nova expressed 
this discovery. 
The role played in this research by logico-empirical evaluative criteria is 
obvious.47 Kepler had set himself the problem of identifying a closed curve which 
44 This passage in Kepler's reasoning is described in Whiteside (1974), pp. 6-7. 
45 Cited ibid., p. 8; interpolations by Whiteside. 
46 Cited ibid., p. 11. 
47 The empirical content of Kepler's laws is analyzed by Mittelstrass (1972), pp. 208-9. 
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was consistent with a set of numerical data; after having rejected at least two 
possible curves on the strength of their divergence from observational data, he 
found the hypothesis that Mars traced an elliptical orbit to be the only one which 
demonstrated a sufficiently close accord with the data. Clearly thus Kepler's 
theory had upon publication in 1609 already undergone evaluation on logico-
empirical criteria; indeed the theory which he published in that year was the sole 
survivor, out of a pool of several candidates, of a preliminary bout of theory-
evaluation on logico-empirical criteria. 
Here is some indication of the nature of the grounds on which Kepler's 
theory gained support upon its formulation, even if only in the mind of its 
begetter. More substantial evidence of the grounds upon which the theory gained 
supporters in its community is drawn from the story of its later reception.48 
The greatest empirical triumph of the Keplerian theory of the years 
immediately following its enunciation, and the achievement which more than any 
other contributed to its establishment in its community, came with the publication 
by Kepler in 1627 of the Tabulae Rudolphinae. These were compilations of 
numerical predictions of the future positions of the moon and planets computed 
by the application of Kepler's laws, and which offered themselves with the 
passage of time to testing against observational data by planetary astronomers. In 
essence these tables were an example of an entity frequently discussed by 
philosophers of science but seldom so concretely and explicitly produced in 
scientific practice: they were a tabulation of the observational consequences of a 
body of theory, which by their means opened itself to experimental test. The 
project of testing Keplerian theory was facilitated by the publication of the 
Rudolphine tables more than one might have expected, for astronomers of the 
time of Kepler had much less familiarity with the properties of the ellipse than 
with those of the circle, and had - needless to report - no recourse to coordinate 
geometry or differential calculus; they would hence have found the task of 
computing the predictive consequences of the theory ungrateful. From the 
moment of the publication of the tables, astronomers acquired means which 
enabled them easily to test the predictions of Keplerian theory against the actually 
observed positions of the sun, moon and planets, and compare the accuracy 
attained with that of rival astronomical theories.49 Use of the Rudolphine tables 
48 
49 
The reception gained by Kepler's theory in the period 1609-66 is described in J.L. Russell (1964). 
On the contribution of the Rudolphine tables to the empirical testing of Kepler's theory see Russell (1964), p. 7. 
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quickly showed that the ellipse which Kepler had successfully posited as the form 
of the orbit of Mars fitted with good precision also the orbits of the earth and the 
other planets, even that of Mercury which had thus far proved the planetary orbit 
most recalcitrant to astronomical theories.50 
This historical evidence suggests in a preliminary way that the grounds 
upon which Kepler's theory established itself in the community of mathematical 
planetary astronomers were chiefly logico-eni.pirical in nature: it was the 
demonstrated close accord of the Keplerian predictions in the Rudolphine tables 
with observation which played the largest role in convincing members of the 
community that they ought to embrace Kepler's theory in preference to the 
Ptolemaic, the Tychonic or the Copernican. 
The model of scientific revolutions contained in chapter 8 suggests that a 
theory which constituted a revolutionary innovation in its discipline will gain 
adherents exclusively on the strength of its logico-empirical virtues, remaining 
unable to gather support in virtue of its aesthetic features in view of its aesthetic 
innovativeness. Thus, the historiographic finding that Keplerian theory attracted 
adherents on the strength of its empirical predictions is at least consistent with 
the thesis of this section, that Kepler's theory constituted a revolutionary 
innovation in the discipline of mathematical planetary astronomy. More detailed 
historiographic research offers stronger support for this thesis, as will be shown 
next. 
The model of scientific revolutions constructed in the present treatment 
suggests that the reception of a theory which constitutes a revolutionary 
innovation will exhibit two phases. The first will be characterized by resistance to 
the new theory, especially on the part of the more conservative members of the 
community, on the grounds of its aesthetic innovativeness, which causes its 
aesthetic features to conflict with the aesthetic evaluative canons to which part of 
the community remains wedded. A theory which constitutes a successful 
revolution will notwithstanding this resistance proceed to demonstrate substantial 
empirical success, arid in particular greater such success than can be mustered by 
the preceding, aesthetically conservative theory which constitutes its competition. 
The second distinctive phase in the reception of such a th~ory will be inaugurated 
when the empirical success accumulated by the new theory is so substantial as to 
cause the greater part of the community - including many members who were 
previously opposed to it on aesthetic grounds - to embrace it in order to draw 
50 As Russell (1964, p . 20) recounts, Keplerian astronomy attracted far more favourable 
attention after the publication of the Rudolphine tables than before it. 
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benefit from its empirical power, now demonstrably greater than that of its 
competitor-theory. To further this end, members of the community will suspend 
or de-emphasize their aesthetic sensibility towards theories in order to avoid the 
prescriptive conflict which would result from an application at full strength of the 
two evaluative canons. 
Each of these distinctive phases of revolution was realized in the 
community which received Kepler's theory. Kepler's assertion that planets moved 
in elliptical orbits encountered a system of astronomical belief unfavourably 
disposed towards the suggestion that celestial bodies might move in paths other 
than circular. This hostility was justified by those who professed it not on the 
empirical criterion that the postulation of non-circular orbits rendered planetary 
theory incapable of accounting with sufficient accuracy for astronomical data, but 
on a non-empirical, metaphysical and - on the present treatment - aesthetic 
criterion, that only the postulation of circular orbits could attain the harmony 
demanded for planetary astronomy. This attitude, widely held in the community 
in which Kepler worked, was manifested for instance by Tycho in a seemingly 
admonitory passage of a letter to Kepler: 
The orbits of the planets must be constructed exclusively from 
circular motions; otherwise they could not recur with a uniform and 
equal constancy, eternal duration would be impossible; moreover, 
the orbits would be less simple, would exhibit greater irregularities 
and would not be suitable for scientific treatment and practice.51 
In this passage Tycho gives notice of opposition to the assertion which was to 
become the distinctive thesis of Kepler's theory. His objection is ·moved on 
archetypically extra-empirical or more precisely - in the eyes of the present 
treatment - aesthetic grounds. Tycho resists the introduction of non-circular orbits 
into planetary theory not because the observational success of the theory which 
posited such orbits would be impaired, but because the resulting theory would be 
less attractive on aesthetic, metaphysical grounds. This stance is characteristic of 
the conservative faction of the community in which a theory which constitutes a 
revolutionary innovation has been proposed: as the present treatment predicts, 
· members of that faction resist the new theory not in virtue of the application of 
the logico-empirical criteria of theory-assessment - whic? may yield a positive 
evaluation of the theory's predictive power - but on the grounds of the new 
theory's violation of the pre-existing aesthetic evaluative canons of the 
51 The passage is contained in a letter of Tycho of December 1599, here cited in the translation of Mittelstrass (1972), p. 210. 
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community. Tycho's statement thus expresses the attitude which the present 
model predicts will be widespread in the first phase of the response to a 
revolutionary theory. 
The present treatment further predicts that as the new theory demonstrates 
its possession of logico-empirical qualities to a degree superior to that of previous 
theories which adhered to the. extant aesthetic canons, then its violation of those 
canons will come to assume less and less importance for theory-choice in the eyes 
of the community. In time even the conservative faction will be led to suspend its 
faculties of aesthetic theory-evaluation and embrace the new theory on logico-
empirical grounds. Of this phenomenon too the history of the reception of the 
Keplerian theory offers evidence. In the years subsequent to the publication of the 
Astronomia nova, P. Criiger, Professor of Mathematics at Danzig, expressed 
profound scepticism towards Keplerian astronomy and recoiled from entertaining 
it. He wrote for instance in 1624: 'I do not subscribe to the hypotheses of Kepler. I 
trust that God will grant us some other way of arriving at the true theory of 
Mars.'52 The publication in 1927 of the Tabulae Rudolphinae caused him radically to 
change his mind. In a letter to the astronomer P. Muller of 1629 - thus after the 
tables had had the opportunity of showing the predictive accuracy of the theory 
on which they were based - Criiger expressed the impact which the empirical 
corroborations had caused upon him: 
You hope that someone will give these tables [the astronomical tables of Longomontanus] a further polishing and you say that all 
astronomers would be grateful for this. But I should have thought that it would be a waste of time now that the Rudolphine Tables have been published, since all astronomers will undoubtedly use these. [ ... ] I am wholly occupied with trying to understand the foundations upon which the Rudolphine rules and tables are based, 
and I am using for this purpose the Epitome of Astronomy previously published by Kepler as an introduction to the tables. This 
epitome which previously I had [ ... ] so many times thrown aside, I 
now take up again and study [ .. .]. I am no longer repelled by the 
elliptical form of the planetary orbits [ ... ].53 
In the last sentence· of this passage, Criiger renounces one of the criteria upon 
which he had at a previous time unfavourably assessed Keplerian theory: he 
withdraws from among the grounds upon which to oppose the new theory the 
observation that it attributes to planetary orbits an elliptical form. The feature of 
Kepler's theory which Criiger no longer wishes to count against it is non-
52 
53 
Here cited in the translation of Russell (1964), p. 8. For further expressions of Criiger's early unfavourable response to Kepler's theory see ibid., pp. 7-8. 
Cited ibid., p. 8. 
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empirical or aesthetic in nature: it is the theory's violation of the pre-existing 
metaphysically-backed prescription of a certain form of simplicity or symmetry to 
planetary theory, to which Ptolemaic, Tychonic and Copernican theory had each 
adhered. 
The reason for which Criiger feels he can no longer afford to reject 
Keplerian theory on the grounds of its violation of this principle is, as the 
remainder of the above passage makes clear, that the theory had manifested 
through the Rudolphine tables a high degree of empirical accuracy. The present 
model of scientific revolutions predicts that at least some members of the 
conservative faction of a scientific community - those who had initially 
condemned a revolutionary theory on the grounds of its infraction of aesthetic 
canons - will later be drawn nonetheless to embrace it in recognition of the great 
degree to which it satisfies the logico-empirical criteria of theory-evaluation. It is 
to the credit of Criiger if he was able after his study of the evidence contained in 
the Rudolphine tables to set aside his initial non-empirical reservations against 
Keplerian theory and acknowledge that its empirical power rendered its adoption 
advisable. 
The grounds adduced in evaluations of Kepler's theory during the period 
of its first reception enable conclusions to be drawn - in accordance with section 
1 of this chapter - about the nature of the innovation constituted by that theory 
in planetary astronomy. Unlike Copemicus's theory, which the previous section 
showed to have gained support on the strength of its aesthetic features rather 
than of any supposed significant empirical superiority over Ptolemaic theory, 
Kepler's theory appears to have attracted endorsement in virtue of the 
considerably greater accuracy of its empirical predictions over that of any 
previous theory, and in spite of its non-empirical or aesthetic features. Far from 
reinforcing the appeal of the theory among Kepler's contemporaries, its aesthetic 
features proved a hindrance to the theory's establishment which had gradually to 
be overcome by demonstrations of its empirical power. Unlike Copernicus's 
theory, Kepler's thus meets the specifications which the present treatment 
prescribes of a theoretical innovation for it to be considered revolutionary: it 
appears to have effected a rupture with the pre-existi:t1g aesthetic evaluative 
canons of its community, and it established itself in the teeth of initial aesthetic 
opposition on the strength of the considerable degree to which it exhibited the 
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possession of logico-empirical virtues.54 
Kepler's theory appears on these grounds the crucial turning-point between 
medieval planetary astronomy and Newtonian celestial dynamics. The present 
treatment thus agrees with the verdict on this period of Hanson: 'The line 
between Ptolemy and Copernicus is unbroken. The line between Copernicus and 
Newton is discontinuous; welded only by the mighty innovations of Kepler.'55 
Certainly Kepler was responsible for more than merely a 'version of Copernicus' 
proposal', as Kuhn seeks to construe his contribution.56 
The last two sections have attempted to support the model of scientific 
revolutions presented earlier in this treatment in the following way. They have 
corroborated on historiographic grounds the model's description of a 
community's reactions to theories which constitute revolutionary and non-
revolutionary innovations in their discipline. To this extent the story of the 
transition from Ptolemaic-Copernican to Keplerian astronomy demonstrates the 
application of aesthetic canons of theory-appraisal in a phase of scientific history, 
and hence permits one to gauge the ability of the model in its entirety to account 
for historiographic data.57 
4. Aspects of continuity: the theory of special relativity 
The discipline of physics between 1900 and 1940 underwent transformations 
perhaps even more conspicuous than those of astronomy between 1540 and 1630. 
54 
55 
56 
57 
That Kepler's theory was responsible for a revolutionary break has been affirmed by historians on arguments entirely independent of those pursued in the present treatment of scientific revolutions: see e.g. Mittelstrass (1972), pp. 205, 207. 
Hanson (1961), P: 169. 
Kuhn (1957), p. 219. 
There is an aspect of seventeenth-century astronomy separate from those pursued in this chapter which allows the incidence of aesthetic factors in theory-choice to be 
studied in abstraction from empirical grounds. Throughout the seventeenth century the community of mathematical planetary astronomy possessed two theories -Copernican heliocentrism and Tychonic geo-heliocentrism - which were 
observationally precisely equivalent. Any choice between them could therefore be 
made solely on non-empirical grounds. Undoubtedly among the factors which decided the choice for some natural philosophers were arguments · inspired from 
religious doctrine and physical plausibility; but a study of the preferences of 
mathematical scientists of this period between the two equivalent theories could 
reveal also a vein of aesthetic motivations and argumentation. I propose to address this question in forthcoming research. 
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The theories of relativity and of quantum mechanics vie with one another in 
popular accounts for the title of the supreme innovation of modem science. 
The task of discerning which, if either, of these contributions to physics 
constituted a revolution will - as is by now usual in this treatment - be 
discharged by means of an examination of the grounds on which each gained 
adherents early after their first enunciations. As has been repeated above, the 
present model prescribes that the discovery that a new theory gained 
endorsement on aesthetic grounds indicates that it failed to constitute a 
revolution, whereas the finding that it attracted support on logico-empirical 
grounds and in the face of aesthetically-motivated opposition suggests that it 
indeed constituted a revolutionary departure from previous science. 
The old suggestion that Einstein was impelled to formulate the theory of 
special relativity by the null results of the aether-drift experiments of A.A. 
Michelson and E.W. Morley has by now been conclusively discredited.58 Far from 
playing an important role in convincing Einstein of the truth of his theory as he 
worked on it, these results came to his notice only some time after the publication 
of his paper on special relativity of 1905.59 In fact, the paper does not invoke 
explicitly any of the experimental results unfavourable to elements of classical 
physics, and the Michelson-Morley experiments are not mentioned even when the 
opportunity arises to show how the theory of relativity would account for their 
result. 60 It is thus illegitimate to attribute the entrenchment of the theory of 
relativity in Einstein's mind in the period in which he conceived it and refined its 
formulation to this empirical virtue of the theory, its ability - not shared by 
classical physics - easily to account for the Michelson-Morley results. What were 
then the grounds upon which Einstein, even as he formulated it, was first 
persuaded of the value of the theory of relativity? 
In view of the fact that theory-assessment consists generally of a 
comparative evaluation of two or more alternative theories rather than of an 
appraisal of an isolated theory, to answer this question one must first investigate 
the reasons for Einstein's dissatisfaction with classical physics, the theoretical 
corpus constituted essentially by the conjunction of Newtonian mechanics and 
Maxwell's electrodynamics.61 Einstein indicates the cause o,f his dissatisfaction in 
58 
59 
60 
61 
See Swenson (1972), pp. 156-60, and Holton (1973), pp. 261-352. 
For evidence of this claim see Swenson (1972), pp. 158-9, and Holton (1973), pp. 282-4. . 
Holton (1973), p. 169. 
Einstein's appraisal of classical physics is discussed in Zahar (1973), pp. 223-7. 
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the opening of the paper in which the theory of relativity is first expounded: 
'That Maxwell's electrodynamics - the way in which it is usually understood -
when applied to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries which do not appear to be 
inherent in the phenomena is well known. ' 62 
The asymmetries of which Einstein here thinks appear in the application of 
Maxwell's electrodynamics to certain physical systems, including the system 
composed of a conductor and a magnet in motion relative to one another. In, at 
least, their formulations cognizant of the work of Mach, the principles of classical 
physics recognize relative motions but none that is absolute. One is hence led by 
classical physics to expect no difference between the situation obtained by moving 
a conductor at a certain velocity relative to a magnet which is at rest in the 
laboratory and that produced by now affixing the conductor to the bench and 
moving the magnet with the same velocity respect to it. It is expected that all 
physical parameters will take identical values in the two cases: in particular, the 
intensities of the electrical currents induced in the conductor are expected to be 
identical in the two cases. Experiment bears out these expectations. 
Maxwell's electrodynamics predicts to high accuracy the intensity of the 
induced currents for any values of the velocities of conductor and magnet. Of 
greater interest to Einstein than the outcome of the calculations was however their 
route. Maxwell's electrodynamics prescribes that one apply to the system 
composed of stationary conductor and moving magnet an analysis substantially 
different from that which it deems appropriate to the system of stationary magnet 
and moving conductor.6.l No matter that the final predictions of these analyses 
coincide both with one another and with empirical data: Einstein found 
displeasing the unwarranted asymmetry which was embedded in the theory.64 
The theory of special relativity was, on Einstein's own account, designed to 
provide a treatment of systems of conductors and magnets in relative motion 
which exhibited symmetry in the sense specified above, and therefore did not 
offer analyses of these systems which differed according to whether the motion 
62 
6.l 
64 
Cited in Miller (1981), p. 392; pp. 391-415 of this volume consist of a translation of the whole of Einstein's 1905 paper on relativity, while pp. 143-83 conduct an extensive analysis of its introductory comments. 
For a study of the way in which classical electrodynamics treats the system of magnet and conductor see Miller (1981), pp. 145-50. 
As Holton (1973, p. 168) points out, Einstein's displeasure at the asymmetries of classical physics is voiced . not only in his paper on special relativity but also in his other two important papers of 1905. Further on Einstein's concern for symmetry as a property of theories see ibid., pp. 362-7. It is only fair to record the contention of Shelton (1988) that Holton overestimates the importance of symmetry considerations as a motivation of Einstein's work. 
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was attributed to the magnet or the conductor. In this task the new theory 
succeeded well. That this success was the principle perceived achievement of 
Einstein's theory of 1905 is intimated by the name by which he intended it to be 
known: the 'theory of invariants'.65 These observations suggest that the theory of 
special relativity gained support at least in part and at least in the system of 
beliefs of its originator on the strength of the form of symmetry embedded in its 
structure. 66 
To grounds of what nature does one refer when one favourably evaluates 
the theory of special relativity for the symmetries of its explanatory structure? In 
particular, are the grounds which one thus adduces empirical or aesthetic in 
nature? 
Again one must hark back to the grounds for Einstein's dissatisfaction with 
classical physics. The shortcoming which Einstein perceived in electrodynamics -
the asymmetries inherent in its treatment of certain physical systems - was not an 
empirical defect of the theory: the accuracy of the predictions yielded by 
Maxwell's electrodynamics for the intensity of the current induced in a conductor 
in motion with respect to a magnet is both very high relative to the precision of 
the experimental data and as high as that of the predictions yielded by 
applications of the same theory to phenomena where no similar asymmetries are 
manifested. Thus the fact that Maxwell's electrodynamics prescribes that one 
should choose between two different analyses of a physical system on the basis of 
the identity of the body which one imagines to be in motion does not appear to 
impair the predictive power of the theory: positivists - if one indicates by this 
term scientists concerned solely with the degree of observational success of their 
theories and not with any non-observational virtues or defects which they may 
manifest - · would find in the asymmetry of applications of Maxwell's 
electrodynamics no reason to weaken their allegiance to the theory. 
The grounds upon which Einstein rejected classical physics provided also 
the grounds upon which the theory which he proposed gained initial support at 
least in his own mind: the appeal which the theory of special relativity had for 
Einstein lay chiefly in its being free of the non-empirical shortcoming which he 
criticized in classical physics. This quality of special relativity is clearly itself non-
empirical: the fact that the new theory omits to follow the old in drawing a 
distinction between certain physical systems of itself communicates nothing about 
the predictive virtues of the new theory by comparison with those of its 
65 See Holton (1973), p. 362, or Miller (1981), p. 173. 
66 Wider issues in the reception of relativity theory are examined in Glick (1987). 
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predecessor. 
The present treatment suggests that the criterion on which Einstein 
repudiated classical physics and embraced the theory of relativity was aesthetic in 
the sense defined in the course of the foregoing chapters. It was on this view an 
aesthetic dissatisfaction which Einstein felt in . classical physics, and on aesthetic 
grounds that the theory of special relativity proved more satisfactory to him.67 
The suggestion that Einstein may have · made recourse to an aesthetic 
criterion of theory-assessment in the work leading to the formulation of the 
theory of relativity is of course supported by the evidence of his methodological 
beliefs presented elsewhere in this treatment. For instance, chapter 5 construed 
part of the 'Autobiographical Notes' as the description of a two-criterion canon of 
theory-assessment of which one of the component criteria was aesthetic in nature. 
Einstein's choice between classical physics and the theory of relativity is to be 
seen as an application of this aesthetic criterion of evaluation. 
Theories which win adherents on the strength of their aesthetic features are 
deemed by the present treatment to have constituted not revolutionary breaks 
with previous science but rather moderate innovations, which remain within the 
paradigm which dominated the discipline at the time of their formulation. The 
fact that part of the appeal of the theory of relativity was perceived to reside in 
its aesthetic features leads one to the conclusion that this theory was a moderate, 
aesthetically-conservative innovation of the latter sort. In maintaining aesthetic 
solidarity with classical physics, the theory of relativity betrays its membership of 
the paradigm in physical science which was defined principally by Maxwell's 
electrodynamics. 
The conclusion that the theory of relativity is most appropriately seen as 
the culmination of the programme of nineteenth-century physics, here reached on 
an analysis of the grounds on which it attracted early support and on inferences 
prompted by the present model of scientific revolutions, is reached by 
independent itineraries by several philosophically-informed histories of classical 
physics.68 Holton for instance writes: 
67 
68 
The so-called scientific 'revolution' turns out to be at bottom an effort to 
return to a classical purity. [ ... ] Indeed, while it is usually stressed that 
This view wins the assent of several historians of twentieth-century physics. Swenson (1972), p. 157, concurs that the motivations which led Einstein to the theory of special relativity were largely aesthetic in nature. Pais (1982), pp. 138-40, 
retraces some of the considerations on aesthetic grounds which Einstein pursued in formulating this theory. 
That the theory of relativity is in many aspects the culmination of the programme of 
classical physics is argued by e.g. Hesse (1961), p. 226. 
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Einstein challenged Newtonian physics in fundamental ways, the 
equally correct but neglected point is the number of methodological 
correspondences with earlier physics [exhibited by Einstein's 
contributions].69 
Einstein would have been the first to point out the continuity of his work with 
classical physics: 'With respect to the theory of relativity it is not at all a question 
of a revolutionary act, but of a natural development of a line which can be 
pursued through centuries.'70 
On such arguments is established the judgement of the theory of special 
relativity as falling short of constituting a revolutionary innovation, as 
maintaining continuity with the physical science of the previous century. The 
theory of special relativity resembles Copernican astronomy in having been 
designed to rid of imperfections the aesthetic structure of the science forged by 
the paradigm then dominant in its discipline, and by this means to contribute to 
that paradigm's fullest development. 
5. Aspects of revolution: quantum mechanics 
The previous section suggested that the theory of special relativity gained 
adherents on the strength of its aesthetic features as well as of its logico-empirical 
virtues. The reception obtained by quantum mechanics was different: the extra-
empirical features of the theory proved repellent rather than attractive to the 
community in which it was formulated, and the endorsement which it acquired 
was won in virtue of its logico-empirical strengths alone and despite the aesthetic 
features which it exhibited. This section will allude briefly to the reactions of 
Planck and Einstein towards quantum mechanics as an illustration of the 
reception accorded by a community to a theory which constitutes a revolutionary 
innovation. 
The early history of quantum mechanics may be subdivided into three 
phases. The first opened with the formulation of the quantum theory of black-
body radiation in 1900; the second with the quantum atomic theory of Bohr in 
1913. Despite their empirical success, it became increasingly apparent in the early 
69 
70 
Holton (1973), p. 170; emphasis in the original. 
Cited in Holton (1973), p. 176. 
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1920s that the forms of quantum mechanics developed up to that time were 
inadequate. They amounted less to a unified and consistent body of theory than 
to a piecemeal doctoring of classical physics, a set of conventions governing when 
to impose upon classical principles 'quantum conditions' restricting the range of 
values which given variables could assume. The more uniform and consistent 
version of quantum physics was constructed in the third phase through the work 
of Heisenberg, Schrodinger and others from 1926 · onwards. 
Whereas the forms of quantum physics obtained during the first two 
phases were theories insufficiently fully-formed to exhibit determinate extra-
empirical or aesthetic characteristics, the new quantum physics possessed 
distinctive aesthetic qualities in the sense specified by the present treatment. The 
most conspicuous aesthetic feature which the new theory exhibited was causal 
indeterminism. It was perception of this quality which provoked Planck' s and 
Einstein's opposition to quantum mechanics. 
Both these scientists had contributed greatly to development of the first 
form of quantum physics. Planck had inaugurated the new approach by 
introducing the notion of the quantum of action to explain the energy spectrum 
of black-body radiation; Einstein had demonstrated the power of the quantum 
hypothesis to explain the experimental findings of the photoelectric effect. Both 
scientists lent their assent to early versions of quantum physics on the strength of 
the empirical success of their own contributions and those of others. But for both 
Planck and Einstein the unpalatable extra-empirical features of the new quantum 
mechanics easily outweighed the empirical success of the theory and ensured 
their rejection of it. 71 
It is not that Planck or Einstein denied the predictive attainments of 
quantum physics, and rejected it consequently on empirical grounds: both 
repeatedly paid tribute to the predictive success of the new theory. But they drew 
attention also to other features of the theory - chiefly its indeterministic treatment 
of physical events - which they found unacceptable. There exists compelling 
textual evidence for the claim that both Planck and Einstein adopted attitudes of 
this description towards quantum physics. 
In his Nobel Prize address, where he seeks tQ retrace the origin and 
development of quantum theory, Planck explicitly and at length commends the 
71 
· Planck recalls his opposition to quantum mechanics in his (1948), pp. 43-5. For background information on Einstein's resistance to quantum physics see Stachel (1986), and on that of both Planck and Einstein see J. Bernstein (1973), pp. 153-65. 
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theory for its empirical success in many and diverse areas of physics.72 A passage 
immediately following this review, although closing with the acknowledgement 
that the ultimate fate of the theory is to be decided on the strength of its 
empirical performance, lets slip Planck' s displeasure: 
The difficulties which the introduction of the quantum of action into 
the well-established classical theory has encountered from the outset [ ... ] have gradually increased rather than diminished; and although 
research in its forward march has in the meantime passed over some 
of them, the remaining gaps in the theory are the more distressing to 
the conscientious theoretical physicist. [ ... ] 
But numbers decide, and in consequence the tables have been 
turned.73 
The fact that Planck should admit that 'the numbers' have won to quantum 
physics the community's support, and that he should nonetheless voice 
displeasure at the theory, suggests that he consciously harboured extra-empirical 
reservations about a theory which he recognized to have demonstrated empirical 
success. The distinction drawn in Planck's statement between two spheres in 
which support may be extended or withheld from a theory not only helps to 
entrench the claim made in the present treatment that scientific practice 
commonly passes separate logico-empirical and aesthetic judgements about 
theories, but also illustrates the tenacity of some scientists in mustering opposition 
on aesthetic grounds to a theory even when it has evidently won the day on 
logico-empirical grounds. 
An article of Einstein's reiterates both Planck's commendation _of quantum 
physics on empirical grounds and his over-riding reservations against it. The 
rhetorical structure of Einstein's article closely followed that of Planck's lecture: 
his praise for the wealth of empirical success demonstrated by quantum physics 
is followed abruptly by criticism of it on quite different grounds: 
Experiments on interference made with particle rays have given a brilliant proof that the wave character of phenomena of motion as 
assumed by the theory does, really, correspond to the facts. In 
addition to ~his, the theory succeeded, easily, in demonstrating the 
statistical laws of the transition of a system from one quantum 
condition to another under the action of external forces, which, from 
the standpoint of classical mecharucs, appears as a miracle. [ ... ] Even 
an understanding of the laws of radioactive decomposition, at least 
in their broad lines, was provided by the theory. 
Probably never before has a theory been evolved which has given a key to the interpretation and calculation of such a · 
heterogeneous group of phenomena as has the quantum theory. In 
72 
· Planck (1922), pp. 13-7. 
73 Ibid., p. 18. 
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spite of this, however, I believe that the theory is apt to beguile us into error on our search for a uniform basis for physics, because, in my belief, it is an incomplete representation of real things [ ... ]. The incompleteness of the representation is the outcome of the statistical nature [ ... ] of the laws.74 
Einstein's drawing the distinction between the empirical grounds which 
warranted an initial favourable appraisal of quantum physics and other grounds 
on which his overall unfavourable verdict was motivated contributes to 
establishing the reasons for his opposition as extra-empirical or - in the present 
treatment - aesthetic. His biographers concur that Einstein's misgivings at 
indeterminism were based essentially on aesthetic considerations: for him the 
harmony of the theory would be marred if, to use his own metaphor, God were 
depicted in it as casting dice.75 
The aesthetic opposition raised to quantum mechanics, and the fact that the 
theory entrenched itself in the community of physical scientists on the strength of 
its predictive attainments and despite its aesthetic features, suffice on the present 
account to consider this theory revolutionary. The conduct of members of the 
community illustrates the behaviour of the factions which on the present account 
is to be expected in time of revolution. In chapter 5 it was suggested that 
members of the conservative faction would remain wedded to the aesthetic 
canons of theory-evaluation bequeathed by the paradigm of which the period of 
domination is ending, and resist the adoption of the new and aesthetically-
innovative theory on the grounds of its violation of those canons. Members of the 
progressive faction would on the contrary not allow a commitment to past 
aesthetic canons to dissuade them from embracing the new theory and attaining 
the greater predictive power which this brings, even if this necessitated 
suspending the process of theory-assessment on aesthetic grounds. If Einstein is a 
representative member of the conservative faction which opposed quantum 
mechanics from 1927 onwards, his counterpart in the progressive faction is Bohr: 
in their celebrated series of discussions Einstein customarily attacked quantum 
mechanics on extra-empirical grounds, while Bohr - declining to attempt a point-
by-point rebuttal of Einstein's aesthetic misgivings - rested his case on the great 
and increasing empirical success of quantum mechanics.76 In time one should 
expect the metainductive construction of aesthetic canons of theory-appraisal to 
74 
75 
76 
Einstein (1936), p. 374; emphasis in the original. 
See e.g. the biography of Hoffman (1972), p. 195. 
Bohr's recollections of his discussions with Einstein on quantum mechanics are contained in his (1949). 
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yield a canon for which a theory's exhibiting indeterminism no longer counted 
against the adoption of that theory. This process has · perhaps by now been 
completed: sixty years after the formulation of the new quantum mechanics few 
physicists continue to offer resistance to its adoption on the grounds that it is 
indeterministic. 
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Chapter Eleven 
THE DEFINITION OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
1. Review of the argument 
The aim of this treatment has been to contribute some maintenance-work to that 
hierarchy of partial models of science which is topped by the rationalist image. 
The problem for the rationalist image of science which was identified at the 
outset of this work was constituted by its apparent incompatibility with two 
lower-level members of the hierarchy of currently popular partial models. The 
first of these lower-level models asserted that science's past development has been 
fractured by revolutions into periods adhering to norms of theory-formulation 
and evaluation which are peculiar to each period and not altogether shared by 
adjacent periods; the second asserted that many important acts of theory-
evaluation and choice have been the effect of scientists' applying evaluative 
criteria which paid regard to the aesthetic as opposed to the logico-empirical 
features of theories. 
The prospect was anticipated that those who with the aid of such 
hierarchies of models seek to understand the methodology and the history of 
science might abandon the rationalist image on the grounds of its incompatibility 
with attractive lower-level models like the two mentioned here, and choose a 
different model as their image of science of highest generality. In support of the 
rationalist image, the present treatment aimed to show that the adoption of at 
least particular fonn.ulations of these two lower-level models would not compel 
the abandonment of rationalist conceptions of science. 
The first step in the achievement of this aim was the construction of the 
particular formulations of the two lower-level models which would ensure this 
degree of consistency. The fact that the currently available models of scientific 
revolution are considerably more sophisticated than are current models of the 
practice of theory-evaluation on aesthetic grounds meant that the greater part of 
the foregoing treatment . had to be directed towards the construction of a model of 
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the latter phenomenon of scientific practice. As it then happened, the content of 
the model of scientific revolutions put forth in chapter 8 was very largely 
prompted by the work done earlier in the treatment on the model of aesthetic 
theory-evaluation. 
Both the lower-level models constructed here postulate the existence of a 
canon for the evaluation of scientific theories which is composed of two sets of 
criteria, distinguished from one another by the origin and the manner of the 
variability of the criteria by which they are composed. The criteria of one set have 
a metarationalistic origin: they are criteria of which the application in theory-
evaluation and choice is suggested by practical reason to be conducive to the 
attainment of the goal which the community imposes on science. Scientific 
communities typically characterize this goal in terms of increasing verisimilitude 
or observational success, or at any rate in logico-empirical terms. The choice of 
logico-empirical terms as those in which to couch a specification of the goal of 
science ensures that the methodological precepts which practical reason prescribes 
in the furtherance of its attainment will relate principally to logico-empirical 
aspects of theories; in particular, if these precepts are formulated as criteria of 
theory-choice, the features of theories to which the criteria relate will be their 
logico-empirical features. 
The manner of the origin of criteria of this set bestows on them a high 
degree of stability: barring mistakes in the application of practical reason to the 
case, the canon of logico-empirical precepts will not require revision for at least as 
long as the community leaves unaltered the formulation which it attributes to the 
goal of science. Since changes in the formulation of the goal of science do not 
appear .to have been frequent in history, the canon of logico-empirical evaluative 
criteria are possessed of considerable historical stability. 
Two interlocking reasons were adduced for the belief that it was necessary 
to supplement reference to this canon of methodological norms by allusion to a 
set of quite different criteria of theory-evaluation. The first was the observation 
that it was impossible adequately to reconstruct salient episodes in the history of 
science by reference to logico-empirical evaluative criteria alone, and hence that a 
further set of criteria were required for the completion of t:\le historian's task. The 
second set of considerations, drawn from philosophical aesthetics, suggested that 
scientific theories were susceptible to a mode of perception that could be 
considered aesthetic in having in view no utilitarian ends, instead turning upon 
its object a disinterested · gaze. This supposition gained support from the 
observation that the procedures historically followed in scientific practice appear 
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to have included the perception of the aesthetic qualities of theories and their 
evaluation on nonutilitarian grounds alongside the perception of their logico-
empirical features and their evaluation on utilitarian grounds. 
The set of aesthetic criteria of theory-assessment of which the operation 
was postulated by these considerations was held in chapter 7 to possess a 
metainductive origin, and in consequence to exhibit a degree of historical stability 
much lower than that of logico-empirical evaluative criteria. The varying degree 
of accord between the recommendations in cases of theory-choice of the two sets 
of criteria enabled two states in history of science to be envisaged: a state of 
normal science, obtained when the recommendations of the two sets maintain a 
reasonably close accord, and a state of pre-revolutionary crisis, when the joint 
application of the two sets of criteria renders theory-choice undecidable. The 
interrelations of the two sets of criteria enabled a mechanism to be proposed in 
chapter 8 for the advent and termination of scientific revolutions. 
2. The scientist's look 
From within the present work, scientific practice emerges as the joint application 
of two modes of perception and of two corresponding classes of evaluative 
criteria. The first mode of perception, which has hitherto received the lion's share 
of philosophers' attention, may be termed utilitarian, interested, or transitive. It is 
utilitarian or . interested in the sense that under this mode of attention scientific 
theories are perceived as vehicles for the attainment of certain ends or goals; it is 
a mode of transitive perception in the sense that the percipient's attention dwells 
on the theory in its relationship with entities external to it. Under this mode of 
perception theories a!e appraised as the vehicles for the attainment of the goal of 
science, the eventual formulation of the complete, empirically adequate or true 
explanatory account of the universe; they are thus perceived not as free-standing 
constructs but rather in their relationship vis-a-vis the phenomena or the data. 
The second mode of perception counterbalances the first in these respects. 
The mode of aesthetic perception is nonutilitarian, disinterested, or intransitive. 
Under its operation scientific theories are not perceived and appraised as vehicles 
for the attainment of goals external to them: this mode of perception rather 
regards theories with an attention which is absolute or detached from 
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considerations of ends. When a theory is evaluated by a percipient in this mode 
of attention, it is evaluated for its possession of aesthetic features. To the extent 
that under this mode scientific theories are perceived as self-sufficient constructs 
and not in their relationship with the data, this mode of perception is intransitive. 
The present treatment thus attributes to the scientist recourse to both the 
mode of utilitarian perception which is informed by criteria of logico-empirical 
evaluation, and the mode of disinterested perception which is informed by criteria 
of aesthetic assessment. The scientific look, the gaze which scientists turn upon 
the products of their activity, is composed of both these elements. 
The suggestion that scientists apply to theories both modes of perception 
gains support from various sources. It finds backing in historiography, to the 
extent to which reconstructions of instances of theory-choice which refer to 
scientists' perception of their theories as both vehicles of utility to be assessed 
with an end in view and intellectual constructs to be judged on disinterested or 
aesthetic criteria exhibit a degree of historiographic fidelity greater than that of 
reconstructions which refuse to acknowledge scientists' application of a mode of 
attention other than the utilitarian and of categories of evaluation other than 
logico-empirical. It gains support too from the methodological pronouncements of 
scientists, who explicitly regard themselves as turning upon scientific theories 
both an interested gaze which hopes to discern in them empirical virtues, and a 
disinterested look which searches for purely perceptual or aesthetic quality. 
3. The adherence to rationalist precepts 
The present treatment undertook to demonstrate the consistency of the rationalist 
image of science with the two lower-level models which had at the outset 
appeared to conflict with the broad claims of the top-level model. Chapter 8 
showed how both the occurrence of revolutionary discontinuities in scientific 
progress and the practice of theory-evaluation on aesthetic grounds could be 
reconciled with tenets of the rationalist image. 
The achievement of mutual consistency between a set of models such as 
these is however apt to perturb or alter the character of each · of them. For 
instance, the model of scientific revolutions which is embraced here is an 
adaptation of that of Kuhn, which is among all previously-existing models of 
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scientific practice the one to which the present treatment most directly reacts. But 
the effect of bringing the three models into consistency has been to alter not only 
the character of the two lower-level models but also that of their top-level 
counterpart. The rationalist image of science which emerges from the present 
treatment possesses features not shared by its formulations at the hands of 
previous authors. 
Scientific rationality finds its bedrock in an application of practical reason, 
an inference from ends to means. Science is, and is universally perceived by 
scientific communities to be, a goal-directed enterprise. Rationalist accounts of 
science have tended to posit that its goal is the formulation of empirically 
adequate accounts of natural phenomena. A central component of science's 
methodological canon is drawn up by considering what policies will best achieve 
this aim. The application of practical reason suggests that the aim will best be 
attained by acting in accordance with a set of criteria which prescribe that, under 
conditions of equality, those theories should be preferred which exhibit certain 
logico-empirical qualities. In the context created by the prescriptive assumptions 
of science, to act rationally is to act in accordance with these criteria. 
If the members of a scientific community successfully resolved that they 
would allow their actions to be determined only by their canon of logico-
empirical precepts, and there existed no other set of precepts which could 
encourage departures from the behaviour recommended by the logico-empirical 
canon, then presumably the sole lapses from rational behaviour in science would 
be due to misinterpretations or misapplications of the logico-empirical criteria of 
theory-evaluation. But communities are clearly unable to ensure that no precepts 
which might conflict with their logico-empirical criteria of theory-choice will take 
a hand in determining their behaviour. Consequently, departures from rational 
behaviour as this is defined by the prescriptive assumptions of science are more 
frequent and also more susceptible to reasoned defence than one might otherwise 
expect, since they may be prompted and justified by the sets of precepts separate 
from the logico-empirical criteria of theory-choice to which the behaviour of 
communities may be responsive. 
The present treatment has contended that, even if . one leaves aside the 
multitude of other sets of precepts - of varying degrees of externality - to which 
scientific communities may be subject, there exists one set of methodological 
precepts to which acts of theory-evaluation and choice on very many occasions in 
the history of science adhere. This is of course the canon of aesthetic criteria of 
theory-evaluation. Here · is therefore a codification which may systematically 
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encourage departures from the adherence to logico-empirical precepts, and thus 
from rational behaviour as this is defined by the prescriptive assumptions of 
science. 
In periods of so-called normal science, the logico-empirical and the 
aesthetic canons of theory-evaluation will remain according to the present 
treatment in close agreement. The choices among theories which the community 
in that phase of history takes, and which will be decided upon by the joint 
application of both their canons of evaluative criteria, will not differ greatly from 
the choices which the community would have taken on the guidance of their 
logico-empirical criteria alone. Thus in periods of normal science the conduct of a 
community accords closely with the ideal of the rational behaviour as this would 
be determined by the imposition of the logico-empirical methodological precepts. 
At the approach of a revolutionary crisis, on the other hand, the 
recommendations for theory-choice put forth by the community's aesthetic canon 
will diverge increasingly from those simultaneously advanced by their logico-
empirical criteria. Some of the choices among theories which the community takes 
in this phase will be swayed by the aesthetic canon to which it pays allegiance, 
and will thus depart from the choices which the community would have taken in 
the absence of its aesthetic canon and under the guidance of the logico-empirical 
criteria alone. In such circumstances the community's acts will be said to deviate 
from the optimally rational behaviour, as this is defined by the prescriptive 
assumptions of science and consequently by the application of the logico-
empirical criteria of theory-choice. 
In times of pre-revolutionary crisis, therefore, aesthetic criteria of theory-
assessment amount to an influence which perturbs the community's practice of 
theory-choice, causing it to deviate from the rational sequence of choices. 
According to the present model, of course, the deviation from rationality in 
scientific practice is not allowed to persist indefinitely: in a pre-revolutionary 
period those members of the community whose choices are taken on aesthetic 
grounds are thereby led to embrace theories which are empirically less successful 
than are the theories adopted by those whose choices are grounded on logico-
empirical grounds. As chapter 8 illustrated, the empirical inferiority of the choices 
taken on aesthetic grounds will grow increasingly manifest until all members of 
the community agree that the constraints on theory-choice imposed by the 
aesthetic evaluative canon ought to be relaxed. By this decision, the community's 
practice of theory-choice will be returned to full rationality as this is defined by 
the application of logico-empirical considerations; this state will persist into the 
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next period of normal science, until the aesthetic canon of theory-assessment 
which the community constructs again enters into conflict with the 
recommendations of logico-empirical criteria. 
4. The memory of science 
The difference between the two canons of criteria of theory-evaluation of which 
the use by scientists is invoked by the present treatment may be summarized in 
the following way: whereas logico-empirical criteria are of a priori formulation 
and express what scientific communities hold to be unvarying or at least very 
slowly varying requirements of theories, aesthetic criteria are formulated on 
metainductive considerations. As chapter 7 argued, a community assembles its 
aesthetic canon at a certain date from among the aesthetic features of all past 
theories by attributing to each feature a degree of favour proportional to the 
degree of empirical success scored to that date by the set of theories which have 
appeared to embody it: the community's aesthetic canon is then composed of the 
set of mutually consistent such features which have gained the greatest favour. 
Clearly, a crucial step in the construction of an aesthetic canon of theory-
evaluation is the formulation of a judgement about the past. In order to assemble 
a canon of aesthetic criteria for theory-assessment, the eye of the scientific 
community must range over the historical record, sort by their aesthetic features 
the theories which the community has at some past time embraced, and attribute 
to each such feature a degree of favour proportional to the perceived empirical 
success of the set of theories which have exhibited that feature. Scientific 
communities thus have to discharge the historiographic task of isolating and 
evaluating the theories_ which they have in the past embraced. 
As the present treatment has made plain, the application of the canon of 
aesthetic criteria which is constructed by these means is a important component 
of the community's scientific practice. The fact that this , canon is formulated 
partly on the basis of historiographic judgements entails that the norms of 
scientific practice are constructed in part on historiographic grounds. In other 
words, scientists appear to derive their practice partly from a view of the history 
of science and a notion of which instances in that history have been 
methodologically most notable. Scientific judgement thus comes to be determined 
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in part by historical judgement: historiography may be seen as a contributor to 
the construction of scientific methodology. The scientific community retains a 
historiographic 'memory' of instances of theory-choice and on their basis 
constructs the canon of practice which is to guide it further. 
This view attributes . to the scientist important historiographic interests. It 
predicts that practising scientists will find the history of their discipline a 
necessary subject of study. Their stake in the study will differ from that of the 
professional historian. While the aim of the historian in retracing science's past 
will be to understand the development of science or perhaps of wider culture for 
its own sake, the aim underlying the scientist's approach to the history of his or 
her discipline will be to acquire the data necessary to the construction of the 
inductive component of his or her methodological canon. 
Naturally much of the historiographic investigations and judgements of 
practising scientists will remain unwritten or implicit: after all, they are judged by 
the eventual outcome in science of their contributions and not, as are the 
historians, by their strictly historiographic writings.1 Nonetheless, there is much 
evidence that scientists turn to history for guidance on precepts of method or for 
didactically valuable instances of scientific judgement. Such evidence tends to 
support the contention of the present treatment that data from the history of 
science plays an important role in the construction of scientific method, and that 
scientists themselves show both awareness of this use and alacrity in exploiting it. 
Examples of the scientist turning historiographer in the expectation that 
history will offer methodological guidance in his or her present researches 
abound. Newton and many eighteenth-century scientists thought it appropriate to 
preface scientific works with historical notes locating their own research in a story 
of natural-philosophical inquiry stretching back many years.2 
This view attaches to the history of science an importance much greater 
than even that which it receives from some of its most dedicated recent partisans. 
Kuhn stated that the llistory of science could serve a role in the understanding of 
2 
The reluctance of the practising scientist to commit to print his or her historiographic judgements has moreover naturally increased with the creation and increasing formalization of a professional discipline of history of science. 
For evidence of Newton's historiographic interests see his Scholia classica the text of 
which is reproduced with commentary in Casini (1984); for further study of Newton's general interest in historiography see Manuel (1%3). Galluzzi (1988) has 
charted the extensive historical comments into which French scientists of the 
eighteenth century set their new contributions. In general on the role of scientists' historiographic remarks in their construction of scientific methodology see Kragh (1987), pp. 1-19, 112-9. 
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scientific methodology:3 from the findings presented here, it emerges that the 
history of science contributes essentially not only to the understanding of 
scientific methodology but to its very construction. 
3 Kuhn (1962), p. 1. 
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